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Abstract
The relationship that is widely presumed to hold between physical theories and
their successors, in which the successors in some sense explain the success of the the-
ories they replace, is known commonly as ’reduction.’ I argue that one traditional ap-
proach to theory reduction in physics, founded on the notion that a superseded theory
should simply be a mathematical limit of the theory that supersedes it, is misleading
as a general picture of the relationship whereby one theory encompasses the domain
of empirical validity of another. I defend an alternative account that builds upon a
certain general type of relationship between dynamical systems models describing the
same physical system, further suggesting how this relationship can be generalized in
its core features to cases where neither model is a dynamical system. I demonstrate
how this particular relationship resembles the methodological prescriptions set out by
Ernest Nagel’s more general approach to reduction across the sciences.
After clarifying these points of general methodology, I go on to apply this approach
to a number of particular inter-theory reductions in physics involving quantum theory.
I consider three reductions: first, connecting classical mechanics and non-relativistic
quantum mechanics; second, connecting classical electrodynamics and quantum elec-
trodynamics; and third, connecting non-relativistic quantum mechanics and quantum
electrodynamics. In all cases, a certain core set of mechanisms, employing decoherence
together with variations of Ehrenfest’s Theorem, serves to underwrite the occurrence
of approximately classical behavior. For concreteness, I consider two particular realist
interpretations of quantum theory - the Everett and Bohm theories - as potential bases
for these reductions. However, many of the technical results concerning these reduc-
tions pertain also more generally to the bare, uninterpreted formalism of quantum
theory.
Chapter 1
The Methodology of Theory
Reduction in Physics
The progress of physics since the era of Kepler and Newton suggests that new
fundamental theories should be required to bear a special relationship to their
predecessors called ‘reduction,’ which is supposed to ensure that newer theories
encompass all of the genuine successes of their predecessors. The relationships
between special relativity and Newtonian mechanics and between statistical me-
chanics and thermodynamics are often taken as paradigmatic examples of theory
reduction in physics. However, this relationship is also usually taken to hold be-
tween general relativity and special relativity, between general relativity and the
theory of Newtonian gravitation, between quantum theories and classical the-
ories, between relativistic and non-relativistic quantum theories, and between
quantum field theories and quantum mechanics. However, the possibility of re-
ductions involving quantum theory continue to be somewhat more controversial
because of the measurement problem and widespread disagreement about the
possible nature of wave function collapse.
Broadly, the goal of this thesis is to elaborate a philosophical picture of re-
duction that I develop in general terms in this chapter, and then to use this
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picture to clarify how certain instances of reduction involving quantum theory
come about. The approach of this thesis will be to take as potential bases for
these reductions two competing versions of quantum theory which offer unam-
biguous, realist accounts of measurement processes and which explain, rather
than merely postulating (as positivist and empiricist versions of the theory do),
the appearance of wave function collapse: namely, Everett’s ‘Many Worlds’
theory and Bohm’s ‘hidden variables’ theory. Because these theories share an
essential piece of mathematical structure - a wave function that always evolves
according to the Schrodinger equation - it is natural to consider these theories
in parallel. I emphasize that my primary goal is not to weigh the relative merits
of these two interpretations of quantum theory, but to consider how various re-
ductions would work differently between them. However, if one theory succeeds
with a particular reduction where the other does not, we should take this as a
basis for preferring one to the other; on the other hand, it may turn out that
both succeed in underpinning these reductions on their own terms, in which
case the position of this thesis will remain neutral with respect to the two.
My analysis of reduction throughout this thesis rests upon a broadly realist
(rather than a positivist or empiricist) view of scientific theories, as well as on
the view that physical theories and science more generally should be expected to
progress toward a state of greater unification over time, and that this progress
reflects an underlying unity in nature itself. I do not attempt to defend realism
or the unity of science as a whole, except insofar as my analyses potentially
lend greater credibility to the realist interpretations of quantum theory that I
consider by demonstrating their success at underpinning certain reductions, and
except insofar as the specific reductions that I examine serve to illustrate the
possibility of subsuming (and thereby unifying) the successes of different theories
under a single framework. Rather, I take these philosophical doctrines as the
starting point and general setting for my analysis of reduction. In my treatment
of the particular reductions that I consider, I proceed on the expectation that
such reductions can be performed (thus assuming the possibility of unification
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from the outset), addressing the question of how, exactly, to perform them by
considering what particular results must hold in order for these reductions to
go through.
1.1 Introduction: Outline and Structure of the
Thesis
First, a very brief summary of the thesis: Chapter 1 spells out the methodol-
ogy of reduction in physics - or ‘physical reduction,’ as I call it - that I employ
throughout the thesis. Chapters 2, 4 and 5 elaborate a number of particular
reductions according to this methodology, while Chapter 3 provides an intro-
duction to prerequisites of quantum field theory needed for Chapters 4 and 5.
Chapter 6 considers how the account of physical reduction developed in the
present chapter serves to resolve certain difficulties with another closely related
account of reduction.
To be more specific, the present chapter, Chapter 1, is devoted to setting
out the methodology for physical reduction that I apply to particular reduc-
tions in later chapters, and to placing this methodology within the context of
existing accounts of reduction in science. In it, I make three central arguments
concerning the methodology of physical reduction (which I label in boldface for
the sake of emphasis).
1. Limits and Their Limitations: First, the conventional notion that
superseded theories in physics are, generally speaking, limiting cases of
the theories that supersede them, is simplistic. In fact, this notion of
reduction fails to characterise many of the inter-theory relations that it is
most often purported to characterise.
2. Dynamical Systems Reduction: Within a realist, semantic view of
physical theories (where the semantic view identifies a theory with the
collection of its models), a more appropriate characterisation of the re-
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duction relation in physics can be given in cases where the models of the
theories concerned can be given in terms of some dynamical map on some
state space. This approach to reduction, which I call the dynamical sys-
tems approach, is built around an insight extracted from reductions in
statistical mechanics but that I argue can be extended more generally to
reduction in physics as a whole; in the philosophical literature, it has been
discussed independently in publications by Marco Giunti, Jeremy But-
terfield and Jeffrey Yoshimi and was introduced to me in different forms
by David Wallace and David Albert, who as far as I know also came to
it independently in the context of research into the foundations of sta-
tistical mechanics. By comparison with the more popular Nagelian and
limit-based approaches, this way of approaching reduction in physics has
received relatively little attention in the literature on reduction; however,
I argue here that it is central to an accurate, general account of theory
reduction in physics. Moreover, I argue that dynamical systems reduc-
tion exhibits a number of important parallels with Ernest Nagel’s classic
account of theory reduction - or rather, with a particular refinement of
Nagel’s account - but also exhibits a number of disanalogies with Nagel’s
approach as well.
3. Template-Based Reduction: I argue that the project of effecting a
reduction between two theories within the dynamical systems framework
is most perspicuously approached through the use of what I call ‘reduction
templates,’ which, briefly, are incomplete proofs of reduction. In reducing
the theoretical description of a particular system provided by a high level
theory to the theoretical description of that same system provided by a
lower level theory, the generality of the reduction - that is, the range of
systems within the domain of the higher level theory to which the reduc-
tion applies - runs inversely to the degree of completeness of the proof.
Complete proofs of reduction often require reference to the specific details
governing the system in question, while an understanding of the general
4
mechanisms that apply across a wide range of systems may require abstrac-
tion away from system-specific details. Through the use of templates, the
process of reduction can be compartmentalised into those components of
the reduction which apply across of wide range of instances of the super-
seded theory’s success, and those which are more specialised to particular
systems or sets of systems. For a clear sense both of the general mech-
anisms that underpin the reduction, as well as the more system-specific
details that are required to make the reduction complete, I claim that one
should provide multiple templates: first, at a high level of generality and
possibly a low level of completeness, and then successively customising
the template to progressively narrower specifications and smaller sets of
systems, thereby filling the gaps in the more general templates.
In addition to the general claims about reduction that I make in Chapter 1,
in Chapters 2,4, and 5 I apply a dynamical sytems, template-based approach
to a number of particular reductions: 1) in Chapter 2, the reduction between
classical Newtonian mechanics (NM) and quantum mechanics (QM) 1, 2) in
Chapter 4, the reduction between quantum mechanics (QM) and relativistic
quantum electrodynamics (QED) 3) in Chapter 5, the reduction between clas-
sical electrodynamics (CED) and relativistic quantum electrodynamics (QED).
In providing the templates for these reductions, I endeavour to make clear
which results remain in need of proof, either because of the need to consider
systems at a level of detail that goes beneath the level of generality that I seek
to achieve in my analysis, or because of a technical conjecture which, though
plausible, I have left unproven. In developing these templates, my approach is,
in some respects, to work backward from the result to be proven, assuming that
the reduction can be performed, and to consider what results need to hold for
the reduction to be effected in the manner I have suggested.
Given the realist background of this project, the quantum theories involved
1Note that I use ‘classical’ here to describe theories which are non-quantum, and ‘Newto-
nian’ to describe theories which are non-quantum and nonrelativistic.
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in the reductions I consider - QM and QED - must be given realist interpreta-
tions, which, in contrast to operationalist or positivist interpretations, associate
a relatively concrete metaphysical picture to the theory. I adopt as bases for my
analysis the Everett and Bohm versions of these theories, which both possess
the property, essential to my analysis, that they are non-collapse interpreta-
tions of quantum theory. For reasons that I elaborate in Chapter 2, this fact
makes it especially natural and convenient to consider the Everett and Bohm
interpretations in parallel.
Where the Bohm theory is concerned, I employ Bohm’s original formulation
of the nonrelativistic quantum mechanics of a spinless particle, and Bell’s for-
mulation of the nonrelativistic quantum mechanics of a spin-1/2 particle [13],
[9]. In the case of QED, I consider Struyve and Westman’s minimalist model
[99]. Where the Everett theory is concerned, I hope that the discussion will be
of interest even to readers skeptical of Everett’s theory, or of realist interpre-
tations of quantum theory more generally; the technical discussions pertaining
to Everett’s theory apply equally well to the bare, uninterpreted formalism of
quantum mechanics without collapse (for a defense of the view that Everett’s
theory simply is a reification of the bare QM formalism without collapse, see
Wallace’s [110]). Insofar as any interpretation of quantum theory is likely to
‘piggyback’ on the empirical success of the bare formalism - as all the leading re-
alist interpretations do - results pertaining to the bare formalism, whether with
regard to reduction or other considerations, are likely to have strong relevance
to any realist interpretation of quantum theory. For this reason, the results
concerning particular reductions that I present in chapters 2, 4 and 5 carry a
significance that is interpretation-neutral.
In non-collapse interpretations of quantum theory, the phenomenon of deco-
herence is responsible for effective wave function collapse. However, as I explain
in chapter 2, the particular decoherence condition that ensures effective col-
lapse in Everettian theories does not suffice to ensure effective collapse in their
Bohmian counterparts. In Bohmian theories, the requirement for effective col-
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lapse, namely that branches of the quantum state be disjoint with respect to
the configuration space of the additional variables, or ‘beables,’ as John Bell
called them (to contrast them with ‘observables’), amounts to a special kind of
decoherence condition whose mathematical specification depends on the choice
of beable. With regard to the reduction of classical theories to Bohmian quan-
tum theories, I argue that the vanishing of the ‘quantum potential,’ which is
often cited as a sufficient condition for classical behaviour, is in some important
respects a red herring with regard to the explanation of classical behavior within
any Bohmian theory. I demonstrate that an approach which first considers the
detailed structure of the wave function resulting from decoherence, and only
then the determines effect of the wave function on the Bohmian configuration,
is more transparent and better reflects the nature of realistic classical systems.
In the reductions relating to quantum field theory that I consider in Chap-
ters 4 and 5, the Schrodinger picture of quantum field theory proves to be an
extremely useful tool for analysing the nonrelativistic and classical domains of
QED. I provide a detailed review of the Schrodinger picture of quantum field
theory, as well as of Bohmian QFT, before presenting a template-based dynam-
ical systems analysis of the classical and nonrelativistic domains of QED.
In chapter 6, I consider how a dynamical systems approach to reduction,
despite its deep parallels with Nagelian reduction, addresses some of the ma-
jor concerns about Nagelian reduction, at least within the context of physical
reductions.
1.2 Two Views of Physical Reduction
In [76], Nickles observes that the term ‘reduction’ is typically used in opposite
senses in the philosophy and physics literatures. Given a high-level (i.e. less
encompassing, less fundamental) theory Th and a low-level (i.e., more encom-
passing, more fundamental) theory Tl , the physics literature typically speaks
of Tl reducing to Th, while the philosophical literature speaks of Th reducing
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to Tl. This is, to some extent, a matter of convention. The physicist’s sense
of reduction calls to mind uses of ‘reduction’ that designate simplification, as
when a complex fraction is reduced to a simpler one in arithmetic, while the
philosopher’s sense calls to mind uses of ‘reduction’ that signify some sort of
subsumption or inclusion into a broader framework, as in ‘the reduction of
chemistry to physics,’ or the ‘reduction of mathematics to logic.’ Both senses
are true to different uses of the word. In this thesis, I have chosen to employ
the philosopher’s sense of the term.
Thomas Nickles is often credited with being the first to underscore the dis-
tinction between reduction in the philosopher’s sense and reduction in the physi-
cist’s sense [76]. Yet the distinction, as Nickles draws it, is not solely a matter
of convention as to whether the high level theory is said to reduce to the low
level theory or the low level theory to reduce to the high level theory. Once
the conventions are made to agree, there remains a substantive difference be-
tween the meaning of the term ‘reduction’ as it is most often employed in the
physics literature and the meaning of the term as it is most often employed in
the philosophy literature. The philosopher’s notion is based on an account of
reduction given by Ernest Nagel while the physicist’s views reduction essentially
as a matter of taking mathematical limits [75] 2.
Having reversed the physicist’s convention to agree with the philosopher’s,
these two notions of reduction as Nickles defines them, and which he designates
reduction1 for the philosopher’s sense and reduction2 for the physicist’s sense,
can be defined as follows:
Reduction1: (Nagelian Reduction) Th reduces1 to Tl if the laws of Th
can be derived from those of Tl, possibly along with some auxiliary
assumptions, either exactly or (more often) as approximations, in
2Of course, one may question whether it is entirely appropriate or fair to identify one
sense of reduction as the physicist’s and the other as the philosopher’s. There are, after
all, instances of physicists employing what is effectively reduction in the philosopher’s sense
(arguably, textbook proofs of the Ideal Gas Law on the basis of statistical mechanics are
examples of this [62]) and of philosophers employing reduction in the physicist’s sense (see,
for instance, [6]).
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all cases in which Th is approximately accurate.
Reduction2: (Limit-Based Reduction) Th reduces2 to Tl if there ex-
ists some set of parameters {ǫi} defined within Tl such that lim{ǫi→0} Tl =
Th. [76],[7]
3 4
Both of these definitions of reduction as they stand are still quite vague. In
Nagelian reduction, what does it mean to ‘derive’ the laws of one theory from
those of another, given that many of the theories listed above have radically
different ontologies, and are often formulated in drastically different mathemat-
ical and conceptual frameworks? Concerning limit-based reduction, what does
it mean to take the limit of a theory, given that the notion of a mathematical
limit is usually defined for functions?
Moreover, one may doubt that these two concepts of reduction are wholly
mutually exclusive: for example, perhaps the limit-based notion of reduction
can be subsumed into the Nagelian one, since taking limits might be construed
as a form of deduction. However, as we will see when we discuss reduction in
the Nagelian sense in more detail, in cases where Th employs terms not used in
Tl, Nagelian reduction requires the use of additional assumptions often referred
to as ‘bridge laws’ to translate these terms into the terms of Tl. Limit-based
reduction, insofar as it constitutes a well-defined framework for reduction at all,
typically makes no mention or use of such assumptions. Thus, in such cases of
‘heterogeneous reduction,’ as Nagel calls it, there is indeed a clear distinction
to be made between the two approaches, on the basis of whether or not bridge
rules are employed.
3Note that if one has lim{ǫi→∞} Tl = Th, or lim{ǫi→a} Tl = Th where 0 < a < ∞, one
can always redefine the parameters {ǫi} so that the limit approaches 0.
4In Nickles’ original definition of reduction2, the sense of reduction is the inverse of the one
I give here, in that on Nickle’s definition the superseding theory T1 reduces2 to the superseded
theory T2, rather than vice versa as in the definition that I provide. This inversion merely
reflects an arbitrary choice of convention, and I choose the opposite convention to the one
that Nickles chooses. The reason for this is so that reduction2 and reduction1 are defined
according to the same choice of convention (that is, with the superseded theory reducing to
the superseding theory), thereby facilitating an analysis of the truly substantive differences
between these concepts of reduction.
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Finally, apart from these two notions of reduction, there are several other
approaches to reduction that have been proposed in the philosophy literature:
notably, Kim’s functional model of reduction and Hooker’s ‘New Wave’ model
[60], [52]. Both of these have been presented as alternatives to Nagelian re-
duction, primarily in the context of discussions of reduction and emergence in
philosophy of mind. Marras, however, has argued that Kim’s account is only
superficially distinct from Nagel’s [69]. Likewise, Fazekas has argued that the
main purported difference between New Wave and Nagelian reduction, that
New Wave reduction succeeds without employing bridge laws, is obviated by
the tacit, surreptitious invocation of assumptions that are effectively equivalent
to bridge laws. Given that discussions of Kim’s account are largely specialised
to philosophy of mind, it would take the analysis too far afield to see how, if at
all, his account can be translated to the context of physical reductions. Insofar
as Hooker’s account does hold some natural application to physical reduction,
Fazekas has argued, convincingly in my view, that it, too, collapses into a par-
ticular refinement of Nagelian reduction [34].
For these reasons - the fact that these other approaches to reduction have
been formulated primarily in the context of philosophy of mind, and the pos-
sibility that, when applied to physical reduction, they collapse into Nagelian
reduction - I will retain a focus on the two approaches to physical reduction
that Nickles discusses: limit-based and Nagelian. In sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2,
I suggest how these accounts can be made more precise. In section 1.2.1, I
argue that even on the most plausible clarification of the limit-based view of
reduction, this account fails to accurately characterise the general nature of the
relation between high- and low- level physical theories. In section 1.2.2, I discuss
a particular refinement of Nagelian reduction and list some of the most common
concerns with it. In section 1.3, I describe an alternative account of physical re-
duction, which I designate dynamical systems (or DS) reduction, and highlight
its similarities to Nagelian reduction; crucially, though, this approach concerns
the reduction of individual models of the high-level theory to individual models
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of the low-level theory, rather than the wholesale reduction of entire theories.
1.2.1 Limits and Their Limitations
The literature on limit-based approaches to reduction is extensive. Batterman,
Butterfield, Rohrlich, Schiebe, Redhead and Post, among others, all have ex-
plored different applications and implications of this approach [19], [6], [85], [91],
[92], [93], [83], [80] . A detailed review of the literature on this topic is beyond
the scope of this thesis, and I limit myself to considering its two most commonly
cited applications: the NM/SR reduction and the CM/QM reduction.
The physics and philosophy of physics literatures are replete with claims
that Newtonian mechanics is a ‘limiting case’ of special relativity as c → ∞,
or as 1c → 0 (abbreviated here as NM = limc→∞ SR) and that classical me-
chanics is a limiting case of quantum mechanics as ~ → 0 (abbreviated here
as CM = lim~→0QM) (see, e.g., [53], [87]). These claims entail that, as some
parameter or set of parameters {ǫi} approach zero, the theory Tl somehow ‘goes
into’ Th. However, in the case of Newtonian mechanics and special relativity,
1
c never approaches zero for any system, nor does it approach anything since c
is always a constant. In the case of classical and quantum mechanics, analo-
gous considerations apply: ~ never approaches zero for any system since it is a
constant with a definite value. Nevertheless, from a purely mathematical per-
spective it is often the case that if one does allow the values of these parameters
to vary, then one often does retrieve equations that are approximately Newto-
nian or classical in form. However, it would be obviously incorrect to say that
physical systems which behave in Newtonian fashion are those with very large
values of c and that those which behave classically are those with small values
of ~, since all systems have the same values for these quantities. For this reason,
the physical significance of results concerning the ~ → 0 and 1c → 0 limits is
obscure.
A more sophisticated formulation of reduction2, then, should explain why
results derived by taking 1c and ~ to zero should be physically significant given
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that in reality the values of these quantities are fixed. A natural answer to
this concern would be to consider the possibility that what is really meant by 1c
approaching zero or c approaching infinity is that c is very large in comparison to
a certain relevant, variable set of velocities characterizing the system in question,
and that what is really meant by ~ approaching zero is that ~ is very small in
comparison to some relevant measure of action (the units of ~) Scl characterizing
the system. On this formulation of reduction2, the appropriate limit to take in
the NM-SR case is the limit as some dimensionless parameter ǫ ≡ vc approaches
zero, while the appropriate limit to take in the CM-QM case is the limit as the
(again) dimensionless parameter ǫ ≡ ~Scl approaches zero.
A question that immediately presents itself about this refinement of reduction2,
in which the parameters ǫi are required to be dimensionless, is how to identify
appropriate definitions for the quantities v and Scl: for a given system, which
velocities, exactly, are relevant to the limit, and how precisely does one compute
the ‘typical action’? If one were able to identify such a set of velocities or such
a definition of the typical action of a system, it might then be possible to formu-
late derivations that extract Newtonian or classical equations from relativistic
or quantum theories, respectively, without taking 1c and ~ to zero, but rather
by taking the value of some corresponding dimensionless quantity such as ǫ ≡ vc
or ǫ ≡ ~Scl , to zero - specifically, by varying v or Scl, each of which may assume
distinct values from system to system. In this more sophisticated formulation,
Newtonian systems could conceivably be characterised as those with velocities
much smaller than c, and classical systems as those with typical actions large
in comparison with ~.
Once we have specified that the relevant parameters characterising the limit
in reduction2 should be dimensionless, we are still left with another worry,
relevant specifically to the NM/SR case. Strictly speaking, the limit of SR as
all velocities go to zero is a theory in which nothing moves, and in which there
is only one reference frame. What is really meant, then, when NM is identified
as a limiting case of SR is not that models of NM are strictly speaking the
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limits of some models of SR as the relevant velocities go to zero, but rather that
they provide some first- (or potentially higher-but-finite-) order approximation
to these models of SR. More generally, what must be meant by reduction2, if
it is to include the NM/SR case as an example, is that for systems in which
the relevant ǫi are sufficiently small, Th provides a good approximation to Tl
(whether zeroth, first, second, or higher order in the ǫi) - not necessarily, as
Nickles has suggested, that Th is a limit of Tl as ǫi → 0.
On this further refinement of reduction2, though, there remain yet other
questions about the limit-based concept of reduction. The ǫi being small are sup-
posed to be a sufficient condition for a given model of Tl’s being approximated
by some model of Th; is this also a necessary condition? Purported instances of
reduction2, particularly the NM/SR and CM/QM cases, seem to suggest that it
may also be necessary; however, to lend the definition of reduction2 the great-
est potential viability, I will refrain from encumbering it with this additional
constraint, and assume that reduction2 takes it only as a sufficient condition
that the ǫi be small.
A final worry about reduction2, as specified thus far, pertains to cases where
Th and Tl are formulated within radically different mathematical and conceptual
frameworks, such as the CM/QM reduction. In these cases, taking the relevant
ǫi to be small may not be sufficient to establish any uniquely obvious corre-
spondence between models of the two theories, as the mathematical concepts
involved in the two models still will be radically different even after taking the
limit. That is, beyond taking ǫi to be small, some clear correspondence between
the frameworks of the two theories is typically still needed for the reduction
to be effected, as will become apparent when we further consider the CM/QM
case.
Putting this last worry aside, a less ambiguous and more refined version of
reduction2 might be formulated as follows:
Reduction2(refined): Th reduces2 to Tl if there exists some set of
dimensionless parameters {ǫi} defined within Tl such that when {ǫi}
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are sufficiently small, Th approximates Tl.
Without some clear correspondence between the concepts populating the math-
ematical frameworks of the two theories, it may not be possible to decide in
general whether a given model of Tl is approximated by some model of Th. As
we will see, in the case of NM/SR, the correspondence between the variables in
the two theories presents itself fairly immediately: position in SR corresponds to
position in NM, time in SR (within a narrow range of inertial reference frames)
corresponds to time in NM, etc.. In the case of CM/QM, this is less the case.
Nevertheless, when I refer to reduction2 below, the reader should understand it
in terms of the refined version I have elaborated here.
What theories might satisfy this updated construal of reduction2? I ar-
gue below that neither the NM-SR reduction nor the CM-QM reduction does.
(Throughout, I employ the term classical to mean non-quantum, and Newtonian
to mean non-quantum and non-relativistic; so, relativistic systems may be clas-
sical, but not Newtonian.) As I argue shortly, in the relativistic case there does
not appear to be any set of velocities such that whenever c is large in comparison
to these, Newtonian behavior is always approximately retrieved. Similarly, in
the quantum mechanical case there does not appear to be any precise definition
of the typical action of a system such that whenever ~ is small in comparison to
it, this suffices to ensure classical behavior of the system in question (a claim I
defend below as well as in Chapter 2 when I consider the emergence of classical
behavior within the Everettian and Bohmian formulations of quantum theory).
Moreover, in the CM-QM case, there are quantum systems such as spin-1/2
particles or (near-) plane waves, which simply do not yield any counterpart in
the classical theory in this limit (since taking ~Scl to be small does not destroy
interference or superposition effects). The notion that every model of a quan-
tum system has a ‘classical limit,’ in the sense that it approximates some model
of classical mechanics, is incorrect.
To take an example other than the NM/SR and CM/QM cases, classical
optics is often said to be the limit of wave optics as λd → 0, where λ is the
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wavelength of light and d the typical dimensions of the object on which it is
impinging. Yet, applying the refined version of reduction2 described above,
one can identify systems in wave optics which, as one takes λd progressively
smaller, do not return any system in the less encompassing theory of geometric
optics. For example, a system of standing waves in a metallic cavity does not
produce the ray-like behavior of waves in geometric optics, since standing waves,
which are essentially wave-like and do not propagate in any single direction,
will continue to occupy the cavity even as one shortens their wavelength (while
maintaining the relationship between the wavelength and the relevant cavity
dimension necessary to sustain a standing wave). From this example and the
two discussed below, it follows that one cannot generally expect a given system
in a low level theory to give rise to a system contained within the high level
theory in the manner prescribed by reduction2.
Problems with Reduction2 in the NM/SR Case
I’ll begin by considering the possibility of a type-2 reduction in the case of
the reduction of Newtonian mechanics to special relativity. With regard to the
choice of dimensionless parameters characterising the reduction, it is possible to
interpret v in at least two different ways: we may interpret v as the velocity of
a body as measured from a given frame, or we may interpret it as the relative
speed of two frames of reference used to describe the motion of the same system.
One account of the connection between relativistic and Newtonian mechanics
that adopts the latter interpretation is [53], in which Wigner and Inonu demon-
strate that the group of transformations relating inertial reference frames in
Newton’s theory, the Galilean group, is a ‘contraction’ of the group of transfor-
mations relating inertial frames in special relativity, the Lorentz group - where
a group is a contraction of another group, roughly, if it is a limit of the other
group as some parameter ǫ is taken to zero. They do so by taking ǫ = 1c and
c→∞.
While from a mathematical point of view Wigner and Inonu’s results are
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unassailable, as an account of reduction between Newtonian and special rela-
tivistic theories they certainly do not suffice.The variable c is constant, so the
“counterfactual” limit c→∞ is not physically realistic. Strictly speaking, it is
the variable cv where v is the relative speed of the two frames, and not c itself,
which must be taken to ∞ (or, rather, very large). Such a limit amounts to
the physical requirement the relative velocities of the two frames be small in
comparison to c.
However, reinterpreted as the claim that the Galilean group approximates
the Lorentz group for small vc , Wigner and Inonu’s result still does not suffice to
demonstrate the claim stated in the refined definition of reduction2, namely that
the NM and SR agree to arbitrary precision when v/c is sufficiently small. When
v
c is small, the Lorentz transformation equations do not converge uniformly to
the Galilean transformation equations: the Lorentz transformation equation for
the time coordinate contains a residual dependence on the x coordinate, even
when vc is taken to be small: t
′ ≈ t− vc2x, so that for arbtirarily small vc , there will
be an x such that the difference between the time coordinates of the two frames
at x - a relativistic effect - can be made arbitrarily large. This x-dependence of
the time coordinate can only be eliminated if one additionally insists that x is
such that
v
c2
x
t << 1. If one does not impose this additional constraint, then for
small but non-zero v, say 5 miles per hour, there will continue to be significant
difference in standards of simultaneity between the two frames for sufficiently
large x.
But even if one imposes this additional restriction on x, while the Galiliean
transformations are guaranteed to agree with Lorentz transformations to arbi-
trary precision, the pair of restrictions vc << 1,
v
c2
x
t << 1 places no limit on
the speeds of bodies measured from these two frames (as distinguished from the
relative speed of the two frames). The fact that these bodies cannot travel faster
than light with respect to either frame, or the that internal energy contributes
to inertia, for example, is a non-Newtonian effect, one that may obtain even in
the presence of the condition v/c << 1, since this is a condition on the relative
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velocities of the frames and not on the motions of bodies measured from these
frames. In order to surmount this difficulty one must impose the additional
restriction that v
′
c << 1, where v
′ is the upper bound on the speeds of bodies
in the system, measured from either frame.
Yet even if one imposes this third condition, one is still confronted with cases
in which relativistic, non-Newtonian effects arise. For example, in a conducting
wire, electrons move relatively slowly, at a drift velocity of fractions of a meter
per second. If one has two wires, then from the drift frame of the electrons in one
of the wires, there is a disparity between positive and negative charge densities
in the other wire caused by relativistic length contraction, since the positive
and negative charges in the other wire are moving at different speeds. Thus,
from the point of view of this test charge, there is an electrostatic force from
the other wire that either attracts or repels it depending on the direction of the
current. While for any single electron this relativistic effect is miniscule since its
velocity is so small, for 1023 electrons, it is perfectly detectable [81]. Thus, even
given the above constraints, miniscule relativistic effects can become detectable
if they are compounded over many degrees of freedom. What constraint ought
one to impose in order to preclude non-Newtonian effects like these? One could
try to limit the number of particles in the system, but the advisability of doing
so seems doubtful, especially since most of the reliably non-relativistic classical
systems we know of contain large numbers of particles.
To be sure, the attraction of the wires can be modelled nonrelativistically as
a magnetostatic effect from the original reference frame in which the wires are
stationary. However, given that the Principle of Relativity applies in Newtonian
mechanics as in Special Relativity, it is equally legitimate to describe the system
from the frame of the moving electrons, and to regard the force as electrostatic.
The presence of an electrostatic force in the electron frame as compared with the
absence of any such force in the rest frame of the wires is undeniably a relativistic
effect, since the use of Galiliean as opposed to Lorentz transformations between
the frames would require the electrostatic force to be zero in the electron frame
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if it is zero in the wire frame, which is not the case.
Problems with Reduction2 in the CM/QM Case
Like the NM/SR reduction, the CM/QM reduction is frequently cited as a case
of reduction2 - that is, CM is frequently characterised as a ‘limiting case’ of
QM. I have already argued that naive formulations of reduction2, which do
not require that relevant parameters be dimensionless, fail to characterise any
inter-theory relations for the simple reason that constants of nature don’t vary.
Might the more refined formulation of reduction2 that I have proposed succeed
in characterising the CM/QM case? I have offered evidence to the effect that
this refinement does not characterise the NM/SR case, and will likewise argue
now that it fails to characterise the CM/QM case.
In the CM/QM case, reduction2, on my refinement, amounts to the claim
that models of QM for which the characteristic classical action is large in com-
parison with ~ - that is, for which ~Sc << 1 - each approximate some model of
classical mechanics. In attempting to assess the validity of this claim, a difficulty
immediately arises: without some way of knowing which elements of a classical
model are supposed to correspond to a given element of the quantum model
under consideration, how are we to determine whether the quantum model ap-
proximates some classical model? This was not a problem in the NM/SR case,
as a correspondence between the models of the two theories naturally presented
itself there: spatial positions as measured from a particular reference frame in
SR corresponded to spatial positions as measured from the some reference frame
in NM, the coordinate time and standard of simultaneity in a particular SR ref-
erence frame correspond to the measure of time and standard of simultaneity
in some model of NM. But the case of CM/QM is different. Models of CM
describe point particles moving in space under the influence of some force laws
(though these models may be given various formulations, such as those associ-
ated with the Lagrangian and Hamiltonian formalisms). Models of QM describe
the time evolution of some matrix elements either of state vectors or operators
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on a Hilbert space; position and momentum in these models are typically as-
sociated with non-commuting operators rather than c-numbers as in CM, and
even in the limit where the typical classical action of a quantum system is large,
the position and momentum operators do not become c-numbers; whatever the
value of the typical classical action, operators on Hilbert space and c-numbers
defined, say, on some phase space, are different sorts of mathematical objects,
so the behavior of one could never mimic or approximate that of the other -
it’s not clear what it would even mean for an infinite-dimensional matrix of a
position operator, consisting of a continuous infinity of numerical entries, to
approximate a classical position, which consists of only three numbers.
Given the drastically different mathematical frameworks employed in models
of CM and of QM, some correspondence must be established between the two
before the CM model can be regarded as an approximation to the QM model.
Indeed, this assertion simply reflects the need for the ‘bridging principles’ that
play such a central role in Nagelian accounts of reduction, which I describe in the
next section. One natural correspondence between the frameworks of quantum
and classical mechanics, however, does seem fairly obvious: classical position
and momentum correspond to the expectation values of the quantum mechanical
position and momentum operators, rather than to the operators themselves.
Let us take for granted this correspondence, even though reduction2 makes no
reference to the need for such bridging assumptions between the two theories.
Does reduction2 successfully account for the relationship between CM and QM
if we allow that expectation values of quantum operators correspond the values
of corresponding classical quantities? It does not, because a quantum system’s
typical classical action being large in comparison to ~ does not ensure that
expectation values, say, of position and momentum, follow the same dynamics
as their classical counterparts. Indeed, the dynamics of these expectation values
depends essentially on the choice of quantum state, and an arbitrary choice of
quantum state certainly will not yield classical evolutions for these expectation
values, even in cases where the typical classical action is large relative to ~ (say,
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as a result of the system’s mass being large). Any state that is not a narrow
wave packet state in nearly any system other than a simple harmonic oscillar,
will yield non-classical evolutions for these expectation values.
In the preceding examination of the reduction2 approach to physical reduc-
tion, I have attempted to make every reasonable allowance for this account (and
some allowances one might fairly consider unreasonable) in an effort to clarify
its methodology and to seek out instances in which it succeeds. I have shown
that in the two cases that are most often cited cited as examples of this kind of
reduction, it in fact does not apply. This, I claim, is strong enough reason for
abandoning reduction2 as a general characterisation of inter-theory relations in
physics.
Before moving on from reduction2 for good, though, it is worth noting in
connection with limit-based reduction the work of Robert Batterman on this
subject. Batterman has argued in [6] that the singular nature of the limits that
are purported to characterise certain inter-theory relations - such as the relation
between quantum and classical mechanics - precludes the reduction of the high-
level theory to the low-level theory and signals the existence of a new, emergent
(in the sense of being irreducible to the lower-level model) theory characterising
what Batterman calls the ‘asymptotic borderland’ between the theories. While
I do not attempt to address Batterman’s claims in this thesis, the view taken
here is that the asymptotic nature of the limits in question does not signal the
failure of reduction between the theories, because limit-based reduction is not
the proper way to characterise reduction in physics to begin with. Batterman’s
analysis of asymptotic relations between theories simply shows that if reduction
between physical theories is defined along the lines of reduction2, then some of
the cases that we thought were instances of reduction aren’t.
Jeremy Butterfield has also written extensively on the role of limits in theory
reduction in physics. In particular, he has argued that limits offer a way of
reconciling the categories of reduction and emergence, widely regarded in the
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philosophical literature as mutually exclusive [19]. Again, though, because I
claim that a limit-based approach does properly characterise the general nature
is not the right way of construing reduction between physical theories, these
results will not enter the rest of my analysis.
I’ve argued that the concept of inter-theory reduction in physics that takes
a high-level theory be a limiting case of a low-level theory is either too vague
to be useful or, upon further elaboration, wrong. But there is no denying that
the limit-based results that appear throughout physics are strongly suggestive
of some deep connection between the theories in question. Whatever the nature
of this connection, their physical significance lies not in providing an overar-
ching explanation of the success of the high-level theory. What the physical
significance of these limit-based results is, precisely, I leave as an open question.
1.2.2 Nagelian Reduction and its Critics
According to the account of reduction set out in Ernest Nagel’s The Structure of
Science, reductions can be broadly classified into two categories: homogeneous
and inhomogeneous. In the former, the theory to be reduced contains no terms
which are not contained in the reducing theory, while in the latter it does.
An example of a homogeneous reduction is the reduction of Kepler’s theory
of planetary motion to Newton’s Theory of Gravitation [30]. An example of a
heterogeneous reduction is the reduction of thermodynamics, which employs the
concept of temperature, to the Newtonian mechanics of microscopic particles,
which contains no reference to temperature.
Nagel’s Formal Criteria for Reduction: ‘Connectability’ and ‘Deriv-
ability’
Recognizing that ‘no term can appear in the conclusion of a formal demon-
stration unless the term also appears in the premises,’ Nagel asserts that in
the case of an inhomogeneous reduction, something beyond the low-level theory
(which Nagel calls the ‘primary science’) is necessary to perform a derivation
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of the laws of the higher-level theory (which Nagel refers to as the ‘secondary
science’). He claims that there are two formal conditions that must be satisfied
in order to effect an inhomogeneous reduction of the higher- to the lower- level
theory, criteria which Nagel designates the condition of ‘connectability’ and the
condition of ‘derivability’:
(1) Assumptions of some kind must be introduced which postulate
suitable relations between whatever is signified by ‘A’ [a term in
the secondary science] and traits represented by theoretical terms
already present in the primary science. The nature of such assump-
tions remains to be examined; but without prejudging the outcome
of further discussion, it will be convenient to refer to this condition
as the ‘condition of connectability.’ (2) With the help of these addi-
tional assumptions, all the laws of the secondary science, including
those containing the term ‘A,’ must be logically derivable from the
theoretical premises and their associated coordinating definitions in
the primary discipline. Let us call this the ‘condition of derivability.’
While Nagel takes reduction essentially to be deduction, and thus to center on
criterion (2), the condition of connectability provides the additional element
required to effect a deduction of a higher-level theory containing terms that do
not appear in the lower-level theory, in that it provides for a lexicon of sorts to
translate the terminology of the higher-level theory into that of the lower-level
theory.
The central example that Nagel employs to illustrate his model of reduction
is the reduction of the Ideal Gas Law (pV = nRT ), as understood in the con-
text of classical thermodynamics, to the laws of Newtonian mechanics, which
were assumed during the period when statistical mechanics was formulated to
govern the fundamental microscopic constituents of gases. He notes that while
the term ‘temperature’ had an accepted meaning in the context of thermo-
dynamics, given in terms of experimental measurements using thermometers
and other devices, as well as in terms of the theoretical role that it played in
thermodynamical laws, the term made no appearance in the low-level theory,
Newtonian mechanics. Pointing to the usual derivation of the Ideal Gas Law
from classical statistical mechanics that one finds in most introductory text-
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books on statistical mechanics, Nagel takes note of the strategy used to resolve
this difficulty: namely, to associate the thermodynamical term temperature with
a quantity understandable within the framework Newtonian mechanics, namely
average molecular kinetic energy. More precisely, the derivation of the Ideal
Gas Law from the assumptions of Newtonian physics postulates the relation
〈K.E.〉 = 32kT , thereby satisfying Nagel’s connectability condition and permit-
ting the derivation of the Ideal Gas Law from Newtonian physics (combined
with some assumptions about Newtonian initial conditions). The connection
between temperature and molecular kinetic energy has come to serve as the
paradigmatic example of what is sometimes referred to as a ‘bridge principle,’
‘bridge law’ or ‘bridge rule’ or ‘reduction function’ - that is, one of Nagel’s
connecting assumptions.
Nagel’s Model, Refined
Since Nagel put forward his original model of reduction, a number of modifica-
tions and refinements of this model have been proposed. There isn’t space here
to review all of them, so I will only discuss the particular modifications which
are employed in the refinement of Nagel’s views that I consider in my analysis.
Schaffner, one of the early commentators on and developers of Nagel’s work
on reduction, observed that Nagel’s account of reduction is, strictly speaking,
too stringent, since reductions in practice rarely if ever yield derivations of the
higher level theory T2 from the lower level theory Tl, but rather yield derivations
of some modified or corrected version T
′
h of Th that employs the same vocabulary
as Th; T
′
h is sometimes referred to as the ‘analogue theory’ of Th. According to
Schaffner, bridge laws can then be understood as those relations that link all
terms in T
′
h that do not appear in Tl with terms in Tl. One then derives T
′
h
from a combination of Tl and the set of bridge laws [89].
Like Schaffner, Hooker proposed a revision of Nagel’s model that accommo-
dates the fact that in practice it is often not, strictly speaking, Th that gets
derived from Tl. However, unlike Schaffner, Hooker claims that the theory that
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one does derive from Tl, which Hooker calls the ‘image theory,’ T
∗
h , of Th, should
be formulated in the vocabulary of Tl rather than that of Th. Thus, no bridge
laws are required to derive T ∗h from Tl. Once an image theory has been derived,
says Hooker, one can regard Th as having been reduced by virtue of an ‘ana-
logue relation’ that Th bears to T
∗
h [52]. While it is not clear precisely what
Hooker’s analogue relation consists in, Hooker claims that because what one
really derives in a reduction is an image theory and not the theory Th itself,
even inhomogeneous reductions do not require the use of bridge laws.
The refinement of Nagel’s account that I consider here, dubbed the General-
ized Nagel-Schaffner (GNS) model by Dizadji-Bahmani, Frigg and Hartmann in
[30], consolidates both Schaffner’s and Hooker’s 5 insights, and is based largely
on Schaffner’s Generalized-Replacement-Reduction (GRR) model 6. Specifi-
cally, the GNS model incorporates both Hooker’s image and Schaffner’s ana-
logue theories. On this model, reduction can be understood as a three-step
process, starting with the basic ingredients of a low-level theory Tl, a high-level
theory Th, and a set of bridge laws:
1. Derive the image theory T ∗h for some restricted boundary or initial condi-
tions within the low level theory Tl. This step refines Nagel’s derivability
condition; it is the image theory T ∗h , not the high-level theory Th, that is
derived from Tl on this account of reduction.
2. Use bridge laws to replace terms in T ∗h , which belong to the vocabulary of
the low level theory, with corresponding terms belonging to the high level
theory. This yields the analogue theory T ′h (as is made clear in step 3, the
sense of ‘analogue’ here is different from the sense in which Hooker uses
it, in that it refers to the relation between T ′h and Th, not between T
∗
h
and Th as in Hooker’s account). This, along with step 3, refines Nagel’s
connectability condition.
5The GNS model does not explicitly draw on Hooker’s work, although it does independently
of this work, recognise the need for what Hooker calls an image theory in the process of
reduction.
6the distinction largely being that the former does not adopt Schaffner’s view of bridge
laws (see [90])
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3. If the modified theory T ′h is ‘strongly analogous’ to the high level theory Th,
the high level theory has been reduced to Tl. The ‘strong analogy’ relation
is sometimes also characterised as approximate equality, close agreement,
or good approximation and can be understood in any of these senses.
This step contributes an additional component to Nagel’s connectability
condition.
Henceforth, when I speak of Nagelian reduction, I will construe it according to
the GNS model, unless explicitly stated otherwise. Moreover, note that Nagel’s
connectability condition on this refinement consists of two ‘connections’: first,
the bridge laws that link the image theory T ∗h and the analogue theory T
′
h, and
second, the rather vaguely defined ‘analogue relation’ that connects the analogue
theory T
′
h to the high level theory Th.
Problems for Nagelian Reduction
In [30], the authors provide a comprehensive survey of common criticisms of
Nagelian approaches to reduction. Here, I restrict my focus to a few of these,
quoting the authors directly:
• The syntactic view of theories. Nagel formulated his theory in the frame-
work of the so-called syntactic view of theories, which regards the- ories
as axiomatic systems formulated in first-order logic whose non-logical vo-
cabulary is bifurcated into observational and theoretical terms. This view
is deemed untenable for many reasons, one of them being that first-order
logic is too weak to adequately formalise theories and that the distinction
between observational and theoretical terms is unsustainable. This, so one
often hears, renders Nagelian reduction untenable.
• The content of bridge laws. There is a question about what kind of state-
ments bridge laws are. Nagel considers three options: they can be claims of
meaning equivalence, conventional stipulations, or assertions about mat-
ters of fact. The third option can be broken down further, since a state-
ment connecting two quantities could assert the identity of two properties,
the presence of a (merely) de facto correlation between them, or the exis-
tence of a nomic connection. Although the issue of the content bridge laws
is not per se an objection, it is a question that has often been discussed in
ways that gave rise to various objections, in particular in connection with
multiple realisability, to which we turn now.
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• Bridge laws and multiple realisability. The issue of multiple realisability
(MR) is omnipresent in discussions of reduction. A TP -property [in my
notation, Th-property ] is multiply realisable if it corresponds to more
than one different TF -properties [in my notation, Tl-properties ]. The
standard example of a multiply realisable property is that of pain: Pain
can be realised by different physical states, for instance in a humans and in
a dogs brain. The issue also seems to arise in SM because, as Sklar points
out (Sklar 1993, 352), temperature is multiply realisable. MR is commonly
considered to undermine reduction. ... [One] argument from MR is that,
in order to reduce TP -phenomena to TF -phenomena, TP -properties
must be shown to be nothing over and above TF -properties. That is,
it must be shown that TP -properties do not exist as something extra or
in addition to TF -properties: There is only one group of entities, TF -
properties. Showing this requires the identification of TP - properties with
TF -properties. But a multiply realisable TP -property is not identifiable
with a TF -property. This undercuts reduction.
• Strong analogy. Strong analogy is essential to GNS. This raises three
issues. The first is that the notion of strong analogy is too vague and hard
to pin down to do serious work in a reduction. It is a commonplace that
everything is similar to everything else, and hence saying that one theory
is analogous to another one is a vacuous claim.
• The Epistemology of Bridge Laws. How are bridge laws established? Nagel
points out that this is a difficult issue since we cannot test bridge laws
independently. The kinetic theory of gases can be put to test only after
we have adopted Equation 5 as a bridge law, but then we can only test
the entire package of the kinetic theory and the bridge law, while it is
impossible to subject the bridge law to independent tests. While this is
not a problem if one sees bridge laws as analytical statements or mere
conventions, it is an issue for those who see bridge laws as making factual
claims. [30]
As we will see, the alternative account of reduction that I propose, dynamical
systems, or DS, reduction, adopts certain elements of the GNS account, but
considers the reduction of individual models of a high-level theory to models of a
low-level theory, rather than the reduction of whole theories. In the concluding
chapter, I explain how DS reduction eliminates much of the vagueness and
ambiguity that lies at the root of most of these criticisms of Nagelian reduction,
and thereby addresses these concerns in the cases where it applies.
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1.3 Dynamical Systems (DS) Reduction
While Nagel and Schaffner were proponents of the (now widely repudiated) syn-
tactic view of theories, the approach adopted in this dissertation is the semantic
view. Van Fraassen, famously, has characterised the distinction between the
semantic and the syntactic views of scientific theories as follows:
The syntactic picture of a theory identifies it with a body of
theorems, stated in one particular language chosen for the expression
of that theory. This should be contrasted with the alternative of
presenting a theory in the first instance by identifying a class of
structures as its models. In this second, semantic, approach the
language used to express the theory is neither basic nor unique; the
same class of structures could well be described in radically different
ways, each with its own limitations. The models occupy centre stage.
[105]
Although there is, of course, more to the difference between the syntactic and
semantic views than this now-popular slogan communicates, the subtleties of
the distinction will not concern us as the remainder of the analysis will take
place within the semantic view, in which, as Van Fraassen puts it ‘the models
occupy centre stage.’ In section 1.4, I argue that, despite Nagel’s own disposition
toward the syntactic view, Nagelian (read: GNS) reduction applies equally well
within the semantic view, since nothing about the central requirements of GNS
reduction, apart from the reference to the reduction of theories rather than to the
reduction of models of those theories, uniquely requires a syntactic intepretation
of the theories concerned: as we will see, the concepts of image theory, bridge
rule, analogue theory and strong analogy all can be carried over into the semantic
framework, with the only major difference being that in this context the three
steps of GNS reduction involve an image model, bridge rules, an analogue model
and strong analogy. In this dissertation, the particular models that I consider
are all of a particular sort: namely, they can be formulated as dynamical systems,
a notion I define shortly. The basic elements of Nagelian reduction, as applied
to the reduction of dynamical systems models, constitute what I refer to as
‘dynamical systems reduction,’ or DS reduction, and furnish the methodological
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groundwork for the particular reductions considered in Chapters 2, 4 and 5.
The methodology elaborated here seeks both to generalise and develop an
approach that has been applied to certain reductions in statistical mechan-
ics, demonstrating how it may also be used more widely to describe relations
between theories outside of this context. In section 1.3.7, I discuss work by a
number of authors that either anticipates or paves the way for the DS approach.
1.3.1 Models of Dynamical Systems
A dynamical systems model M of a theory T consists of a state space S and
a dynamical map D on S; formally, we can write M = (S,D). In all models
that I consider, the state space S is endowed with the minimum structure of
a differentiable manifold with a norm. The dynamical map is a differentiable
function of time and of the state x in S such that for fixed t, D specifies a
bijection of S onto itself, and such that D is the identity map on S when t = 0:
D : R× S −→ S, (1.1)
D : (t, x0) 7−→ x(t), (1.2)
Dt : S −→ S, (1.3)
D : (0;x0) 7−→ x0. (1.4)
The dynamical map specifies the time evolution of points in S, so that x(t) =
D(t;x0), where x0 is the state of the system at time t = 0. The requirement
that the dynamical map at fixed time be one-to-one ensures that the dynamics
are deterministic.
For example, the model of a single massive, spinless particle in CM is given
by M = (Γ, DCM ), where Γ is the corresponding classical phase space and
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DCM
[
t; (x0, p0)
]
=
(
e{◦,H}tx
∣∣
x0,p0
, e{◦,H}tp
∣∣
x0,p0
)
, (1.5)
where e{◦,H}tf(x, p) ≡ f(x, p)+{f(x, p),H}t+ 1
2!
{{f(x, p), H},H}t2+ 1
3!
{{{f(x, p),H}, H}, H}t3+
... , and {, } denotes the Poisson bracket, defined by {f, g} ≡ ∂xf∂pg − ∂xg∂pf ,
with f and g some arbitrary differentiable functions on phase space.
The model of a single massive, spinless particle in QM is given by MQM =
(H, DQM ), where H is the Hilbert space of a single massive spinless particle and
DQM
[
t; |ψ0〉
]
= e−iHˆt|ψ0〉. (1.6)
where e−iHˆt|ψ0〉 ≡
(
Iˆ + (−iHˆt) + 12! (−iHˆt)2 + 13! (−iHˆt)3 + ...
)|ψ0〉 .
All models of the theories considered in this dissertation, including the quan-
tum theories, employ dynamical maps that are deterministic. I leave the ques-
tion as to how to extend the dynamical systems approach to indeterministic
systems for future work. The interpretations of quantum theory that I exam-
ine - the Everett and Bohm theories - both treat wave function collapse as an
effective process induced by decoherence, and the stochastic aspects of quan-
tum theory as merely apparent. The underlying dynamics in both cases is fully
deterministic.
1.3.2 Laws of Motion in DS Models
GNS reduction requires that the laws of Th be derivable, in an approximate
sense, from the laws of Tl, along with some auxiliary assumptions that include
bridge rules. In a semantic, dynamical systems context, the laws of a theory
often correspond to the dynamical maps of its models; typically, the dynamical
maps associated with the different models of a theory will all have some common
form.
Conventionally, though, the dynamical laws of a theory are not specified in
the form of dynamical maps, but equivalently in terms of differential equations.
In the case of theories whose maps are deterministic, it will be possible to model
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the system’s dynamics in terms of a first order differential equation, or some set
of first order differential equations. Starting from the solution x(t) = D(t;x0)
and differentiating both sides with respect to time, we have the first order
differential equation of motion
dx
dt
= f(x, t) (1.7)
where f(x, t) = ∂∂tD(t;x0)
∣∣
t=0,x0=x
.
For example, in the case of CM, the first order differential equations corre-
sponding to the dynamical map provided in eq. (1.5) are
dx
dt
= {x,H}
dp
dt
= {p,H},
(1.8)
which are simply Hamilton’s equations.
In the case of QM, the first order differential equation corresponding to the
dynamical map provided in eq. (1.6) is
i
∂
∂t
|ψ〉 = Hˆ|ψ〉, (1.9)
the standard form of Schrodinger’s equation.
1.3.3 Symmetries of Dynamical Systems
A function T : S → S is a dynamical symmetry of the dynamical systems model
(S,D) if it is an automorphism of S satisfying the condition
D(t;T (x0)) = T (D(t;x0)) for all x0 ∈ S for all t ∈ R. (1.10)
That is, T carries solutions of the equations of motion into other solutions of
the equations of motion. Or, equivalently, if one takes the trajectory/solution
associated with the function x(t), with x(0) = x0, then the function T (x(t)) also
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consitutes a solution to the equation of motion with initial condition T (x0).
For example, in classical Hamiltonian mechanics, consider the model of a
single particle in 3 dimensions moving in a spherically symmetric potential, so
that the Hamiltonian takes the form
H =
p2
2m
+ V (r) (1.11)
where r is the distance of the particle from some fixed origin. Then the map T
given by
T (~x, ~p) =
(
e{◦,~L·nˆθ}~x, e{◦,~L·nˆθ}~p
)
(1.12)
where ~L = ~x × ~p is the angular momentum, and which constitutes a rotation
of the position and momentum about the axis nˆ and the angle θ, is a dynam-
ical symmetry (as well as what is known in classical Hamiltonian dynamics
as a canonical transformation generated by the function ~L · nˆ). This follows
straightforwardly from the fact that for the above Hamiltonian
{Li, H} = 0 for all i, where i = x, y, z (1.13)
(see for instance, [41] Ch. 9). Other dynamical symmetries for the above Hamil-
tonian include spatial translations (which are generated by the momentum func-
tion p on phase space) and and time translations (which are generated by the
Hamiltonian H itself).
1.3.4 Reduction of Dynamical Systems
In this subsection, I set out formal criteria for DS reduction, first offering some
remarks to motivate these criteria. I also provide a somewhat simplified example
to illustrate this approach. More complicated examples are discussed in later
chapters of the thesis.
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Bridge Maps and Bridge Rules
As we will see, the appropriate DS counterpart to Nagelian bridge laws is a
differentiable, time-independent function B from the low level state space Sl
into the high level state space Sh:
B : Sl −→ Sh (1.14)
B : xl 7−→ B(xl), (1.15)
where xl ∈ Sl. The function B will typically be many-one, and satisfies certain
added conditions to be discussed below. Its mathematical domain may be the
whole of Sl or a subset of Sl, and its image the whole of Sh or a subset of Sh.
As we will see, the bridge map will serve to identify those structures in the low-
level model that approximately emulate the behavior of states in the high-level
model.
If xh ∈ Sh and xh = B(xl), denote its inverse image under the bridge map
Exh , so that
Exh ≡
{
xl ∈ Sl
∣∣B(xl) = xh}. (1.16)
Thus, the set Exh is the set of states that correspond to x
h under the bridge
map. As we will see, though, there is a dynamical constraint which further
restricts which xl physically instantiate a given xh under the bridge map.
For example, let us consider the CM and QM models of a single spinless
particle of mass m in an external potential. One possible bridge map between
SQM = H1p, the Hilbert space of a single spinless particle, and SCM = Γ1p,
the phase space of a single massive particle with no internal degrees of freedom,
is given by taking expectation values of the quantum mechanical position and
momentum operators:
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BCMQM : H1p −→ Γ1p (1.17)
BCMQM : |ψ〉 7−→
(
〈ψ|xˆ|ψ〉, 〈ψ|pˆ|ψ〉
)
(1.18)
The bridge map thus associates with each element |ψ〉 of H1p an element (x′, p′)
of Γ1p, such that (x
′, p′) =
(〈ψ|xˆ|ψ〉, 〈ψ|pˆ|ψ〉). Note that this map is many-one,
since there will be many |ψ〉 which map to the same (x′, p′). Its domain is the
whole of SQM = H1p and its image the whole of SCM = Γ1p. Furthermore, note
that
E(x′,p′) ≡
{
|ψ〉 ∈ H1p
∣∣ (〈ψ|xˆ|ψ〉, 〈ψ|pˆ|ψ〉) = (x′, p′)}. (1.19)
In other words, E(x,p) is the set of quantum states whose expectation values for
position and momentum are, respectively, (x, p).
In highlighting the parallels between the DS account and the GNS account
of reduction later on, it will be important to distinguish between the function
that carries elements of the low-level space Sl to elements of the high level space
Sh, which I call the bridge map, and the assignment of variable names to the
images under the bridge map of elements in Sl, which I call a bridge rule. For
example, the bridge map BCMQM carries |ψ〉 into (〈ψ|xˆ|ψ〉, 〈ψ|pˆ|ψ〉); the bridge
rule simply makes the assignment of the variables (x′, p′) to (〈ψ|xˆ|ψ〉, 〈ψ|pˆ|ψ〉).
At this stage, such a distinction may seem trivial, and the GNS account does
not bother to distinguish between these two steps. However, as we will see, the
distinction turns out to play an important role in distinguishing between image
and analogue models in the DS account.
Note how the bridge map and bridge rule have gone some of the way toward
satisfying Nagel’s connectability criterion (as interpreted within a semantic, dy-
namical systems approach): they associate with each xh a set of xl, thereby
providing a clear correspondence between a certain portion of the mathematical
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formalism of Th, namely Sh, and a certain portion of the mathematical formal-
ism of Tl, namely Sl. However, the full analogy between bridge maps as I have
defined them here and bridge laws as they are envisaged in the GNS account
will become apparent only once the DS account of reduction has been fully laid
out.
Induced Dynamics
Given a model Ml = (Sl, Dl) of Tl, a model Mh = (Sh, Dh) of Th, and a
bridge map B : Sl −→ Sh, the dynamical map Dl : Sl → Sl induces, through
the bridge map, a dynamics D
xl0
h (t;x
h
0 ) on Sh. Specfically, every dynamical
trajectory xl(t) = Dl(t;x
l
0) on Sl that remains in the domain of B has an image
x′h(t) = B
(
Dl(t;x
l
0)
)
in Sh. Generally, the trajectory x
′h(t) may depend on the
particular choice of initial condition xl0, not just on the image x
h
0 ≡ B(xl0) to
which xl0 maps under B.
For example, in the CM/QM case we have been considering, the dynamics
on Hilbert space induces through the bridge map/rule a dynamics on phase
space:
BCMQM
(
DQM
(
t; |ψ0〉
))
=
(
x′(t), p′(t)
)
=
(〈ψ0|eiHˆtxˆ e−iHˆt|ψ0〉, 〈ψ0|eiHˆtpˆ e−iHˆt|ψ0〉)
(1.20)
However, it is important to note that the induced trajectory on Sh is sensitive
to the choice of initial condition |ψ0〉 in the Hilbert space Sl. In this sense, the
dynamical map induced by the low-level dynamics via the bridge map does not
in general prescribe an autonomous (in sense of being determined only by high-
level states and not depending on the specific low-level states that instantiate
them) dynamics on Sh.
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Reducing Dynamics
In order for a DS reduction to take place between a model Mh = (Sh, Dh) of
Th and a model Ml = (Sl, Dl) of Tl, it is necessary that the induced dynamics
B ◦Dl on Sh approximate, in the sense of Sh’s norm, the dynamics Dh. This re-
quirement, which I denote the DSR (Dynamical Systems Reduction) condition,
can we written
B(Dl(t;x
l
0)) ≈ Dh(t;B(xl0)) (1.21)
or, more precisely,
∣∣∣∣B(Dl(t;xl0))−Dh(t;B(xl0))∣∣∣∣
h
< δ, (1.22)
for some domain d of states in Sl,where | |h designates the norm on Sh and δ is
a prescribed margin of error characterising the accuracy of the approximation.
Note that the left hand side of (1.21) corresponds to the dynamics induced on Sh
byDl through B, with initial condition x
l
0, while the right hand side corresponds
to the dynamics of Th applied to x
h
0 ≡ B(xl0), the image of xl0 under B.
The DSR condition guarantees that some element of the low level-model, pre-
scribed by some function of the low-level state determined by the bridge map
B(xl), behaves approximately in the same manner as a state in the high-level
model. As we will see shortly, the requirement for DS reduction will be formu-
lated in terms of the existence of a bridge map satisfying the DSR condition;
however, in order to avoid trivialising counterexamples, the DSR condition must
be supplemented with certain additional constraints on the bridge map B(xl).
The first of these constraints is that the bridge map not depend explicitly on
the time t. Without this constraint, the DSR condition would be trivial insofar
as it would be satisfied between any two models for which the cardinality of the
low-level model was greater than or the same as that of the high-level theory; it
is straightforward to see that one could simply absorb any differences of dynam-
ical structure into the bridge map itself. As I explain now, a further constraint,
35
pertaining to the symmetries of the two models, also must be imposed on the
bridge map.
Reducing Symmetries
Beyond time-independence of the bridge map, it is also necessary that the bridge
map be compatible with the dynamical symmetries of the high-level model in a
sense that I now elaborate. For any dynamical symmetry Th of the high-level
model and any xl0 ∈ d ⊂ Sl such that Th(B(xl0)) ∈ B(d) (where recall that d is
the domain for which the DSR condition holds approximately, and B(d) is its
image under B), there should exist some symmetry Tl of the low-level model
such that
Th(B(x
l
0)) ≈ B(Tl(xl0)). (1.23)
The rationale for imposing this condition is that it serves to ensure that not
only the trajectory Dh(t;x
h
0 ), but also its image Th(Dh(t;x
h
0 )) under the sym-
metry Th, is reduced by some solution to the low-level model - which is to
say, there exists some solution of the low-level model whose image under B ap-
proximates the transformed high-level trajectory - so long as the transformed
high-level trajectory remains in the image domain B(d). Note that if the
DSR condition is satisfied for some high-level solution, so that B(Dl(t;x
l
0)) ≈
Dh(t;B(x
l
0)), and the condition (1.23) holds, then the solution Th(Dh(t;x
′h
0 )) =
Dh(t;Th(x
′h
0 )) of the high-level dynamics also satisfies the DSR condition in the
form B(Dl(t;Tl(x
l
0))) ≈ Dh(t;B(Tl(xl0))). This can be seen as follows:
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Dh(t;B(x
l
0)) ≈ B(Dl(t;xl0)) (1.24)
Th(Dh(t;B(x
l
0)) ≈ Th(B(Dl(t;xl0))) [Apply Th to both sides] (1.25)
Dh(t;Th(B(x
l
0)) ≈ B(Tl(Dl(t;xl0))) [Use Th(Dh(t;xh0 ) = Dh(Th(xh0 )) and (1.23)]
(1.26)
Dh(t;B(Tl(x
l
0)) ≈ B(Dl(t;Tl(xl0))) [Use (1.23) and Th(Dh(t;xh0 ) = Dh(Th(xh0 ))].
(1.27)
Thus, if condition (1.23) is satisfied, then if a high-level trajectory is approxi-
mated by the image under B of some trajectory in the low-level model, it follows
the transformation of that high-level trajectory under a symmetry of the high-
level model will be approximated by the image under B of some other trajectory
in the low-level model.
However, we should only demand that the transformed trajectory Th(Dh(t;x
′h
0 ))
be approximated by the image of some trajectory in the low-level model if the
symmetry tranformation Th does not carry the trajectory - or some chosen seg-
ment of it - outside of the image domain B(d), or outside the domain of applica-
bility of the high-level model. For instance, Galilean symmetries of Newtonian
models include boosts by velocities with magnitude greater than the speed of
light; we should not insist that the high-level trajectories obtained under this
symmetry transformation be approximated by the image of some trajectory in
a given low-level model (e.g. a model of SR) for the simple reason that these
transformed trajectories are unphysical - that is, they do not describe real physi-
cal systems since they are outside the high-level model’s domain of applicability.
In our reductions, we should only insist that those parts of a high-level model
that serve to describe real physical systems be approximated by some low-level
model (though it may sometimes be the case that a low-level model does never-
theless reduce even the unphysical parts of the high-level model, as is the case
between nonrelativistic CM and nonrelativistic QM, which both incorporate
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Galilean boosts of arbitrarily high velocity).
I assume here that, for some sufficiently constrained class C of physical
systems, the domain of applicability of Mh to C is circumscribed by the image
B(d) of Mh’s domain d in Ml, where Ml is a low-level model that also serves to
describe C. As discussed in the Introduction, I presume throughout this thesis
a convergence of successive models to the truth, proceeding on the expectation
that lower-level models will indeed turn out to represent a strictly more accurate
approximation to reality - i.e. to the class C of physical systems in question -
than do their high-level counterparts and that, as a consequence, the domain
of applicability of some Mh to some C is circumscribed by any Ml that also
describes C.
In addition to criterion (1.23), we should require that the group structure
characterising the action of the symmetries of the high-level model be approxi-
mated, within B(d), by the group structure induced through the bridge map by
the group structure characterising the symmetries of the low-level model. That
is, we should require that if
T 1h (B(x
l)) ≈ B(T 1l (xl)) for all xl ∈ d such that T 1l (xl) ∈ d (1.28)
and
T 2h(B(x
l)) ≈ B(T 2l (xl)) for all xl ∈ d such that T 2l (xl) ∈ d, (1.29)
and T 1l ◦ T 2l (xl) ∈ d, and T 1h ◦ T 2h (B(xl)) ∈ B(d) , then
T 1h ◦ T 2h(B(xl)) ≈ B(T 1l ◦ T 2l (xl)). (1.30)
Thus, the bridge map can be regarded as an approximately structure-preserving
function between the state spaces of the two models, where the preserved struc-
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ture is associated not only with the dynamics of the models but also with their
dynamical symmetries.
Formal Criteria for DS Reduction
Having made these motivating remarks, we are now in a position to state formal
conditions for dynamical systems reduction:
DS Reduction:
A model Mh=(Sh, Dh) of Th describing some class C of physical
systems reduces over time scale τ and to within margin of error δ
to a model Ml =(Sl, Dl) of Tl also describing C only if there exists
differentiable function B : Sl → Sh that does not depend explicitly
on time, and a nonempty subset d ⊂ Sl, such that
1. for any xl0 ∈ d
∣∣∣∣B(Dl(t;xl0))−Dh(t;B(xl0))∣∣∣∣
h
< δ, (1.31)
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ τ ;
2. (a) for every dynamical symmetry Th ofMh and for every x
h ∈
B(d) such that Th(x
h) ∈ B(d), there exists a dynamical
symmetry Tl of Ml and an x
l ∈ d, such that xh = B(xl)
and
Th(B(x
l)) ≈ B(Tl(xl)); (1.32)
(b) if
T 1h (B(x
l)) ≈ B(T 1l (xl)) for all xl ∈ d such that T 1l (xl) ∈ d,
(1.33)
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and
T 2h (B(x
l)) ≈ B(T 2l (xl)) for all xl ∈ d such that T 2l (xl) ∈ d,
(1.34)
and T 1l ◦ T 2l (xl) ∈ d, and T 1h ◦ T 2h(B(xl)) ∈ B(d), then
T 1h ◦ T 2h(B(xl)) ≈ B(T 1l ◦ T 2l (xl)). (1.35)
These conditions should be understood as necessary conditions for one dynam-
ical system to reduce to another. Whether they are sufficient depends on the
possibility of finding trivialising counterexamples - i.e., examples such that for
any two DS models for which the cardinality of Sl is higher than that of Sh, one
can find a bridge map B satisfying the specified conditions. If such examples
can be found, then further conditions must be imposed on the bridge map B.
What the above conditions are meant to capture are two of the most salient
requirements that must be satisfied for a mathematical structure defined in a
low-level model - specified by the bridge map - to emulate, or approximately
instantiate, the dynamical behavior and other physically salient aspects of the
state in the high-level model. I leave it to future work to ascertain whether
any further conditions need be placed on the bridge map, and if so, what these
conditions are.
In the simple example that I consider later in this chapter, I demonstrate
that condition 1) is satisfied and show that 2) is satisfied for two particular
symmetries of the high-level model, leaving it to the reader to extrapolate how
the other symmetries of the high-level model are to be reduced. In the more
involved reductions considered in the body chapters of this thesis, I focus on
demonstrating condition 1), leaving it to future work to demonstrate the validity
of condition 2); nevertheless, it is not difficult to surmise in many of these cases
how the demonstration of condition 2) for the various symmetries of the high-
level model should go.
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Reduction v. Mathematical Analogy
The requirement of DS reduction that both models describe the same physical
system - or, more generally, class C of physical systems - is included in the
formal requirements for DS reduction so as to rule out pairs of models that are
mathematically similar in structure but in which the success of one at describing
some physical system cannot be reasonably regarded as accounting for the suc-
cess of the other, since the two models are used to describe completely different
physical systems. For example, the Schrodinger equation for a free massive par-
ticle takes the form of a diffusion equation with imaginary coefficient; as a result
there exists a direct mapping between between models of, say, heat diffusion in
three dimensions and the quantum mechanical model of a single free particle.
Yet it is clear that we would not want to say that the theory of heat diffusion in
three dimensions serves in any respect to explain the success of the Schrodinger
equation in modelling the behavior of free (low-energy) particles; the parallels
between the models simply provide a case in which similar mathematical struc-
tures happen to be applicable in distinct physical contexts. Thus, one must
distinguish between mere mathematical analogy, which occurs when the same
or related mathematical structures happen to be applicable in different physical
contexts, and reduction, in which similarities of mathematical structure serve
to account for the fact that two distinct models can be successfully employed in
describing the same physical system.
A Note on the Question of Relativistic Covariance
Note that the DSR Condition assumes a common time parameter for the high-
and low- level models. Moreover, in making this choice of time parameter, the
DS account of reduction requires that the manifest covariance of any relativistic
models involved in the reduction be sacrificed. Note, however, that the reference
to a common time parameter in the DSR condition is incompatible only with
models formulated in a manifestly relativistically covariant fashion, but not with
models that are covariant. Thus, the reference to a particular time parameter in
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the DSR condition does not preclude the inclusion of Lorentz-invariant models
within this frameowork. When I turn to relativistic theories in Chapters 4 and
5, my focus will be on Hamiltonian and Schrodinger picture formulations of the
models that I consider, which, although not manifestly covariant, are covariant.
DS Reduction and Laws of Motion
It is often more convenient to specify the dynamics of a DS model in the form
of first-order differential equations, rather than in the form of a dynamical map.
Let us examine how the DSR condition should be formulated when the dynamics
of the high- and low- level models are prescribed in this way. As discussed in
section 1.3.2, the dynamical map ofMh specifies the solutions x
h(t) = Dh(t;x
h
0 )
to the differential equation
dxh
dt
= fh(x
h, t) (1.36)
where fh(x
h, t) = ∂∂tDh(t;x
h
0 )
∣∣
t=0,xh0=x
h , and likewise the dynamical map of Ml
specifies the solutions xl(t) = Dl(t;x
l
0) to the differential equation
dxl
dt
= fl(x
l, t), (1.37)
where fl(x
l, t) = ∂∂tDl(t;x
l
0)
∣∣
t=0,xl0=x
l .
At the level of differential equations, DSR condition will be satisfied if the
induced trajectory x′h(t) ≡ Bhl (xl(t)) approximately satisfies the differential
equations of Th:
dx′h
dt
≈ fh(x′h, t) (1.38)
or, more explicitly, if
d
dt
Bhl
(
xl(t)
) ≈ fh(Bhl (xl(t)), t). (1.39)
Note that while this relation is a sufficient condition for the DSR condition to
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hold, it is not a necessary condition. We can see that it is a sufficient condition
by integrating both sides of (1.39) with respect to time:
∫ t
0
dt′
d
dt′
Bhl (x
l(t′)) ≈
∫ t
0
dt′ fh
(
Bhl
(
xl(t
′)
)
, t′
)
Bhl (x
l(t)) −Bhl (xl0) ≈ Dh(t;Bhl (xl0))−Dh(0;Bhl (xl0))
Bhl (Dl(t;x
l
0)) ≈ Dh(t;Bhl (xl0))
(1.40)
where in going from the first line to the second line I have used that fh(x
h, t) =
∂
∂tDh(t;x
h
0 )
∣∣
t=0,xh0=x
h , and in going from the second to the third I have used
that Bhl (x
l
0) = Dh(0;B
h
l (x
l
0)). Note that for the condition (1.39) to be sustained
over some time period τ , the domain d should be such that the image dynamics
roughly preserve the set d; that is, that they map states in d to other states in
d, at least on the timescale τ .
While (1.39) is sufficient for the DSR condition to hold, it is not necessary
insofar as there may exist induced trajectories on the high-level state space
that remain close (in the sense of the Sh’s norm) to the trajectory prescribed
by the high-level model but such that the time derivative of these trajectories
does not remain close in value to the derivatives prescribed by (1.36). For
example, consider a trajectory rapidly oscillating with small amplitude around
the trajectory prescribed by the high-level dynamics; the values of the states
will be close, so that the DSR condition is satisfied, but the time derivatives will
differ drastically so that (1.39), or alternatively, (1.38), is not. In all reductions
considered in later chapters, the stronger condition (1.39) will be proven, rather
than the condition (1.21).
A Simple Example of DS Reduction: Classical Mechanics and Quan-
tum Mechanics (w/o Environmental Decoherence)
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Condition 1: Dynamics
To continue with the models of a single spinless particle in the CM/QM
reduction, note that the DSR condition in differential form requires, in the case
H = p
2
2m + V (x), Hˆ =
pˆ2
2m + V (xˆ), that
d
dt
〈xˆ〉 ≈ {〈x〉, H(〈xˆ〉, 〈pˆ〉)}〈xˆ〉,〈pˆ〉 = 1m 〈pˆ〉
d
dt
〈pˆ〉 ≈ {〈p〉, H(〈xˆ〉, 〈pˆ〉)}〈xˆ〉,〈pˆ〉 = −∂V (〈xˆ)〉∂〈xˆ〉 ,
(1.41)
where the subscript 〈xˆ〉, 〈pˆ〉 on the Poisson brackets indicates differentiation
with respect to 〈xˆ〉 and 〈pˆ〉, rather than with respect to x and p. Employing
the bridge rule substitutions x′ ≡ 〈xˆ〉, p′ ≡ 〈pˆ〉, these can be written in a form
more reminiscent of the original classical equations that they serve to reduce:
dx′
dt
≈ {x′, H(x′, p′)}
x′,p′
=
1
m
p′
dp′
dt
≈ {p′, H(x′, p′)}
x′,p′
= −∂V (x
′)
∂x′
,
(1.42)
It can be shown using Ehrenfest’s Theorem that these approximate equations,
representing the differential DSR condition as applied this pair of models, hold
within the domain dCM of states consisting of wave packets that are simulta-
neously narrow in both position and momentum (to within the constraints of
the Uncertainty Principle). Ehrenfest’s Theorem states that, for any state of
a quantum system with the above-specified Hamiltonian, the following relation
holds:
d〈pˆ〉
dt
= −
〈
∂ˆV
∂x
〉
(1.43)
(see, for instance, [73], p. 41, or almost any other graduate level quantum
mechanics text, for a proof of this theorem). Note that this does not suffice to
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ensure that expectation values of position and momentum evolve approximately
according to Newtonian equations. For this, it is necessary that the stronger
condition,
d〈pˆ〉
dt
≈ −∂V (〈xˆ〉)
∂〈xˆ〉 (1.44)
hold. It is well-known that, as a result of Ehrenfest’s Theorem, this condition
holds approximately for states that are narrowly peaked in position and mo-
mentum. Thus, for the domain of states consisting of narrow wave packets, the
DSR condition between the high- and low-level models is approximately satis-
fied. However, the timescale on which this is so will typically be restricted by
the timescale on which wave packets tend to spread under the dynamics, as they
tend to do in generic situations.
The relation (1.44) suffices to ensure the validity of condition 1) for DSR
reduction, which in this particular case takes the form,
∣∣∣∣〈ψ0|eiHˆtxˆ e−iHˆt|ψ0〉 − e{◦,H}tx∣∣〈xˆ〉0,〈pˆ〉0
∣∣∣∣ < δx,
and
∣∣∣∣〈ψ0|eiHˆtpˆ e−iHˆt|ψ0〉 − e{◦,H}tp∣∣〈xˆ〉0,〈pˆ〉0
∣∣∣∣ < δp,
(1.45)
where 〈xˆ〉0 ≡ 〈ψ0|xˆ|ψ0〉 and 〈pˆ〉0 ≡ 〈ψ0|pˆ|ψ0〉, for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ , where τ is timescale
on which wave packets become widely spread out on spatial dimensions charac-
teristic of the variation of the potential V (x) (for a more precise characterisation
of this length scale, see for instance [1]). The norm employed on phase space
is simply the difference of the positions and of the momenta. Less formally, we
can write this condition as
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〈ψ0|eiHˆtxˆ e−iHˆt|ψ0〉 ≈ e{◦,H}tx
∣∣
〈xˆ〉0,〈pˆ〉0
and
〈ψ0|eiHˆtpˆ e−iHˆt|ψ0〉 ≈ e{◦,H}tp
∣∣
〈xˆ〉0,〈pˆ〉0 ,
(1.46)
where, again, the approximation should be understood as being relative to some
specified margins of error δx and δp.
Condition 2: Symmetries
I demonstrate the validity of condition 2), concerning the relation between
the symmetries of the models, with regard to rotations and Galilean boosts in
classical mechanics. In principle, these conditions should be shown to hold for
all symmetries and states of the high-level model such that both the states and
their mappings under the symmetry are in the image domain B(d), which here
consists of the entire classical phase space Γ. While I limit myself here to con-
sidering these two symmetries, following these examples it should be straight-
forward for the reader to demonstrate these conditions for other symmetries of
the given classical model.
Symmetry 1: Rotation
In the case of a Hamiltonian system with spherically symmetric potential
V (r), the rotations about the origin constitute a group of dynamical symmetries.
Condition 2a) for rotations is ensured by the fact that
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(
〈ψ|ei~ˆL·nˆθ xˆ e−i~ˆL·nˆθ|ψ〉, 〈ψ|ei~ˆL·nˆθ pˆ e−i~ˆL·nˆθ|ψ〉
)
≈ e{◦,~L·nˆθ} (〈ψ|xˆ|ψ〉, 〈ψ|pˆ|ψ〉)
(1.47)
for |ψ〉 ∈ d. This condition is satisfied as a consequence both of the Baker-
Hausdorff Lemma, which states that
eiλBˆAˆe−iλBˆ = Aˆ+ iλ
[
Bˆ, Aˆ
]
+
(iλ)2
2!
[
Bˆ,
[
Bˆ, Aˆ
]]
+
(iλ)3
3!
[
Bˆ,
[
Bˆ,
[
Bˆ, Aˆ
]]]
+ ...
(1.48)
≡ e[iλBˆ,◦]Aˆ (1.49)
(see, for instance [87], p.96) and of the result that for narrow wave packet states
|ψq′,p′〉
〈ψq′,p′ | [f(xˆ, pˆ), g(xˆ, pˆ)] |ψq′,p′〉 ≈ i {f(x, p), g(x, p)}
∣∣
q′,p′
(1.50)
where f(x, p) and g(x, p) are the unique classical functions associated with the
quantum operators f(xˆ, pˆ) and g(xˆ, pˆ) and do not vary significantly on scales of
action equal to ~; this can be derived through fairly extensive manipulation of
the canonical commutation relation [xˆ, pˆ] = i. Note that this relation makes ex-
plicit the physical correspondence between Poisson brackets and commutators.
Whereas Dirac originally postulated the correspondence on the basis of the al-
gebraic similarities between the two brackets, rather than on the asummption
that one structure physically underwrites the other, the DSR condition serves
to illustrate the physical basis for this formal correspondence.
Condition 2 b) for rotations takes the form
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(
〈ψ|ei~ˆL·mˆφei~ˆL·nˆθ xˆ e−i~ˆL·nˆθe−i~ˆL·mˆφ|ψ〉, 〈ψ|ei~ˆL·mˆφei~ˆL·nˆθ pˆ e−i~ˆL·nˆθe−i~ˆL·mˆφ|ψ〉
)
≈ e{◦,~L·nˆθ}e{◦,~L·mˆφ}(〈ψ|xˆ|ψ〉, 〈ψ|pˆ|ψ〉)
(1.51)
and is likewise satisfied for |ψ〉 a narrow wave packet state. Again, this result
follows as a consequence of (1.48) and (1.50)
Symmetry 2: Galilean Boosts
The dynamical map associated with a one-particle classical HamiltonianH =
p2
2m + V (x) above will not generally commute with a boost by some velocity v,
which therefore will not serve as a dynamical symmetry of the model. However,
if we consider the two-particle case in which the potential depends only on the
spatial distance between the particles, so that H =
p21
2m1
+
p21
2m1
+ V (|x1 − x2|),
then a boost of both particles by the same velocity v will commute with the
dynamical map associated with this Hamiltonian. Thus, a Galilean boost in
this case will count as a symmetry of the model. A Galilean boost by velocity
v takes the form
x′1 = x1 − vt (1.52)
x′2 = x2 − vt (1.53)
p′1 = p1 −m1v (1.54)
p′2 = p2 −m2v. (1.55)
In the quantum mechanical model, there is likewise a symmetry of the dynamics
that typically also goes under the name of a Galilean boost. As in the classical
model, these transformations are parametrised by a velocity v; under such a
transformation, the wave function ψ(x1, x2, t) transforms to ψ
′(x′1, x
′
2, t
′), given
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by
ψ′(x′1, x
′
2, t
′) = e−i(m1v·x1+m2v·x2−
1
2m1v
2t− 12m2v2t)ψ(x1, x2, t) (1.56)
with x′1 = x1 − vt, x′2 = x2 − vt and t′ = t (see, for instance [73], p.75). It is
straightforward to see that under the bridge map given by the expectation value,
the quantum mechanical Galiliean boost induces a classical Galilean boost:
(〈ψ′|xˆ1|ψ′〉, 〈ψ′|xˆ2|ψ′〉; 〈ψ′|pˆ1|ψ′〉, 〈ψ′|pˆ2|ψ′〉) (1.57)
= (〈ψ|xˆ1|ψ〉 − vt, 〈ψ|xˆ2|ψ〉 − vt; 〈ψ|pˆ1|ψ〉 −m1v, 〈ψ|pˆ2|ψ〉 −m2v) , (1.58)
thereby satisfying condition 2a). Thus, for any Galilean boost on phase space,
there exists a corresponding transformation on Hilbert space that induces it via
the expectation value. To satisfy condition 2b), though, it is necessary that the
composition of two Galilean boosts on phase space , by v and then by v′, agree
approximately with the transformation induced under the bridge map by the
composition of the corresponding boosts on Hilbert space. The composition of
two boosts on Hilbert space gives
ψ′′(x′′1 , x
′′
2 , t
′′) = e−i[m1(v+v
′)·x1+m2(v+v′)·x2− 12m1(v2+v′2)t− 12m2(v2+v′2)t]ψ(x1, x2, t)
(1.59)
with x′′i = xi − (v + v′)t for i = 1, 2 and t′′ = t. Note that this is equal to
a single boost by v + v′ up to a global time-dependent phase factor (m1 +
m2)(v · v′)t, which does not make a difference to any of the amplitudes of the
theory, or to rays in projective Hilbert space. Under the composed boosts, it is
straightforward to see that
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(〈ψ′′|xˆ1|ψ′′〉, 〈ψ′′|xˆ1|ψ′′〉; 〈ψ′′|pˆ1|ψ′′〉, 〈ψ′′|pˆ2|ψ′′〉) (1.60)
= (〈ψ|xˆ1|ψ〉 − (v + v′) t, 〈ψ|xˆ2|ψ〉 − (v + v′) t; 〈ψ|pˆ1|ψ〉 −m1 (v + v′) , 〈ψ|pˆ2|ψ〉 −m2 (v + v′))
(1.61)
thereby ensuring the validity of condition 2b) with respect to classical Galilean
symmetry.
Limitations of the Simple Quantum Model
Note that the quantum models to which the classical models considered so
far have been reduced make no mention of environmental decoherence, and thus
allow for arbitrary coherent superpositions of the degrees of freedom in question.
Moreover, in chaotic systems, the quantum models predict that initially narrow
wave packets will spread on fairly short time scales beyond the coherence lengths
that typically characterise the macroscopic or mesoscopic systems that exhibit
approximately Newtonian behavior (see [110] Ch.3 for detailed discussion of this
point). Thus, although the classical model considered here may serve as an effec-
tive (if only approximate) description of such systems, the quantum model does
not insofar as it will, on relatively short timescales, predict coherence lengths
that disagree dramatically with those observed in these systems. Thus, it is
necessary to replace the quantum model considered here with a more sophisti-
cated one that takes account of environmental degrees of freedom and thereby
continually suppresses the coherence length of the system in question; this is
the goal of the next chapter. Nevertheless, the reduction involving the quantum
model without environment helps to provide a simplified illustration the basic
components of DS reduction, if we momentarily allow ourselves to overlook its
shortcomings as a description of real, approximately Newtonian systems.
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1.3.5 Transitivity of DS reduction
Under certain conditions, if a model M1 reduces to another model M2 and M2
reduces to M3, then it will be true that M1 reduces to M3. Specifically, the
domain d1 ⊂ S2 associated with the bridge map B12 : S2 → S1 must be in
the image of the domain d2 ⊂ S3 under the bridge map B23 : S3 → S2. If
this is the case, then M1 and M3 satisfy the DSR conditions with bridge map
B13 : S3 → S1 equal to the composition of the bridge maps B12 and B23 , so that
B13 ≡ B12 ◦ B23 . The domain in S3 associated with the bridge map B13 is equal
to d2 ∩ (B23)−1(d1), the intersection of d2 and the inverse image under B23 of d1.
The timescale associated with the reduction will be the smaller of the timescales
associated with the two component reductions.
I will prove transitivity for DSR condition 1), in differential form. The proof
of transitivty of condition 2) can be carried out in similar fashion and so is
omitted. Given that the two component reductions hold, we have
d
dt
B12
(
x2(t)
) ≈ f1(B12(x2(t)), t), (1.62)
for some timescale τ1 and
d
dt
B23
(
x3(t)
) ≈ f2(B23(x3(t)), t) (1.63)
for some timescale τ2. Also, x
1(t) = B12(x
2(t)), and x2(t) = B23(x
3(t)). We
want to show that
d
dt
B13
(
x3(t)
) ≈ f1(B13(x3(t)), t), (1.64)
for x3(t) ∈ d with d ≡ d2 ∩ (B23)−1(d1), and 0 ≤ t ≤ τ with τ = min{τ1, τ2},
where τ1 is the timescale for the 1-to-2 reduction and τ2 the timescale for the
2-to-3 reduction. By the Chain Rule, we can expand the left-hand side of (1.70)
as follows
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ddt
x1
(
x2
(
x3(t)
))
=
dx1
dx2
dx2
dx3
dx3
dt
=
dx1
dx2
dx2
dx3
f3
(
x3(t), t
)
(1.65)
where I have employed the dynamical equation for M3,
dx3
dt = f
3(x3, t). Sepa-
rately, and also by the Chain Rule, the reduction of M1 to M2 entails
dx1
dx2
dx2
dt
≈ f1 (x1 (x2(t)) , t) , (1.66)
which in turn entails
dx1
dx2
f2(x2, t) ≈ f1 (x1 (x2(t)) , t) . (1.67)
Likewise, the reduction of M1 to M2 entails
dx2
dx3
f3(x2, t) ≈ f2 (x1 (x2(t)) , t) . (1.68)
Putting these results together, eqn ( 1.65) becomes
d
dt
x1
(
x2
(
x3(t)
))
=
dx1
dx2
dx2
dx3
f3
(
x3(t), t
) ≈ dx1
dx2
f2
(
x2(t), t
) ≈ f1 (x1 (x2(x3(t))) , t).
(1.69)
Alternatively, we can write this as
d
dt
B13
(
x3(t)
) ≈ f1(B13(x3(t)), t), (1.70)
which is the result we wanted. Again, this result will only hold if both of the
component reductions hold, so the reduction timescale here is the minimum of
τ1 and τ2. Moreover, it will also only hold if the point x
3(t) remains in the
domain d2, so that the 2 − 3 reduction holds and its image under B23 is in the
domain d1, so that the 1− 2 reduction holds; thus, the 1 − 3 reduction is only
guaranteed to hold for x3(t) ∈ d2 ∩ (B23)−1(d1).
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1.3.6 Generalising DS Reduction
Dynamical systems reduction only applies in cases where Tl and Th can be
modelled as dynamical systems with a common time parameter. However, for
theories that probe successively more fundamental levels of physical reality,
it is likely this will not continue to be the case. A more general framework
for reduction that encompasses DS reduction as a special case will need to be
developed to accommodate these reductions.
Wallace has suggested a concept of reduction in which theories are modelled
in terms of whole histories rather than in terms of state space evolutions in
dynamical systems. The latter sort of model can be easily subsumed into the
former by treating the trajectories of the dynamical system as the histories,
and the dynamics of the theory as a constraint on allowable histories. However,
not all conceivable models which are formulated in terms of histories need be
formulable as a dynamical system. For example, solutions to the Einstein field
equations which are not globally hyperbolic may not possess a global description
in terms of the time evolution of some state on some state space, but rather
only in terms of histories with no globally definable time parameter. Wallace
defines his concept of reduction as follows:
Given two theories A and B, and some subset D of the histories
of A, we say the A instantiates B over domain D iff there is some
(relatively simple) map ρ from the possible histories of A to those of
B such that if some history h in D satisfies the constraints of A, the
ρ(h) (approximately speaking) satisfies the constraints of B. (It will
often be convenient to speak of the history h as instantiating ρ(h),
but this should be understood as shorthand for the more detailed
definition here.) ...
This instantiation relation (I claim) is the right way of understanding
the relation between different scientific theories - the sense in which
one theory may be said to “reduce” to another [110].
While such a histories-based approach seems a promising generalisation of DS
reduction, Wallace’s definition does not specify any precise constraints on the
map ρ(h) (other than perhaps the implicit constraint that ρ be sufficiently
‘simple’). Future elaborations of Wallace’s notion of reduction should specify
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the necessary constraints on ρ.
1.3.7 Precursors of the DS Approach
The central idea of DS reduction, that the high-level dynamics composed with
some bridge map should yield approximately the same state as does the bridge
map composed with the low-level dynamics over the same time-period - in short,
that the dynamics should commute with the bridge map - is an old one. While its
applications to physics have thus far been restricted primarily to the context of
reductions in statistical mechanics - where the bridge map consists of some sort
of coarse-graining function - I have argued above, and will continue to argue
throughout the remainder of the thesis, that this insight applies much more
broadly to reductions between any two theories whose models can be formulated
as dynamical systems, as is the case with most current physical theories. As
we have seen above, the DS approach develops this basic insight into a more
formal and more general approach to reduction, supplementing it with further
constraints on the bridge map, including time-independence and compatibility
with the symmetries of the models in question. Thus, it represents a full-fledged
alternative to the limit-based and Nagelian approaches that have dominated
the literature on reduction in physics. In the present sub-section, I discuss the
work of a number of authors that also addresses, with some variations, the core
insight on which the DS approach is based, highlighting differences from the DS
approach where they occur; it is worth noting here that none of these approaches
imposes the additional condition requiring compatibility of the bridge map with
the symmetries of the models, nor do any explicitly require the bridge map -
or rather their counterpart to the bridge map - to be time-independent. To
distinguish the general idea that dynamics should commute with some function
between state spaces of the high- and low- level models from its formulation
specifically within the context of DS reduction, I will refer to the general idea as
the ‘dynamical commutation’ condition, and to my own formulation of it as DSR
condition 1) (I may occasionally refer to it also simply as the DSR condition).
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I was led to the basic idea of DS reduction in the context of my own research
through discussions with with my doctoral thesis supervisor, David Wallace,
who has for some time been advocating the dynamical commutation approach
informally in discussion, in particular as regards the derivation in quantum me-
chanics of effective subsystem dynamics for density matrices from the dynamics
a larger system; moreover, Wallace’s [110], Ch. 3 briefly proposes a generalisa-
tion, which I discuss in a later section, of the dynamical commutation condition
to reductions of models formulated in the mathematical language of histories
rather than of states evolving in time; this approach thus involves a map not be-
tween state spaces but rather between the history spaces of the models; however,
Wallace does not impose any precise constraints on this map, as is necessary to
avoid the condition being satisfied trivially. Finally, I also encountered a variant
of the dynamical commutation condition in David Albert’s Columbia University
course on the foundations of statistical mechanics.
Both Giunti and Yoshimi have suggested their own variants of the dynami-
cal commutation condition with regard to the reduction of dynamical systems
generally, though the potential applications that concern them lie within philos-
ophy of mind and in discussions of reduction in philosophy of science generally;
they do not specifically discuss applications of this approach to reductions in
physics, where (I claim) it is especially salient [39], [115]. Moreover, Giunti
requires that his bridge map counterpart, which he calls an ‘emulation,’ be an
injective, or one-to one, function. As we have seen, the bridge map of my DS
approach impose no such requirement, and may be many-one. Yoshimi, on the
other hand, requires that his counterpart to the bridge map, which he calls a
‘supervenience function,’ be an onto function between state space. Again, the
bridge map of DS reduciton imposes no such requirement. Moreover, neither
Giunti nor Yoshimi demand compatibility of their bridge map counterparts with
the symmetries of the models, nor do they explicitly insist that it not be explic-
itly dependent on time (though perhaps this may be regarded as an assumption
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implicit in their analyses).
While much of his work on reduction and emergence focuses on limit-based
and Nagelian approaches, Butterfield also discusses inter-level relations in physics
in terms of dynamical systems. Like DSR condition 1), the core condition for re-
duction that Butterfield’s analysis draws on, which he calls ‘meshing’ of ‘macro-’
and ‘micro-’ level dynamics, involves the commutation of some ‘coarse-graining’
function between micro- and macro-level state spaces with the time-evolution
prescribed on those spaces. The macro-level state space is identified with a
partition of the micro-level state space, and the coarse-graining function simply
maps an element of the micro-level space into the cell of the partition to which it
belongs. On Butterfield’s account, the closest analogue to what I call the high-
level model is the macro-level model; to what I call call the low-level model,
the micro-level model; and to what I call the bridge map, the coarse-graining
function [20]. Note that Butterfield’s terminology draws heavily on examples of
reduction in statistical mechanics.
Butterfield characterises the dynamics of a macro- and micro- models as
‘meshing’ relative to a particular partitioning P = {Ci} of the micro-level state
space S when the set obtained by applying the micro-evolution law T : S→ S to
an element of P is itelf an element of P , so that for any i, T (Ci) = Cj for some j.
Thus, the micro-level dynamics T : S→ S induces, via the coarse-graining, some
macro-level dynamics T¯ : P → P . This will not be the case for an arbitrary
partition of S since two microstates in the same partition may evolve under
the microdynamics into separate elements of the partition, so that micro-level
determinism gives rise to macro-level indeterminism (where the macro state
space corresponds to the partitioning of the micro state space).
However, Butterfield acknowledges that this concept of meshing may not
apply to many realistic cases in which one dynamical system purportedly reduces
to another - such as the reduction of models involving the Boltzmann, Navier-
Stokes and diffusion equations to some micro-physical mechanical model - and so
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suggests that the following modifications and allowances to his notion of meshing
may be required before these realistic examples can be counted as instances of
it(I quote directly from Butterfield here):
• ‘the meshing may not last for all times;
• the meshing may apply, not for all micro-states s, but only for all except
a “small” class;
• the coarse-graining may not be so simple as paritioning S; and indeed
• the definition of the micro-state space S may require approximation and-or
idealisation, especially by taking a limit of a parameter: in particular, by
letting the number of microscopic contitutents tend to infinity, while de-
manding of course that other quantities, such as mass and density, remain
constant or scale appropriately.’ [20]
Indeed, all of the first three of these considerations are already built into the
definition of DS reduction. DS reduction is defined only relative to a particular
timescale and margin of error and for a particular, potentially limited, domain
d of states in the low-level state space; moreover, the bridge-map of DS reduc-
tion need not yield a partitioning of the low-level space (that is, the inverse
images under B of points in Sh need not form a partition of Sl; indeed, it will
not necessarily be the case that every point in Sh even has an inverse image).
Butterfield’s fourth concern only comes into play in certain special cases, for
example in reductions where quantum field theory or statistical mechanics fur-
nishes the reducing model, since both of these theories typically involve taking
limits as the number of degrees of freedom in the theory goes to infinity. In
the case of quantum field theory, which I do consider in this thesis, this fourth
concern of Butterfield’s is averted by taking a ‘cut-off’ approach to quantum
field theory and thereby treating the QFT model in question as a model of a
large-but-finite, rather than an infinite, number of degrees of freedom.
While the modifications to his meshing condition that Butterfield suggests
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anticipate a number of differences between meshing and DS reduction, it will
be worthwhile to explore these differences in a bit more detail. One essential
difference, just noted, is that while Butterfield’s meshing condition requires that
the coarse-graining function (his counterpart of the bridge map) be associated
with some partition of the low-level state space, the bridge map need not take
as its domain the whole of Sl, and therefore need not prescribe a partitioning
of Sl; moreover, the bridge map need not take the whole of Sh as its image,
providing still another reason why the high-level state space cannot in general
be regarded on DS reduction as a partition of the low-level space.
Furthermore, if a micro-level system obeys Butterfield’s meshing condition
with respect to some partition, then for any macro-level initial condition - i.e.,
some partition cell - it must be the case that the deterministic dynamics induced
on the partition by the micro-level dynamics yield the same result irrespective
of the microcondition that instantiates that initial macrocondition. Since any
element of the partition can serve as the macro- initial condition, and since every
element of the micro-level state space belongs to some element of the partition,
Butterfield’s meshing condition requires that the whole micro-level state space
(or at least all but a very small subset of this space) serve as the domain that
approximates the macro-level dynamics under coarse-graining; by contrast, in
DS reduction, the domain of Sl whose induced dynamics under the bridge map
approximates the high-level dynamics is not required to be the entirety of the
low-level space.
Finally, on Butterfield’s approach, the coarse-graining function associated
with a partition that respects the meshing condition is not required to respect
the symmetries of the low-level model insofar as it does not require that for any
symmetry of the deterministic macrodynamics, there will be some symmetry of
the micro-level dynamics that induces it under coarse-graining - nor does not
entail that the group structure of the micro-level symmetries induce the group
structure of the macro-level symmetries on the partition.
A final, though potentially less substantive, difference between Butterfield’s
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account of dynamical commutation and the DS approach is that while the in-
spiration for the DS approach comes from examples of reduction in statistical
mechanics, on the DS approach the reduced and reducing models need not cor-
respond, respectively, to models of macroscopic and microscopic phenomena,
nor does the bridge map need to correspond to a ‘coarse-graining’ in any sense
other than its often being a many-one function (certainly, it is not required to
furnish a partition of Sl, nor is it required to map onto the whole of Sh). Of
course, if Butterfield is using the terms ‘macro-’ and ‘micro-’ merely to sug-
gest some analogy with statistical mechanical reductions, and not by way of
restricting this approach to reductions in which high- and low- level descrip-
tions correspond respectively to ‘macro-’ and ‘micro-’ level phenomena, then
this distinction collapses to some extent into one of terminology.
Within statistical mechanics, Lanford’s Theorem provides an explicit in-
stance of the dynamical commutation 7 (see, for instance, [65], [66], [67], [102]).
Lanford’s Theorem shows that the Boltzmann equation, which describes the
behavior of the distribution ft(~x, ~p) in 6-dimensional µ-space of particles in a
dilute gas (and assumes the molecules in the gas are modelled as solid spheres),
can be derived from the formalism of classical Hamiltonian mechanics, which
prescribes via the Liouville equation the time evolution of a probability dis-
tribution ρt(~x1, ~p1, ..., ~xN , ~pN). The theorem establishes a particular bridge or
correspondence between probability distributions ρ on phase space and distribu-
tions f on µ-space, such that to any probability distribution ρ there corresponds
a unique f , but such that there are in general many ρ that may yield the same
f under this correspondence. The theorem then shows that provided certain
constraints are imposed on the initial phase space probability distribution ρ0 at
some time t = 0, the evolution of f induced by the evolution of ρ via this corre-
spondence approximately satisfies Boltzmann’s equation for some time scale τ
(what this time scale turns out to be depends on the strength of the assumptions
7Thanks to Jeremy Butterfield for pointing me to this example.
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made about the evolution of ρ). Thus, Lanford’s Theorem shows that, applied
to some domain of possible initial probability distributions ρ0, the low-level dy-
namics (The Liouville Equation) for some time t followed by an application of
the bridge map or coarse-graining yields approximately the same final distri-
bution ft as does the bridge map followed by an application of the high-level
dynamics (The Boltzmann equation) for the same time t, thus satisying the
dynamical commutation condition.
Werndl has shown that for every deterministic dynamical system, there is an
indeterministic model that reproduces the same empirical predictions to within
some given margin of error, and also that for every indeterministic dynami-
cal model, there is a deterministic one that is observationally indistinguishable
from it, again to within some margin of error [111], [112], [113], [114]. All of
the models considered in this thesis are deterministic, although it is possible
(particularly in the case of the quantum theories I consider) that observation-
ally equivalent stochastic models can be chosen in place of these; in such a case,
it would be necessary to extend the account of reduction among determinis-
tic models that I provide to reductions among indeterministic models, as well
as to reductions of deterministic to indeterministic models, and reductions of
indeterministic to deterministic models.
Finally, Peter Smith offers an account of approximate truth of models of dy-
namical systems that closely resembles in certain respects the account of strong
analogy between analogue and high-level models that I discuss here (see [96]
and [97], Ch.5). To be sure, the notion of strong analogy that I consider here
concerns a notion of closeness between distinct dynamical systems models, while
Smith is concerned with the notion of closeness between these models and the
behavior of the physical systems that the models describe. While from a concep-
tual point of view the question of what it means for one model to approximate
another and the question of what it means for a model to approximate the be-
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havior some actual physical system are clearly distinct, according to Smith the
latter sense of approximation can be understood as a similarity of geometri-
cal structures associated respectively with the model and the physical system;
likewise, in the account of strong analogy between dynamical systems models
that I give here, what it means for one model to approximate another can also
be understood as similarity of geometrical structure. For example, a classical
phase space model of a simple pendulum can provide an approximately true
description of a real physical pendulum insofar as it is possible to plot, on the
same phase space, both the trajectory predicted by the model and the trajec-
tory of the real pendulum and to show that these trajectories are ‘close’ within
some margin of error ǫ for some time period; crucially, this sense of closeness is
specified by the geometrical structure - usually some norm - of the state space
in question. In the sense of strong analogy that I discuss here, a (say) quantum
model of the simple pendulum will approximate a classical phase space model
if the phase space trajectory induced by the quantum model through the rel-
evant bridge map approximates, in the geometrical sense furnished by a norm
on phase space, the trajectory prescribed by the classical model.
My primary goal in this thesis is to demonstrate that the way of thinking
about reduction in terms of dynamical commutation can be applied widely be-
yond the realm of statistical mechanics, and beyond the realm of macro- to
micro- reductions, and that it can be extended and refined into a general ac-
count of intertheory relations in physics that is distinct from the limit-based
and Nagelian approaches. Nevertheless, it may incorporate elements of both of
these approaches; in particular, in the next section I will be discussing some of
the parallels between DS and Nagelian reduction.
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1.4 DS Reduction and Nagelian Reduction: Par-
allels
Perhaps the most salient parallel between DS and Nagelian reduction is that
both make use of special correspondences between the elements of the high- and
low- level descriptions of a particular system. More specifically, the bridge maps
and bridge rules of DS reduction serve much the same purpose as the bridge
laws of GNS reduction, insofar as they identify those elements of the low-level
description that approximately mimic the behavior of particular elements in the
high-level description.
However, the analogy between the two approaches extends further than this.
Recall that the GNS account of theory reduction distinguishes four ‘theories’:
the low level theory Tl, the high level theory Th, the image theory T
∗
h , and the
analogue theory T ′h. Recall that on the GNS approach, T
∗
h is formulated in the
language of Tl and deduced from Tl without the use of bridge laws; T
′
h is then
obtained from T ∗h by straightforward bridge law substitution, and is formulated
in the language of Th; if the reduction is successful T
′
h will be ‘strongly analogous’
to Th. It is in this sense that a high level theory Th may be reduced to a low
level theory Tl on the GNS account. On the semantic, DS approach to physical
reduction, I claim, the portion of the reduction that involves demonstrating
that DSR condition 1) is satisfied proceeds much according to this same basic
outline, with a major revision being that it is models rather than whole theories
that are reduced. Let us make the parallels between GNS and the dynamical
component of DS reduction more explicit.
Nagel’s Homogeneous/Inhomogeneous Distinction
Nagel introduces the distinction between homogeneous and inhomogeneous re-
ductions as the motivation for introducing bridge laws into his account of re-
duction. Yet it is worth noting here that this distinction can be quite vague
once we begin to probe it further.
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For example, Nagel uses the reduction of the Galilean theory of terrestrial
gravitation to Newton’s Universal Theory of Gravitation as an example of a
homogeneous reduction, explaining that all of the terms employed in the former
- position, time, mass, force - are all also contained in the latter. However,
there is room to doubt this classification when one considers the nature of the
constant g = 9.8m/s2. In Galileo’s theory, g appears as a primitive constant
whose value is unexplained, whereas in Newton’s it is equated to GME
R2
E
(where
ME is the mass of the earth and RE is the radius of the earth). Likewise,
in the reduction of the thermodynamic Ideal Gas Law to statistical mechanics,
temperature T is a basic quantity in the context of thermodynamics, while in the
context of statistical mechanics it is equated to 23kB 〈K.E.〉. Given this parallel,
it seems rather arbitrary of Nagel to claim the term T occurs only in the reduced
but not the reducing theory, making the relation T = 23kB 〈K.E.〉 a bridge law,
while claiming that g occurs in both reduced and reducing theories, making the
relation g = GME
R2
E
something other than a bridge law (say, a definition of a
non-basic quantity - namely, g - in Newton’s theory).
Yet we can still see the motivation for Nagel’s homogeneous/inhomegneous
distinction: in the Galileo/Newton reduction, the theoretical frameworks of the
two theories arguably share a lot more in common than do the frameworks of
the two theories involved in the thermo./stat.-mech. reduction. Yet, as we have
seen in the former example, even in cases where the theoretical frameworks are
quite similar, some links between them - albeit ones that may seem quite obvious
and natural, sometimes so much so that they are left implicit - will be required
to effect a reduction of one theory to the other (in the Galileo/Newton case, the
definition g = GME
R2
E
is indeed required before one can derive Galileo’s F = mg
as an approximation). Whether one regards the theoretical frameworks of the
reduced and reducing theories as sufficiently different to characterise the links
as bridge laws (rather than, say, as definitions of non-fundamental quantities in
the reducing theory) is to a significant extent arbitrary.
Many of these considerations carry over to reduction in the DS approach,
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where the high- and low- level models may involve very similar, or very clearly
distinct, mathematical structures, but in which there is no clear division between
models whose mathematical structures are ‘the same’ - there will always be some
differences, assuming the models are not identical - and those in which they are
clearly distinct. One might be inclined to call reductions between models whose
state spaces take the same general form homogeneous and those in which their
forms are different inhomogeneous. Yet, in the end it is a matter of arbitrary
choice what particular kinds of similary of mathematical structure one relies on
in the classification of reductions as homogeneous or inhomogeneous.
As an example, one might be inclined to regard as homogeneous the DS
reduction of a Newtonian phase space model of the motion of some centers-
of-mass to the Newtonian phase space model of the motion of the system’s
smaller constituents. The classification as homogeneous would be motivated
by the fact that both state spaces are symplectic manifolds (albeit of differ-
ent dimension), and in addition may have Hamiltonians of the same general
H =
∑
i
p2i
2mi
+
∑
i6=j V (|xi−xj |) form. However, even if one classifies such a re-
duction as homogeneous, a bridge map, given by the center of mass function and
the corresponding formula for momentum, is still required. As an example of
an inhomogeneous reduction, one might take the example considered repeatedly
in this chapter, in which some classical phase space model is reduced to some
quantum model; in this case, one state space is a symplectic manifold and the
other a Hilbert space; the bridge map is given by the expectation values of the
position and momentum operators. Again, though, the question of which par-
ticular differences of mathematical structure are to determine the classification
as homogeneous or inhomogenous is a matter of arbitrary choice.
Moreover, whether the state spaces are more or less similar in their math-
ematical form, all DS reductions require bridge maps that are constrained to
fulfill the same set of requirements. Unlike in Nagel’s approach, where some
reductions are said to require bridge laws and some are not, the counterparts
of bridge laws in the DS approach, bridge maps, are required of all reducitons
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(though, again, in some cases these bridge maps may be particularly natural or
obvious). Consequently, it does not appear that in the context of DS reduction
very much hangs on the homogeneous/inhomogeneous distinction, insofar as it
can be drawn.
Image Models, Bridge Rules, Analogue Models and ‘Strong Analogy’
On the DS account of the reduction of a high-level modelMh to a low level model
Ml, one can, by analogy with the GNS approach, identify an image model M
∗
h
and an analogue model M ′h. It is the analogue model that approximates the
high-level model Mh.
The image modelM∗h is formulated using elements of the modelMl - that is,
in terms of the mathematical structures defined on Ml’s state space - and can
be deduced from Ml solely on the basis of a restriction to a particular domain
of states in Sl. Its dynamics consist of the composition of the bridge map B
and Dl:
Image Model Dynamics:
d
dt
B
(
xl(t)
) ≈ fh(B(xl(t)), t) (1.71)
for xl ∈ d, where d is some domain of states in Sl roughly preserved under the
dynamics for some limited timescale τ . Recall that satisfaction of image model
dynamics for some such domain d suffices to ensure satisfaction of the DSR
condition.
By further analogy with the GNS account, the analogue model is obtained
from the image model through bridge rule substitutions,
Bridge Rules:
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x′h ≡ B(xl) (1.72)
and its dynamics are specified by the equation of motion:
Analogue Model Dynamics:
dx′h
dt
≈ fh(x′h, t). (1.73)
Note that the expression B(xl), which occurs in the image model, is an expres-
sion built from structures within the low level model Ml - in this sense it is
formulated in the mathematical ‘language’ of the low level model. On the other
hand, the bridge rule equivalent of this expression, x′h, is to be understood as
an object of the sort defined within the high level model Mh: specifically, an
element of the high level state space Sh. In this sense the analogue model M
′
h
is formulated in the mathematical ‘language’ of the high level model.
From this we can see that the image model is typically formulated in no-
tation which lays bare the detailed construction of the Ml structures that ap-
proximately instantiate the dynamics of Mh, while the analogue model neatly
packages and conceals the internal makeup of these structures by assigning to
them simpler variable expressions which are a mathematical form familiar to
Mh. Figuratively speaking, the image model enables us to ‘look under the hood’
of the analogue modelM ′h to see in detail how its structures are assembled from
the mathematical components of Ml.
For a reduction to take place in the GNS account, the analogue model M ′h
must be ‘strongly analogous’ to the high level model Mh. Within the context
of the GNS model the condition of strong analogy is highly ambiguous, though
is intended to include some requirement of approximate agreement between M ′h
and Mh. On the DS approach, the relation of strong analogy is unambiguous,
66
and requires that
‘Strong Analogy’
∣∣x′h(t)− xh(t)∣∣ < δ ∀ 0 ≤ t ≤ τ, (1.74)
where τ again is the reduction timescale. Note that this ‘strong analogy’ claim
is just the DSR condition rewritten using bridge rule substitution x′h(t) ≡
B
(
Dl(t;x
l
0)
)
and the definition xh(t) ≡ Dh
(
t;B(xl0)
)
. 8
The basic elements of DS reduction can be consolidated in a manner that
directly parallels the three steps of GNS reduction, with an additional step to
show that the dynamical symmetries of the high-level model are approximately
replicated via the bridge map by those of the low-level model :
DS Reduction in Four Steps:
1. Derive the image model M∗h as an approximation to the dynamics of
Ml within some restricted domain of states within the low level state
space Sl. This amounts to deducing a relation of the form
d
dtB
(
xl(t)
) ≈
fh
(
B
(
xl(t)
)
, t
)
from the dynamics of Ml and a restriction to a particular
domain of states in Sl. Note the derivation of an image model amounts
to a proof of the DSR condition. This step refines Nagel’s derivability
condition; note that it is the image model M∗h , not the high-level model
Mh, that is derived from Ml on this account of reduction.
2. Use bridge rules x′h ≡ B(xl) to replace the terms B(xl) occurring in
M∗h , and which are constructed using the mathematical structures of Ml,
8One could object that there is still an ambiguity as to what the appropriate norm to take
on the high level space Sh is. In all the examples I consider, however, the appropriate choice
of norm is always obvious.
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with corresponding terms belonging to the high level model. This yields
the analogue model M ′h, whose dynamics are specified by the dynami-
cal equation dx
′h
dt ≈ fh(x′h, t). This, along with step 3, refines Nagel’s
connectability condition.
3. On the reduction timescale τ on which the image model holds, M ′h is
‘strongly analogous’ to the high level model Mh, in the precisely defined
sense that
∣∣x′h(t) − xh(t)∣∣ < δ ∀ 0 ≤ t ≤ τ . This step contributes an
additional component to Nagel’s connectability condition.
4. (no analogue in GNS) Prove that the bridge map respects the symmetries
of the high-level model by demonstrating that conditions 2 a) and b) for
DS reduction are satisfied.
The parallels with the GNS approach, and the manner in which the essential
elements of this account are all paralleled within a semantic, dynamical systems
approach should at this point be clear. Note also that there is no reason that
dynamical systems reduction, as spelled out here, need be restricted to dynami-
cal systems in physics, though all of the examples I consider here are reductions
of this sort. On a final note, it is in the sense specified by DS reduction that
I will refer to a model Ml of Tl instantiating some model Mh of Th - that is,
Ml instantiates Ml if the DSR condition between the two is satisfied. I also
may refer more specifically to B(d) as approximately instantiating some sub-
set of the high-level state space Sh, and to the image model as approximately
instantiating the dynamics Dh of the high-level model.
1.5 DS Reduction and Nagelian Reduction: Dis-
analogies
The first and most general distinction between DS and Nagelian reduction is
that the former concerns the reduction of individual models while the latter
concerns the reduction of theories. Nagelian reduction, moreover, specifically
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requires the derivation of the laws of the high-level theory from those of the low-
level theory. In the case of DS reduction, to be sure, it is also necessary that the
laws of the high-level model - which I take it are most naturally associated in the
DS picture with the equations of motion of the model - be derivable from those
of the low-level model in the sense that it is possible to derive some image laws
from the low-level model, which serve to approximate the laws of the high-level
theory via bridge rules and the strong analogy relation.
Yet models of physical theories involve much more mathematical structure
than simply their dynamics - for example, the structures associated with their
state spaces and the dynamical symmetries on those state spaces. In models
of classical Hamiltonian mechanics, for example, the dynamical equations, as
expressed in terms of Poisson brackets with the Hamiltonian, are but a portion
of the larger symplectic structure of the phase space manifold, which serves as
a unified geometrical framework in which to understand not only the dynamics
but the symmetries of the theory as well as the whole fomalism of canonical
transformations. In models of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, likewise, the
dynamical law specified by the Schrodinger equation is but a portion of the
larger mathematical apparatus associated with Hermitian operators, unitary
transformations, and the like. Unlike Nagelian reduction, which focuses on the
derivation of the high-level theory’s laws, DS reduction more generally seeks
to identify substructures of the low-level model that approximately instantiate
the structures of the high-level model in some domain. While the dynamical
laws of the high-level model certainly represent one crucial piece of the high-
level model’s structure that must be instantiated by the low-level model (and
the fact of this instantiation is one that must be derived from the low-level
model), they do not exhaust it. As we have seen, the image domain B(d)
instantiates that part of the high-level theory’s state space Sh that can be used
to accurately model the physical system in question, while B(Tl) approximately
instantiates some high-level dynamical symmetry Th of the theory for some Tl;
likewise, the group composition structure of the high-level symmetries T 1h ◦ T 2h
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is approximately instantiated by the group composition structure B(T 1l ◦T 2l ) of
the low-level symmetries induced via the bridge map.
One final difference between DS and Nagelian reduction that bears discussion
is that, while the bridge maps of DS reduction and the bridge laws of Nagelian
reduction do fulfill similar roles, DS reduction is framed in terms of the existence
of a mathematical function (the bridge map) satisfying certain criteria, while
the bridge laws of Nagelian reduction are understood as separate assumptions
made independently of the high-and low- level theories, which are necessary to
derive the appropriate analogue to the high-level laws. That is, the DS approach
takes the high- and low- level models of a system as given, and a reduction is
said to occur only if a certain mathematical relationship obtains between these
models - namely, the existence of a function between the state space satisfying
the necessary mathematical conditions given above. The Nagelian approach, on
the other hand, treats bridge laws as independent auxiliary assumptions that
supplement the low-level theory to facilitate the derivation of an analogue to
the laws of the high-level theory.
1.6 Generality in Reduction
Authors on the subject of theory reduction, particularly in physics, have tended
toward one of two approaches to this subject, which I call the ‘systematic’ and
‘piecemeal’ approaches to reduction. There is no clear-cut division between
these two categories, but rather a spectrum of possible approaches between
these extremes which aspire to varying degrees of generality.
Advocates of more systematic approaches to reduction tend to assume that
among systems which exhibit Th regularities, the explanation in terms of Tl as
to why they do so can be given on the basis of general results that connect
the formalisms of the two theories and which are presumed to apply to all such
systems. That is, they tend to view the problem of reduction exclusively in
terms of generalities which can then be applied to particular systems, much in
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the way an algebraic identity applies generally for all numbers in a particular set.
The details that are most salient to the explanation of the reduction, however,
are always the same, independently of the system being investigated.
Advocates of more piecemeal approaches implicitly deny the possibility of
such generality in explaining why certain Tl systems exhibit Th regularities. Ul-
timately, they deny that it is possible to abstract away so completely from the
details of the system in question in explaining why it obeys regularities charac-
teristic of Th. The most extreme version of this view insists that reductions must
be accounted for on a case-by-case basis - that is, for each system that exhibits
Th regularities, one must provide a separate and distinct Tl-based explanation
of why it does so that is tailored specifically to that system.
The systematic and piecemeal approaches are illustrated, respectively, by
work that tries to explain reduction entirely on the basis of formal mathemat-
ical results, on the one hand, and by work which tries to explain, for a system
defined to within narrow parameters, how behavior characteristic of Th can be
accounted for by Tl, on the other. Landsman’s well-known treatment of the
quantum-classical correspondence (detailed in [63]), for instance, falls more to-
ward the systematic end of the spectrum in that it rests primarily on formal
mathematical correspondences between quantum and classical mechanics with-
out considering the details of particular systems, while Joos and Zeh’s calcula-
tions of decoherence rates for different environments consisting of air molecules,
dust particles, and photons (see [21] and [58]) fall closer to the piecemeal end
of the spectrum.
Let us take a moment to consider how the distinction between systematic and
piecemeal approaches to reduction relates to the distinction between reduction1
and reduction2. The type-1 approach to reduction, to which, I have argued, the
dynamical systems approach belongs, can be systematic since there is nothing
inherent in the definition of DS reduction, or more broadly of Nagelian reduction,
that automatically precludes the existence of some general result that accounts
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for all successful applications of the theory Th. On the other hand, a type-
1 reduction also can be piecemeal, since it is also possible that the set of Tl
systems that instantiate the models of Th are highly distinct in the sense that
their underlying Tl descriptions differ widely.
A type-2 reduction, if any such reductions exist, is necessarily systematic
since it requires that the behavior of any approximately Th system be retrieved
from some Tl system as some set of parameters {ǫi} in Tl approach zero. (Note
that my analysis in section 1.2.1 does not preclude the occurence of instances of
reduction2; it only precludes regarding reduction2 as a general characterisation
of inter-theory relations in physics). Thus, if any system exhibits Th regularities,
one need look no further than the values of {ǫi} and the associated limits for
an explanation of this fact; all other particularities of the system are irrelevant
to the reduction.
It is worth clarifying here the difference between a systematic type-1 reduc-
tion and a type-2 reduction (which is necessarily systematic) since it is reason-
able to ask whether there are any strongly systematic reductions which are of
type-1 but not of type-2. To take one example, circuit theory is instantiated by
Maxwell’s equations and its success can be explained quite systematically, and
with a great deal of generality, on the basis of Maxwell’s theory: at a certain
intermediate level detail, Ohm’s law, and rules governing governing capacitors,
inductors and various other circuit elements all can be derived in similar fash-
ion from Maxwell’s equations (see, for example, [81]) although at the most
fine-grained level of explanation, results from solid state physics pertaining the
specific materials used to make these devices must be invoked. Yet, despite
the generality of these derivations at an intermediate level of detail, it does
not seem that there is any simple limit of the form given in the definition of
reduction2 that neatly encapsulates all such derivations. Therefore, this serves
as an example of systematic-ness within reduction that is not associated with
type-2 reduction.
Moreover, while formal limits tend to feature most centrally in type-2 reduc-
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tions, this does not mean that they may not also play some partial role in either
systematic or piecemeal type-1 reductions. The essential difference between the
manner in which limits are employed in type-2 reductions and the manner in
which they may be employed in type-1 reductions is this: in type-2 reductions,
for any model of any Tl system at all, we expect to retrieve some model Mh of
Th describing the same system when we dial the values of the parameters {ǫi} in
that model sufficiently close to zero. In type-1 reductions, this is not necessarily
the case since there is no requirement in type-1 reductions that every Tl system
correspond to some Th system, but only that every model of Th that successfully
(if approximately) describes a real physical system be instantiated by some do-
main of some Tl model; the explanation as to how this instantiation occurs may
rely partially upon some particular limit-based result, combined with a number
of other non-limit-based results and assumptions.
1.6.1 Reduction and Explanation
The task of any type of reduction considered here, whether type-1 or type-2,
systematic or piecemeal, can be regarded as a task of explanation - specifically,
of explaining why some model of Th succeeds at describing some system or set of
systems on the basis of some model of Tl. The criteria for scientific explanation
are notoriously controversial and seemingly variable across different parts of
science, so it is worthwhile taking a moment to place my analysis within this
broader discussion.
It is straightforward to see that both reduction1 and reduction2 fit squarely
into the traditional deductive-nomological model of explanation, which takes
explanation to be deduction of the explanandum from premises that include at
least one universal law and typically also some auxiliary premises [50]. In the
context specifically of DS reduction, the explanandum is the dynamics of the
image model M∗h , while the universal law is the dynamics of the low-level Ml,
and the auxiliary assumptions are given by a domain restriction within the state
space Sl. The bridge rules, analogue model and strong analogy relationship
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all complement the derivation of the image model dynamics for purposes of
clarifying the connection between the image modelM∗h and the high-level model
Mh.
While reduction1 and reduction2 are well-accomodated by the DN model of
explanation, this model faces a number of well-known difficulties [88]. Neverthe-
less, the particular nuances which make trouble for the DN model, such as the
need to account for assymmetries of explanation and to ensure that premises are
relevant to the conclusion, need not concern us here since they do not arise in
the cases I consider. Moreover, while the DN model was formulated by Hempel
within the framework of logical empiricism, nothing in the DN model’s cen-
tral elements suggests that it cannot also be applied within a semantic, realist
framework. A number of more current models of explanation, such as Salmon’s
causal-mechanical model and Kitcher’s unificationist model, have endeavoured
to refine and update the deductive-nomological model so as to avoid the above-
mentioned difficulties, and do so within a realist framework. Others, such as van
Fraassen’s constructive empiricist account, have sought to replace it wholesale
[88], [61],[105]. I leave it as an open question, which, if either, of the main realist
refinements of the DN model best accommodates the examples I consider.
In section 1.6.2, I explain why wholly systematic approaches to reduction do
not generally succeed, illustrating my point with the by-now familiar examples of
the NM/SR and CM/QM intertheory relations. I then consider the completely
piecemeal approach in section 1.6.3, but argue that it is too weak a position. I
contend, by reference to particular examples, that it is usually possible to retain
a degree of generality and systematic-ness in deriving the image model dynamics
from the base model Ml, without having to produce a totally new derivation for
each system separately. I go on in section 1.6.4 to elaborate and defend a ‘semi-
systematic,’ or template-based, approach to theory reduction that reconciles the
role of system-specific details in reductions with the desire to understand the
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general mechanisms and principles at work in reductions across a wide range
of systems. Not surprisingly, the degree of generality that can be retained in
accounts of theory reduction will depend on the particular pair of theories, and
models, in question.
1.6.2 Completely Systematic Approaches to Theory Re-
duction
Below, I argue that a completely systematic approach to reduction does not
generally succeed in physics, and support this view with two examples: the re-
duction of Newtonian mechanics to special relativity (by ‘special relativity,’ I
mean Lorentz covariant classical dynamics) and the reduction of classical me-
chanics to quantum mechanics.
Completely Systematic Approaches to the NM-SR Reduction
If a completely systematic type-2 reduction of NM to SR is probably not possi-
ble, as argued in section 1.2.1, might a completely systematic type-1 reduction
be? That is, for all physical systems whose behavior can be approximated by
some Newtonian model, is it possible to provide a single general derivation of
the corresponding image laws of NM that applies to all such systems? I claim
that one cannot, and offer an example to illustrate my point.
Consider an SR model of an idealised system consisting of two masses con-
nected by a spring that is sufficiently stiff and sufficiently compressed that the
total system contains enough potential energy to make the rest mass of the total
system substantially exceed the sum of the individual constituent masses; the
spring itself is assumed to have effectively zero rest mass. (While perhaps not
very realistic, one can at least in principle model such a system in SR.) Assume
that the center of mass the combined system behaves in Newtonian fashion and
that the centers of mass of each of the masses do as well. An explanation as to
why this is so will have to include some explanation as to why the energy stored
in the spring is not released (for instance, because it is held together by powerful
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clamp). For, if the potential energy (which is comparable to the rest energies
of the two masses) were converted to kinetic energy, the bodies would fly off at
some substantial fraction of the speed of light and non-Newtonian effects would
become apparent. Consider also a system whose total rest mass is the same
as the total mass of the earlier system, but this time in which the mass is due
entirely to the rest masses of its constituents, and not to the contributions of
internal energy resulting from their interactions or motion. In such a case, the
explanation as to why such a system behaves in Newtonian fashion will be of a
different nature, since there is no need to explain why potential energy is not
being released. In this case, the fact that the body isn’t travelling too close to
the speed of light (relative to some fixed inertial frame) and that there aren’t
excessively strong external forces acting on it should suffice to account for its
Newtonian behavior. Thus, in each case, system-specific details concerning the
nature of the internal binding forces (or lack thereof) within the bodies will play
some role in the explanation of Newtonian behavior.
To take a more realistic example, consider a heavy atomic nucleus that fol-
lows an approximately Newtonian trajectory in a cyclotron (say, the circular
trajectory of a moving charge in a constant magnetic field). The explanation
as to why the trajectory of the nucleus is approximately Newtonian will de-
pend in part on an explanation as to why the binding energy of the nucleus
is not released, causing fragments of the nucleus to fly off at some significant
portion of the speed of light. This explanation will depend on details of the
internal constitution and binding of the nucleus in question and, in particular,
on its half-life. Again, system-specific details play some role in the explana-
tion of Newtonian behavior, precluding a single reduction that encompasses all
Newtonian systems.
By demonstrating the need to invoke system-specific details when attempting
provide a complete explanation of Newtonian behavior in different systems,
these examples illustrate that a reduction of NM to SR that is both complete
and completely general - or, to keep to my terminology, completely systematic
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- does not exist. However, given that the NM-SR reduction ought to have been
at the outset the most likely example of completely systematic reduction, this
particular case does not bode well for the widspread applicability of completely
systematic approaches to reduction.
Having demonstrated that no completely systematic account of the reduction
of NM to SR, either of type 1 or type 2, is available, I will now turn to my second
example, which also will be the focus of Chapter 2: the reduction of classical to
quantum mechanics.
Completely Systematic Approaches to the CM-QM Reduction
If a completely systematic type-2 reduction of CM to QM is probably not possi-
ble, as argued in section 1.2.1, might a completely systematic type-1 reduction
be? That is, for all physical systems whose behavior can be approximated by
some classical model, is it possible to provide some overarching demonstration
of the approximate accuracy of classical models that encompasses all of such
systems? The answer again is patently no, but the arguments to this effect
depend to some degree on what one thinks counts as a successful application of
classical mechanics.
There is potentially a wide range of things one could mean by the term
‘classical.’ From the point of view of quantum theory, the least stringent no-
tion of classicality that we can adopt is apparent definiteness of the values of
variables like position and momentum, absent any dynamical constraints on
their evolution. As I argue later on, decoherence with respect to an appropri-
ate pointer basis, combined with a solution to the measurement problem, will
suffice to reproduce this attribute of classicality. However, people usually mean
more than just apparent definiteness when they speak of the empirical success
of classical mechanics; they also mean that certain dynamical constraints on the
evolution of position and momentum variables are satisfied by the systems in
question. Such dynamical constraints, in turn, come in different varieties. For
example, we might require that the relevant variables obey Newton’s Second
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Law of Motion, without placing any constraints on the allowable force laws that
may appear in this law. Such behavior will include, among other things, be-
havior involving contact forces and friction such as the simple pendulum, mass
on a spring, or normal force systems with and without friction. Also involving
contact forces are the equations of classical fluid dynamics, such as the Navier-
Stokes equation, which are derived from Newton’s Second Law (combined with
additional assumptions affecting the form of the contact forces involved). On
the other hand, one could restrict one’s notion of classical behavior further to
systems described in terms of conservative forces, which can be characterised
in terms of a simple classical potential - for example, the mass on a spring and
the simple pendulum. And one could even further restrict one’s attention to
classical behavior which consists only of behavior that can be described in terms
of fundamental force laws, such as electromagnetism, in which the conservative
forces arise from fields rather than contact forces.
These different classes of systems, which encompass different models of clas-
sical behavior, will, of course, have different quantum mechanical underpinnings.
For classical systems involving a fundamental force law, the potential that ap-
pears in the classical equation of motion will be the same as the one appearing
in the quantum equation of motion. On the other hand, for classical systems
which involve contact forces or friction, the classical potential, if one exists, the
potential appearing the Schrodinger equation of the underlying quantum model
will be extremely complicated and different from the potential that appears in
the underlying microscopic quantum equations (it will likely only match the
potential employed in the classical model in some average sense). To be more
specific, consider two distinct systems described by the classical model of the
harmonic oscillator: the first a mass on a spring and the second an electric
charge moving in a tube bored through an axis of a uniform spherical charge
distribution (in which case the electric field will vary linearly with distance from
the center of the sphere) 9. In the second case, the classical potential generated
9I assume that the charge is sufficiently massive that energy losses through radiation can
be neglected.
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by the electric field will be the same potential that appears in the underlying
quantum model of the charge’es behavior. In the first case, the fact the that one
can employ a harmonic oscillator potential to describe the motion of the block
is something that needs to be explained in terms of the complex microscopic
constitution of the spring - at the microscopic level, this potential will be wildly
fluctuating on the length scale of the atoms making up the spring.
These two applications of the same classical model must be reduced sepa-
rately, and no complete reduction can be given that encompasses both. Thus, a
completely general, completely systematic, type-1 reduction of classical models
of macroscopic systems cannot be given, especially if one adopts a relatively
inclusive construal of what counts as classical behavior. Consideration of de-
tails specific to the system in question, or to the class of systems into which it
falls, will be required for a totally comprehensive reduction of the classical to
the quantum model of that system.
1.6.3 Completely Piecemeal Approaches to Reduction
The failure of completely systematic approaches to reduction, either of type 1
or of type 2, might lead one to take the view that reductions must be performed
in type-1, piecemeal fashion. A quote, again from David Wallace, suggests such
a piecemeal approach:
Crucially: this ‘reduction,’ on the instantiation model, is a local
affair: it is not that one theory is a limiting case of another per se,
but that, in a particular situation, the ‘reducing’ theory instantiates
the ‘reduced’ one. Consider the first example above, for instance.
The reason that classical mechanics is applicable to the planets of
the Solar System is not because of some general [italics mine] result
that classical mechanics is a limiting case of quantum mechanics.
Rather, the particular system [italics mine] under consideration -
the solar system - is such that some of its properties approximately
instantiate a classical-mechanical dynamical system. Others do not,
of course: it is not that the solar system is approximately classical,
it is that it (or a certain subset of its degrees of freedom) instantiate
an approximately classical system.
... The real story of the relations between scientific theories is not a
story about a tower of theories, with particle physics at the bottom
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and macroeconomics at the top: rather, it is a patchwork of domain-
relative instantiations [110].
According to Wallace, the fact that certain quantum systems approximately
instantiate classical Newtonian systems - or rather, that, for certain systems,
quantum models of those systems instantiate certain Newtonian models of those
same systems - is not something that can be accounted for systematically by
some general mathematical result, either involving a limit or, he seems also to
suggest, of any other form, but something that must be explained on a piecemeal
basis.
However, as I now argue, it is still possible to retain some measure of gen-
erality in our accounts of reduction, and we can do better than to provide
reductions in a totally piecemeal, case-by-case fashion. Indeed, it would be
surprising if the rather striking formal results relating the dynamical and kine-
matical structures of superseded and superseding theories in physics did not
have some fairly widespread relevance to actual instances of reduction; to say,
for instance, that the result that lim v
c
→0 1√
1− v2
c2
= 1, and the fact that plenty
of relativistic equations return Newtonian ones as a result, has no widespread
relevance to the emergence of NM behavior from SR is (for reasons which I take
to be self-evident) utterly implausible. Limits or other general formal results,
while they do not in themselves constitute complete reductions, often do lend
significant insight into the mechanisms and principles that relate the high- and
low-level theory models of many or all such systems.
Piecemeal Reduction vs. the Pluralism of Cartwright and Dupre
Wallace’s piecemeal approach to reduction may call to mind the pluralism of
Cartwright and Dupre, who, like Wallace, take pains to underscore the patch-
work nature of regularities described by scientific theories and to characterise
these regularities as islands of order in a much vaster sea of irregularity. Yet the
patchwork of Wallace’s view differs dramatically in certain crucial respects from
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that of Cartwright and Dupre. Wallace’s patchwork respects the hierarchical
distinction between high- and low- level theories, with theories in physics at the
bottom and those in chemistry, biology, and psychology successively further up;
moreover, it respects the reducibility, in the sense specified by Wallace’s concept
of instantiation, of high- to low- level theories. Cartwright and Dupre’s plural-
ist view, on the other hand, is strongly anti-reductionist in that it denies the
reducibility of higher- to lower- level theories, and moreover opposes the very
distinction between high- and low- level theories [23], [32]. Thus, while both
views commonly acknowledge the patchwork nature of scientific regularities,
this is simply a reflection of the fact that both strive to grapple - in very differ-
ent ways - with the same fact about about the way in which science describes
nature.
As a consequence of the differences just cited, the reductionist and pluralist
accounts may be further distinguished in terms of the way they characterise the
relationship between the domains of different theories. In Wallace’s patchwork,
the domains of higher-level theories are contained in those of low-level theories;
that is, systems that instantiate the laws or models of a higher-level theory also
instantiate those of a lower-level theory (though the reverse is not generally
true). Cartwright and Dupre’s patchwork imposes no requirement that the
domain of a high-level theory, say in biology, be contained in that of some
low-level theory in physics. In this sense, the various patches making up the
patchwork on the pluralist view are on more level footing than they are on the
reductionist view; the domains of theories in physics and in biology are simply
different on the pluralist view and the former are not required to contain the
latter; in fact, the pluralist view explicitly requires that this kind of containment
does not occur. Thus, Wallace’s view will typically ascribe much larger domains
to low-level theories than will the pluralist view of Cartwright and Dupre, since
Wallace’s view requires these domains to subsume those of higher-level theories
while Cartwright and Dupre’s denies this subsumption.
This difference between the reductionist and pluralistic accounts of the patch-
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work nature of scientific regularities can in part be traced back to a difference
in the degree to which they condone extrapolation from the observed success
of scientific theories in the carefully controlled contexts where they are often
tested, to their applicability in the much vaster, and typically much more com-
plex, world outside of these contexts. Wallace, along with most of the scientific
and philosophical communities, accepts the legitimacy of such extrapolations,
implicitly taking them as a natural induction on the base of data extracted
from experiments. For instance, while most of what is regarded as the confirm-
ing evidence for the Standard Model of particle physics is drawn from scattering
experiments performed in particle accelerators, physicists typically assume that
these laws also apply in contexts highly remote from particle accelerator exper-
iments, such as occur in efforts to describe the evolution of the early universe.
Cartwright and Dupre, on the other hand, regard such inferences as far too
cavalier and argue that we ought to be more reserved in our extrapolations.
Cartwright, for instance, claims that the theories of physics and the other sci-
ences apply only ceteris paribus, under the carefully tuned conditions under
which they are typically tested. Thus her view goes beyond mere skepticism
about claims, for instance, that biological systems fall within the domain of the
Standard Model or any potential successor to the Standard Model; it centers
on an explicit denial of such claims. Thus, she argues that the patchwork of
scientific practice most strongly supports a metaphysical picture in which it is
not just the contexts in which we can apply our theories to make predictions
that are disjointed, but nature itself.
In summary, one must not overlook the fact that the piecemeal approach to
reduction is just that - an approach to reduction - and thus, unlike Cartwright’s
view, will generally support the idea of higher-level regularities being reduced
to lower-level ones. The kind of diversity that is supported by the piecemeal
approach to reduction is only diversity in the sense of a single underlying theory
providing different explanations of different high-level phenomena, though in
contrast to Cartwright and Dupre’s pluralism, these different explantions may
82
be given within the same underlying theoretical framework; Wallace’s piecemeal
approach to reduction is thus entirely compatible with the idea that there is a
single underlying, universal theory of fundamental physics, and that the many
disparate patches of higher-level regularity all fall within the domain of this one
theory. Cartwright’s view is explicitly anti-reductionist and anti-unfication, and
the diversity that is suggested by Cartwright’s view is diversity at a much deeper,
metaphysical level, since it not only suggests different explanations for different
higher-level regularities, but ultimately that the need for different explanations
reflects a world that is dappled not only in terms of our ability to discern patterns
in high-level phenomena, but fundamentally.
1.6.4 Reduction Templates
Although it is not possible to give a completely general, systematic account of
how a superseded theory Th reduces to a superseding theory Tl, it is often pos-
sible to retain a significant degree of generality in explanations of why certain
systems modelled in Tl also may be approximately modelled in Th, and there-
fore to do better than to approach theory reduction on a completely piecemeal
basis. The degree of generality that can be retained in such explanations de-
pends strongly on the two theories in question, though in most if not all of the
cases mentioned in the first paragraph of the Introduction to this chapter, is
substantial.
Given that any system in the class is described both by a high-level model
Mh and a low level model Ml, the deductive portion of the reduction consists
of deriving the image model M∗h from Ml. Systems with models in Th can be
paritioned into classes, such that reductions to Tl of the Th models of systems
in the same class follow the same ‘template,’ and reductions of systems in dif-
ferent classes follow different templates. A template is an incomplete proof, or
outline, of the basic steps and principles and mechanisms that are involved in
deriving the image model M∗h from Ml. A given template may take for granted
assumptions that can only be proven by considering the full particularities of the
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individual system in question, or that are merely plausible conjectures awaiting
proof. Systems within a given reduction template may differ substantially in
their Tl description, though at a certain intermediate level of detail, the basic
outlines of the reasoning that explains their approximate Th behavior are the
same.
To a degree, the separation into reduction classes of systems in Th’s domain
is arbitrary, and depends in particular on how detailed the template associated
with the class is. Ultimately, the most detailed possible explanation of why
a particular Tl system exhibits Th regularities will take account of things like
the exact state of the system and its exact microscopic constitution; such an
approach amounts essentially to cranking the relevant initial conditions through
the appropriate equations of motion and then reading the information relevant
to the Th level of description off from it. At this level, each template amounts
to a completely detailed, rigorous proof of reduction, and each separate system
has its own reduction template and is the sole member of its reduction class.
However, such explanations in practice are never given because we are not ca-
pable of gaining this kind of detailed information about the systems we care
about. Moreover, they tend to obscure the general principles and mechanisms
at work across a wide range of instances of reduction. If, on the other hand,
one is willing to sacrifice some detail in the template by making certain general,
plausible assumptions about the system in question (which one can go back and
try to prove rigorously later if one likes), then one may gain some insight into
these mechanisms and principles and where they fit in to the overall scheme of
the full reduction. Templates significantly reduce the labor involved in explain-
ing particular instances of reduction by compartmentalising the derivation of
the image model on the one hand into those parts that require specific reference
to the system in question, and, on the other hand, those parts of the derivation
that are uniform across the reduction class.
Thus, a template-based approach to reduction is one in which a variety of
explanations of the approximate Th behavior of a particular system, varying ac-
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cording to level of detail, are possible. Explanations provided by more general,
less detailed templates will apply across a correspondingly larger reduction class
of systems; however, the derivations of the model of the systems in the reduc-
tion class may take a number of claims for granted, since proving these claims
would require considering the particular details of different systems within the
class. On the other hand, less general, more detailed templates will tend to take
the particularities of individual systems into account, and therefore only apply
over smaller reduction classes; the reduction classes of these more detailed tem-
plates should be subsets of the reduction classes corresponding to less detailed
templates for the same system.
Both kinds of templates, general and detailed, are necessary to a full under-
standing of reduction: the former because it illustrates the general principles
and mechanisms at work in the reduction of the Th to the Tl models of a wide
range of systems, and the latter because it ‘fills in’ or completes the more general
template with a detailed demonstration of the assumptions taken for granted
in the more general template. Thus, accounts of reduction provide the most in-
sight not when they are given exclusively at the finest level of detail, nor when
they are given exclusively at the greatest level of generality, but rather when
they are given in stages, with earlier stages corresponding to a template at the
greatest level of generality and later stages corresponding to progressively more
detailed templates, whose reduction classes narrow at each step to account for
more details specific to the system under investigation. Each stage can be seen
as combing over the same deductive path between Tl and Th, but each time in
progressively finer detail, so that both the broad outlines and the fine details of
the explanation can be understood.
Below, I return briefly to the two examples of the CM-QM reduction and the
NM-SR reduction, and suggest in broad terms how a template-based approach
might be applied to them.
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Reduction Templates for the NM-SR Reduction
I argued above that the reduction of Newtonian mechanics to special relativ-
ity cannot be given a systematic formulation, either of type 1 or type 2. On
the other hand, I claim that we can do better than to explain reductions of
Newtonian behavior to SR on a totally piecemeal, case-by-case basis.
Earlier, I argued that Newtonian systems with significant internal energy
(e.g., binding energy comparable to their rest energy) will require a different
explanation for their Newtonian behavior than Newtonian systems that do not
have significant internal energy; on a template-based approach, these two sets of
systems would belong to distinct reduction classes, where the reduction template
for the former class will include some account of why this energy is not released.
However, at a less detailed level of explanation, in which the rest of mass of
composite bodies is taken as an assumption rather than as something to be
explained, and the internal structure of these bodies not considered, these two
sets of systems might belong to the same reduction class and the reduction of
their NM models to their SR models follow the same reduction template.
Reduction Templates in the CM-QM Reduction
As in the case of the NM-SR reduction, I argued above that in the case of the
CM-QM reduction, systematic reductions of type 1 and 2 are not available.
As in the NM-SR case, the failure of totally systematic accounts does not
require us to consider all classical systems on a case-by-case basis. The largest,
most general reduction class for the quantum-classical reduction might be simply
those systems which appear to have definite values for properties such as position
and momentum. As I argue below, decoherence combined with a solution to
the measurement problem should suffice to explain the classicality - construed
in this broad sense - of these systems.
However, we might identify further subclasses of this reduction class: in par-
ticular, the subclass of systems which approximately obey Newtonian equations
of motion. Then we might identify further subclasses of this class corresponding
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to Newtonian systems involving contact forces and those involving fundamental
forces. In the latter case the potential appearing in classical equations is the
same as the potential appearing in the underlying quantum equations, while in
the latter the two potentials are different (assuming these contact forces even
admit description in terms of a classical potential). Proceeding further, we
can distinguish subclasses of the ‘contact force’ reduction class corresponding
to fluid systems exhibiting regularities like the Navier-Stokes equation (which
is derived from Newton’s second law and thus counts as an instance of it ap-
plication) and to systems like the simple pendulum. The microscopic origins
of the phenomenological force laws employed in these two sets of cases will be
substantially different. On the other hand, we can also identify subclasses of
the ‘fundamental force’ reduction class corresponding, say, to gravity and elec-
tromagnetism.
At the most fine-grained level, there will be a reduction class for every sys-
tem and every state of every system (for some states may yield classical behavior
while others don’t). Yet, as was suggested above, if one proceeds immediately
to this level of description without first providing the more general reduction
templates, the general principles and mechanisms which underlie the emergence
of many instances of classical behavior, such as decoherence, Ehrenfest’s the-
orem, and the compounding of micro into macro degrees of freedom, will be
completely obscured.
In the following chapter, I will illustrate the application of a template-based
approach to the CM-QM reduction, in particular by focusing on the reduction
class consisting of classical systems involving only basic force laws like the grav-
itational and electrostatic forces.
Template-based Reduction and the Patchwork Nature of Higher-Level
Regularities
Earlier, when discussing the piecemeal approach to reduction, I pointed to a
superficial similarity between this view and Nancy Cartwright’s ‘dappled’ pic-
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ture of physical laws: namely, that both view higher-level regularities as islands
of order in a much vaster sea of irregularity. Yet, on further analysis, the fact
they share this should come as no surprise, for both views are simply making
an effort to come to terms with what is, after all, a fact about science that any
account of higher level regularities in science must come to grips with. Scien-
tific theories do often tend to operate in isolated patches; the laws of genetics
do apply to living organisms, but not to the inorganic matter and energy and
space and time that make up most of the cosmos; the Standard Model works
well at predicting the results of scattering experiments, but none of us can use
it to predict the population dynamics of badgers in the UK; the laws of circuit
theory work well at predicting the currents and voltages in a circuit, but not for
predicting the scattering cross sections for hadron collisions. No understanding
of the relation between different sets of scientific regularities, whether they are
characterized by different theories within a single science or theories between
different sciences, can be plausible without somehow accommodating this fact.
The template-based approach to reduction, I believe, accommodates the di-
versity and patchwork nature of higher-level regularities more effectively than
does the piecemeal approach to reduction. Like the piecemeal approach, the
template-based view accommodates the diversity of higher-level regularities by
providing different explanations where necessary for different patches of regu-
larity, but all within the framework of the same fundamental theory; on the
template-based view the different explanations correspond to different reduc-
tion templates. Where the template-based approach surpasses the piecemeal
approach is in the fact that the template-based approach provides a frame-
work that facilitates the identification and emphasis of the general principles
and mechanisms that apply across different patches of higher-level regularity,
thereby enabling a more general, systematic understanding of the particular
reductions under consideration than can be achieved by following the purely
piecemeal approach.
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Reduction Templates and Multiple Realisation
Template-based reduction is ideally suited to accommodate the fact of multiple
realisation. On a DS approach, multiple realisability corresponds to the fact
that more than one model of a theory Tl can serve to reduce to the same model
of Th, or that there is more than one bridge map through which reduction
can occur between a single pair of models Ml and Mh, or that more than
one low-level state xl may instantiate the same high-level state xh (I discuss
multiple realisation in DS reduction further in the concluding chapter). The
image models M∗h corresponding to these distinct realisations may be different,
and so the templates for deriving these image models will be distinct at some
fine-grained level of detail. However, it may happen that these distinct, more
fine-grained templates, may have a sufficient number of steps in common that
they can be seen as refinements of the same more general template.
1.7 Summary
Ultimately, the approach to physical reduction that I advocate in this disserta-
tion can be classified as a dynamical systems approach, which is neither wholly
systematic nor wholly piecemeal, but based instead on the use of reduction tem-
plates. In deducing an image model M∗h for some model Mh of Th from a model
Ml of Tl, a complete proof may be difficult or practically impossible to come by
in the case of highly complicated systems. As we will see in the next chapter, in
such a case plausible but unproven assumptions about the system in question
need to be made, and the deduction of M∗h within a particular domain of Ml
should be given in the form of a template rather than a complete proof. For
simpler systems, it may be possible to provide templates that are sufficiently
complete that they constitute complete proofs of the image model.
In summary, the goal of template-based reduction as much to tell a story
about the relationship between the alternative descriptions of the physical world
offered by different physical theories as it is to give a proof of the approximate
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accuracy of the high-level theory’s models on the basis of the low-level theory’s
models (the story, if told in sufficient detail, should amount to such a proof).
Necessarily, given the semantic, dynamical systems approach taken here, as well
as the specialisation to theories in physics, it will be a story told in the language
of mathematics.
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Chapter 2
The Classical Domain of
Non-Relativistic Quantum
Mechanics
The first two theories that I consider as an application of dynamical systems,
template-based reduction are Newtonian mechanics and nonrelativistic quantum
mechanics. Specifically, I consider the reduction of a class of models of Newto-
nian mechanics describing N macroscopic centers of mass interacting through
a time-independent potential, to a class of corresponding models within Ev-
erettian and Bohmian quantum mechanics. Throughout, I refer to the Everett
theory as the Bare/Everett theory as a reminder that, from a mathematical
point of view, Everett’s theory just is the bare formalism of quantum theory,
prescribing unitary dynamics for a vector in a Hilbert space without collapse.
I do not address more abstract algebraic approaches to quantum theory in this
thesis; the interested reader can consult, for example, Landsman’s [63], or [64].
In section 2.1, I discuss the measurement problem as it relates to the re-
duction of classical to quantum mechanics, and my reasons for considering the
Everett and Bohm theories in parallel. In section 2.2, I present the model of
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Newtonian mechanics to be reduced, and the models of Everettian and Bohmian
quantum mechanics to which I reduce it. In section 2.3, I describe the basic
mechanisms of decoherence, measurement and effective wave function collapse
in Bohmian and Everettian quantum mechanics, including a review of the deco-
herent histories framework in the Schrodinger picture. In section 2.4, I provide
a template for the DS reduction of the model of Newtonian mechanics to the
corresponding model in the Bare/Everett theory. Finally, in section 2.5, I pro-
vide a template for the DS reduction of the model of Newtonian mechanics to
the corresponding model in the Bohm theory.
2.1 The Measurement Problem
Given the realist background of this thesis, any attempt to reduce classical to
quantum theory must take account of the quantum measurement problem. For,
it is only through some resolution to this problem that the connection between
the microscopic indeterminacy (relative to familiar variables such as position and
momentum) of quantum theory and the apparent macroscopic determinacy, and
determinism, of classical theory can be elucidated according to the demands of
the realist. It is for this reason that, in considering the reductions that I do, I
have adopted two proposed resolutions to the measurement problem, the Everett
and Bohm theories.
However, I hope that my analysis will contain points of interest for readers
skeptical of the Everett and Bohm theories, or of realist approaches to quantum
theory more generally. As Wallace has argued at length, Everett’s theory, from
a mathematical point of view, is just the bare formalism of quantum theory
without collapse [110]. The distinction between the two, as far as usage goes,
comes from the added points of metaphysical and epistemological interpretation
that the Everett theory attaches to the bare formalism. The most controversial
claim of Everett’s theory, that each branch of the total wave function, as defined
by the requirement of decoherence, corresponds to an independent ‘world’ with
92
its own determinate reality, emerges as a consequence of taking the theory’s
mathematics seriously as a guide to the structure of the physical world; ‘taking
the math seriously,’ on this view, entails not inserting ad hoc exceptions to the
theory’s laws for purposes of agreeing with the experimental data, as advocates
of more traditional positivist or operationalist approaches, such as the famous
Copenhagen Interpretation, are often accused of doing. Since much of the thesis
concerns the bare formalism of quantum theory, and any successful interpreta-
tion of quantum theory is likely to incorporate this formalism in some fashion
or other, the skeptic about Everett and Bohm may still find a few pieces of
pertinent material in the pages to follow. This material will be concentrated
primarily in the sections pertaining to the Bare/Everett theory.
2.1.1 Motivation for Considering the Bare/Everett and
Bohm Theories in Parallel
One motivation for considering the Everett and Bohm theories together is that,
if one is going to attempt to effect these reductions within the context of the
Bohm theory, it is necessary anyway first to effect them within the context
of the Bare/Everett theory (indeed, the project of this thesis grew out of my
initial investigations into the classical domain of Bohm’s theory). The reason
for this is that in the Bohm theory, the dynamics associated with the added
structure of the theory - namely, the guidance equation for the added variables,
designated ‘beables’ by John Bell (of the famous Bell Inequality), one the Bohm
theory’s foremost proponents - depends on the value of the quantum state, but
the value of the quantum state does not depend on the dynamics or configu-
ration of the additional variables. Thus, in order to assess the behavior of the
beables it is necessary, at least in a formal mathematical sense, to go through
the Bare/Everett theory in determining the unitary evolution of the wave func-
tion. Where Everettians and Bohmians disagree, primarily, is on whether the
structure associated with the wave function is sufficient to save the appearances,
and, if not, on whether the additional structure of Bohm’s theory does enable
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the theory to save the appearances.
Brown and Wallace have argued that Bohm’s theory is Everett’s theory ‘in
denial,’ in the sense that Everett’s theory already contains all of the necessary
mathematical structure to save the appearances, and so the additional con-
figurations of Bohm’s theory are therefore merely epiphenomenal ‘idle wheels.’
However, their argument relies on the presumption that Everett’s theory does in-
deed save the appearances - by no means a consensus opinion. Accepting Brown
and Wallace’s point that, if Everett’s theory does indeed save the appearances,
Bohm’s additional configurations are superfluous, I nevertheless maintain a con-
sideration of Bohm’s theory out of recognition of the possibility that Everett’s
theory may, for one reason or other, fail to save the appearances, and that
Bohm’s additional configurations may offer the mechanism needed to address
its shortcomings. The criticism that is currently the source of most informed
skepticism about Everett’s theory is that it cannot adequately explain the role
of probability - specifically, the success of the Born, or |ψ|2, Rule - in ordi-
nary quantum mechanics. Deutsch and Wallace have proposed a derivation of
the Born Rule from the principles of rational decision theory, which has been
notably defended by Greaves [28], [109], [42]. For further discussion of the ‘Ev-
erett in denial’ charge against the Bohm theory, the reader should consult, in
particular, the exchange between Brown/Wallace and Valentini [82], [103].
In section 2.3, I provide a brief summary of the accounts of measurement
offered by the Bare/Everett and Bohm theories.
2.2 The Models
In this section, I describe the detailed structure of the models that I consider in
the context of the CM/QM reduction, specifying the state space S and dynam-
ical map D of each.
Consider a system consisting of N macroscopic centers of mass interacting
through a simple potential. Newtonian mechanics, Everettian quantum me-
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chanics and Bohmian quantum mechanics all provide different descriptions of
this system.
2.2.1 The Newtonian Model
Consider a classical system modelled in the classical Hamiltonian framework,
consisting ofN centers of mass with positions and momenta {(X1, P1, ..., XN , PN )}
and masses {M1, ...,MN}, with the standard Hamiltonian H =
∑
i
P 2i
2Mi
+
V (X1, ..., XN ). The state space is classical N-particle phase space,
State Space
S = ΓN (2.1)
To condense the notation, I will write (X,P ) ≡ (X1, P1, ..., XN , PN ), and F (X,P ) ≡
F (X1, P1, ..., XN , PN ). The first order dynamical equations of evolution are
Hamilton’s equations:
Dynamics
dXi
dt
=
∂H
∂Pi
=
Pi
Mi
dPi
dt
= − ∂H
∂Xi
= − ∂V
∂Xi
.
(2.2)
Together, these reproduce Newton’s Second Law:
Mi
d2Xi
dt2
= − ∂V
∂Xi
(2.3)
Alternatively, as we have seen, the phase space dynamics can be prescribed in
terms of the dynamical map
(
X(t), P (t)
)
= D
[
t; (X0, P0)
]
=
(
e{◦,H}tX
∣∣
X0,P0
, e{◦,H}tP
∣∣
X0,P0
)
.
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2.2.2 The Everett/Bare-QM Model
In the context of a bare-QM/ Everettian picture, the quantum mechanical model
of N particles in isolation from their environment has as its state space the
Hilbert space of N spinless particles:
State Space w/o Environment
S = HS , (2.4)
where the subscript S denotes the system consisting of the central macroscopic
degrees of freedom under consideration. The first-order dynamics of the model
are specified by the Schrodinger equation:
Dynamics w/o Environment
i
∂
∂t
|ψ〉 = HˆS |ψ〉, (2.5)
where HˆS =
∑
i
Pˆ 2i
2Mi
+ V (Xˆ1, ..., XˆN ) and |ψ〉 ∈ HS .
More realistic models of macroscopic systems incorporate environmental de-
grees of freedom and their interaction with the macroscopic degrees of freedom
whose classicality we wish to explain. The state space of this model is
State Space w/ Environment
S = HS ⊗HE , (2.6)
where the subscript E denotes the environmental degrees of freedom, consisting
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of any degrees of freedom external to the centers of mass (which may include in-
ternal degrees of freedom of the bodies in question in addition to degrees of free-
dom not included in these bodies). The dynamics on the combined Hilbert space
of the macro- and micro- degrees of freedom is determined by the Schrodinger
equation,
Dynamics w/ Environment
i
∂
∂t
|χ〉 = (HˆS + HˆE + HˆI)|χ〉, (2.7)
where again HˆS =
∑
i
Pˆ 2i
2Mi
+ V (Xˆ1, ..., XˆN ), HˆE denotes the environmental
Hamiltonian, HˆI the Hamiltonian governing the interaction between the macro-
scopic degrees of freedom and the environment, and |χ〉 ∈ HS ⊗HE .
In the following discussion, I leave the forms of HˆI and HˆE unspecified,
though more detailed models, such as the well-known Caldeira-Legett model,
do specify the forms of these. My choice to leave the forms of HˆI and HˆE reflects
the generality of the template that I seek to provide for the reduction of CM
to QM . Accounts of macroscopic classical behavior within the context of more
specific models, like the Caldeira-Legett model, correspond to templates which,
though more complete as demonstrations of reduction, are correspondingly less
general.
2.2.3 The Bohm Model
The Bohmian model of a system of N particles incorporates all of the mathe-
matical structure of the Bare/Everett model, but adds an additional component
to the state space and to the dynamics. In addition to a quantum state residing
in a Hilbert space and the corresponding dynamics, the Bohm theory posits the
existence of a spatial configuration for each of the N particles in the system,
along with an accompanying dynamics for this configuration. The state space
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thus consists of two spaces: a Hilbert space, and a configuration space. For
purposes of concision, the state space can be regarded as the Cartesian product
of the two:
State Space w/o Environment
S = HS ×QS (2.8)
where, again, the subscript S denotes the system consisting of the central macro-
scopic degrees of freedom under consideration. The first-order dynamics of the
model are given by the first order (in time) equations:
Dynamics w/o Environment
i
∂
∂t
|ψ〉 = HˆS |ψ〉,
dQi
dt
=
1
Mi
∇iS(X)
∣∣
Q
(2.9)
where, again, HˆS =
∑
i
Pˆ 2i
2Mi
+V (Xˆ1, ..., XˆN ), |ψ〉 ∈ HS , Qi ∈ QS and ψ(X, t) ≡
〈X |ψ(t)〉 ≡ R(X, t)eiS(X,t).
In addition, the Bohm theory as originally formulated by Bohm was stip-
ulated to include an additional constraint, that the epistemic probability dis-
tribution over possible initial configurations Q0 is the Born Rule distribution
|〈X |ψ0〉|2. The combined dynamics of the configuration and the quantum state
possess a property known as equivariance that ensures that if this is the case,
the probability over configurations at any later time t is |〈X |ψ(t)〉|2. However,
work by Valentini and Westman, and Valentini, Russell and Towler has argued
that it may not be necessary to postulate the Born Rule distribution, but that
instead this distribution - or rather an arbitrarily close approximation to it -
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can be explained as a consequence of the dynamics of the Bohm theory, in that
these dynamics carry an arbitrary initial distribution, after coarse-graining, into
a distribution that very closely approximates the Born Rule distribution [104],
[101].
More realistic models of such systems incorporate environmental degrees of
freedom and their interaction with the macroscopic degrees of freedom whose
classicality we wish to explain. The state space of this model is
State Space w/ Environment
S =
(HS ⊗HE)× (QS ⊕QE), (2.10)
where the subscript E denotes the environmental degrees of freedom, consisting
of any degrees of freedom external to the centers of mass (which may include
internal degrees of freedom of the bodies in question in addition to degrees of
freedom not included in these bodies). The dynamics of the quantum state and
Bohmian configuration are determined by the first-order equations,
Dynamics w/ Environment
i
∂
∂t
|χ〉 = (HˆS + HˆE + HˆI)|χ〉,
dQi
dt
=
1
Mi
∇XiS(X, y)
∣∣
Q,q
dqj
dt
=
1
mj
∇yjS(X, y)
∣∣
Q,q
,
(2.11)
where |y〉 is a position eigenstate of HE , 〈X, y|χ〉 = R(X, y)eiS(X,y), Qi ∈
QS and qj ∈ QE . Moreover, the center of mass Bohmian configuration Qs is
defined by the relation QS,i =
∑
j
mjqj∑
j
mj
, where the sum is over all microscopic
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fundamental (from the perspective of Bohmian NRQM) particles contained in
the macroscopic body in question. Rimini and Peruzzi discuss the conditions
under which the center of mass Bohmian configuration QS obeys a guidance
equation of the usual form prescribed above [78].
2.2.4 A Few Comments About the Models
For a reduction of macroscopic Newtonian behavior to either Everettian or
Bohmian quantum theory to be complete, the class of system-environment mod-
els for the quantum theories described above, in which the degrees of freedom
of the central system S (also known as the ‘relevant’ degrees of freedom) are
centers of mass of macroscopic bodies, must be derived from a more fundamen-
tal model in which all of the degrees of freedom are microscopic - since, after
all, the center of mass degrees of freedom are simply weighted averages over
the microscopic degrees of freedom of the bodies in question. Deriving these
models from the microscopic models is an important part of a complete reduc-
tion of macroscopic classical behavior to microscopic classical behavior, but one
that is likely to involve system-specific details regarding the specific material
consitution of the body in question the particular binding interactions that join
the microscopic particules into a single macroscopic body. Again, more detailed
templates should be provided to fill in the gaps in the template provided here.
Moreover, given that no environment is included in the Newtonian model,
some explanation as to why it has been incorporated into the quantum model
of the same system should be provided. Briefly, the answer is that, as a result
of quantum entanglement, external degrees of freedom which exert a negligible
effect on the degrees of freedom in a Newtonian model - such as very tiny
particles, or electromagnetic radiation - and therefore can be left out of the
model, can have a profound effect on the dynamics of these degrees of freedom
in the context of the quantum models. We shall see this in more detail in the
coming sections.
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2.3 Decoherence, Measurement and Effective Wave
Function Collapse
A quantum measurement on a subsystem S of closed system SAE (where A
constitutes any measuring apparatus that may be present and E the microscopic
environment) in a pure state is a unitary, dynamical process on SAE’s Hilbert
space that establishes a particular kind of correlation between the degrees of
freedom of S and the degrees of freedom external to S. The presence or absence
within E of human observers is, on the following exposition, immaterial to the
physical description of the measurement process, which, like any other physical
process, is modelled throughout as a unitary evolution on a Hilbert space. The
process whereby such correlations are established in measurements is an example
of the more general phenomenon of quantum decoherence. In this section, I
review the concepts of quantum measurement and decoherence, explaining how
they are manifested in the particular contexts of the Everett and Bohm theories,
and how they give rise to the appearance of effective wave function collapse in
these theories. In the process, I emphasise, following Maroney and Hiley, that
the sort of decoherence that suffices to produce effective collapse in Everett’s
theory does not suffice to do so in Bohm’s; a more specific kind of decoherence
is required to induce effective collapse in Bohm’s theory.
I begin with a brief, preliminary mathematical review of projection valued
measures (PVM’s) and positive operator valued measures (POVM’s), since these
notions underpin much of modern quantum measurement theory, as well as the
decoherent histories framework.
2.3.1 PVM’s and POVM’s
Given a Hilbert space H, a projection valued measure (PVM) on that Hilbert
space is a set of operators {Pˆi} on H satisfying the following criteria:
• ∑i Pˆi = Iˆ
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• PˆiPˆj = δij Pˆj (no sum over like indices).
Any Hermitian operator Aˆ on H can be decomposed in some PVM, according
to the operator’s spectral decomposition:
Aˆ =
∑
i
aiPˆi. (2.12)
Different possible measurement outcomes correspond in the bare quantum for-
malism to operators Pˆi, and, if the state of the system is |ψ〉, the probability of
the outcome ai on measurement is 〈ψ|Pˆi|ψ〉. Of course, on a realist interpreta-
tion of quantum theory such as the Everett or Bohm theory, the sense in which
the Pˆi correspond to determinate outcomes must be elaborated, and the fact
that the probability of the outcome ai is 〈ψ|Pˆi|ψ〉, must be demonstrated.
An example of a PVM is the set {∫
∆i
dX |X〉〈X |}, where ∆i form a partition
of the configuration space, and |X〉 are position eigenstates. Another is the set
{∫
Ωi
dP |P 〉〈P |}, where Ωi form a partition of the momentum space, and |P 〉 are
momentum eigenstates.
Given a Hilbert space H, a positive operator valued measure (POVM) on
that Hilbert space is a set of operators {Πˆi} onH satisfying the following criteria:
• ∑i Πˆi = Iˆ
• 〈ψ|Πˆi|ψ〉 ≥ 0 for all |ψ〉 ∈ H, for all i.
As in the case of PVM’s, each operator Πˆi corresponds to a measurement out-
come or to a range of such outcomes, the probability of which is 〈ψ|Πi|ψ〉 when
the system is in state |ψ〉. As Wallace notes in [110], the first criterion ensures
that the probabilities of all the outcomes sum to 1; the second ensures that
the probability of each outcome is a positive number. Note that any PVM is a
POVM, since 〈ψ|Pˆi|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|Pˆ 2i |ψ〉, and all of the eigenvalues of Pˆ 2i , which are
the squares of the eigenvalues of Pˆi, must be non-negative; in fact, for elements
of a PVM, all eigenvalues of a Pˆi are either 0 or 1.
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An example of a POVM is the set {∫
Σi
dXdP |X,P 〉〈X,P |}, where Σi form a
parition of the phase space and |X,P 〉 is a coherent state of fixed width centered
about the configuration X and the momentum P [110]. For our purposes, it
will suffice to identify a coherent state |X,P 〉 with a Gaussian wave packet of
the form
〈x|X,P 〉 = 1
L1/2π1/4
e−iPxe
−(x−X)2
2L2 (2.13)
that is narrowly peaked in both position and momentum and such that the
uncertainties in position and momentum ∆x and ∆p satisfy the minimum un-
certainty condition ∆x∆p = 12 (the constant L enforces this condition). The
coherent state |X,P 〉 is sometimes defined as an eigenstate of an annihilation
operator aˆ = 1√
2
(
√
mωXˆ + 1√
mω
Pˆ ) with some complex eigenvalue α and for
some m and ω (one can check that the wave packet state given is indeed an
eigenstate of this operator), though it will suffice here to understand by a co-
herent state simply a minimum uncertainty wave packet narrowly peaked both
in position and in momentum.
In general, the elements of this POVM will not be mutually orthogonal and
so will not constitute a PVM. However, if the cells Σi of the phase space partition
have dimensions in position and momentum that are significantly larger than
the position and momentum widths of the coherent states |X,P 〉, the POVM
elements Πˆi ≡
∫
Σi
dXdP |X,P 〉〈X,P | form an approximate PVM, since
ΠˆiΠˆj ≈ δijΠˆi, (2.14)
thereby ensuring approximate orthogonality of the projectors in the POVM.
For a much more thorough account of PVM’s and POVM’s, and of quan-
tum measurement more generally, the reader should consult Busch, Lahti and
Mittelstaedt’s excellent monograph, ‘The Quantum Theory of Measurement’
[18].
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2.3.2 Quantum Measurement
Let S be a subsystem consisting of the degrees of freedom we wish to measure, A
a subsystem consisting of a measuring apparatus, and E the degrees of freedom
external to S and A (e.g., air molecules, photons, etc.) which I shall call the
‘environment.’ Ignore for the moment any potential interaction or entanglement
with the environment and let us simply consider the interaction between S and
A, which I assume for the moment to be unitary. If A is to be an effective
measuring apparatus, then it should be the case that if the states {|si〉} consti-
tute a basis for S associated with some observable of S, and |ar〉 is some initial
‘ready’ state of the apparatus then over the time of the measurement interaction
between A and S
|si〉 ⊗ |ar〉 → |θi〉 ⊗ |ai〉, (2.15)
where 〈aj |ai〉 ≈ 0 for i 6= j (if i is a discrete index) or for i sufficiently different
from j (if i is a continuous index) and |θi〉 is an arbitrary state of A. If |θi〉 = |si〉,
then the measurement is classified as a ‘nondisturbing’ measurement and the
states |si〉 are called ‘pointer states’; otherwise, it is classified as a ‘disturbing’
measurement (the paradigmatic example of a disturbing measurement is an
ideal photon measurement, in which the |θi〉 would be the vacuum state of
the electromagnetic field for every i [27]). The first analysis of measurement
in the nondisturbing case, in which the apparatus was itself treated quantum
mechanically, was famously given by von Neumann in his seminal work [107]. 1
It follows from the linearity of the evolution that if the system S starts out
in a coherent superposition
∑
i ci|si〉, then the measurement interaction induces
the evolution
(
∑
i
ci|si〉)⊗ |ar〉 →
∑
i
ci|θi〉 ⊗ |ai〉, (2.16)
1Note that the term ‘pointer state’ is sometimes used to refer to states of the measuring
device - typically some ‘pointer’ on the measuring device - rather than of the measured system
itself.
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where again the states |ai〉 of A that become correlated to the different basis
states |si〉 are mutually orthogonal.
Let us now incorporate the environment into the analysis, allowing for in-
teraction between the environment E and the system SA and assuming that
the total system SAE is in a pure state that always evolves unitarily accord-
ing to the Schrodinger equation 2. If the states |θi〉 ⊗ |ai〉 are such that they
suffer minimal entanglement with the environment under interaction with the
environment, then this interaction will induce the evolution
|θi〉 ⊗ |ai〉 ⊗ |E0〉 → |θi〉 ⊗ |ai〉 ⊗ |Ei〉, (2.17)
where, for reasons that I discuss further below in the section on environmental
scattering, 〈Ej |Ei〉 ≈ 0 for i 6= j (if i is a discrete index) or for i sufficiently
different from j (if i is a continuous index). Thus, again by linearity, if S begins
in the initial pure state
∑
i ci|si〉 we can expect the measurement interaction to
induce the following evolution:
(
∑
i
ci|si〉)⊗ |ar〉 ⊗ |E0〉 →
∑
i
ci|θi〉 ⊗ |ai〉 ⊗ |Ei〉, (2.18)
where again 〈aj |ai〉 ≈ 0 and 〈Ej |Ei〉 ≈ 0 for i 6= j (if i is a discrete index) or
for i sufficiently different from j (if i is a continuous index). Typically, because
E contains many (often on the order of 1023 or more) degrees of freedom, this
process whereby the states |Ei〉 correlated to the states |si〉 become mutually
orthogonal - which is widely referred to as ‘decoherence’ - will be effectively
irreversible, at least on timescales short of quantum-mechanical Poincare recur-
rence times (see, for example, [12] for a discussion of Poincare recurrence in
quantum mechanics).
In cases where it is only the system A that interacts directly with E, the
states |ai〉 that undergo minimal entanglement with environment are sometimes
also referred to as pointer states, and as we shall see are typically constrained
2In typical cases of quantum measurement, the system S will be microsopic and A macro-
scopic, so it will often only be A that interacts directly with the environment.
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to be localised in both position and momentum as a result of environmental
scattering.
On the Everett interpretation, a measurement requires both orthogonality
of apparatus states (〈aj |ai〉 ≈ 0) and decoherence:
Decoherence: 〈Ej |Ei〉 ≈ 0 for i 6= j. (2.19)
The irreversible process of decoherence is conventionally regarded by Everettians
as inducing effective wave function collapse.
Measurement, and efective collapse of the quantum state, in Bohm’s theory
occurs only if the sets of states and {|ai〉} and {|Ei〉} are not just orthogonal but
specifically non-overlapping in configuration space - that is, only if 〈aj |y〉〈y|ai〉 ≈
0 ∀y ∈ QA for i 6= j and
Configuration Space Decoherence:〈Ej |y〉〈y|Ei〉 ≈ 0 ∀y ∈ QE for i 6= j.
(2.20)
Note that this condition entails 2.19, but is not entailed by it. The condition
that {|ai〉} be non-overlapping in A’s configuration space QA serves to ensure
that the Bohmian configuration of A becomes appropriately correlated to the
state of S, while the condition that {|Ei〉} be non-overlapping in E’s configu-
ration space QE serves to ensure not only that the Bohmian configuration of
the environment E becomes appropriately correlated to the states of A and
S, but also that this process is efffectively irreversible. Note that what I have
called ‘configuration space decoherence,’ Maroney and Hiley elsewhere has called
‘superorthogonality,’ also identifying it as the necessary condition for effective
collapse in Bohm’s theory (see [68] and [15]); in addition, Bohm, in his original
account of quantum measurement in pilot wave theory, emphasises the need for
wave packets to be disjoint in the beable configuration space in order to in-
duce effective collapse (though he does not employ the term ‘beable,’ which was
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later coined by Bell) [14]. If (2.20) is satisfied, the branches of the total quan-
tum state will have disjoint configuration space supports and only one branch
|si〉 ⊗ |ai〉 ⊗ |Ei〉 will govern the evolution of the total Bohmian configuration
of SAE; all other branches can be disregarded, although they are still present,
and the state has in this sense effectively collapsed onto a single branch.
Thus, in bare QM, a quantum measurement generally establishes a corre-
lation between the quantum state of system AE at some time after the mea-
surement interaction and the state of system S at some time prior to the mea-
surement interaction (in measurements of the first kind, the states of B will
in addition be correlated with the states of A after the measurement). In the
Bohm theory, a quantum measurement also does this, but additionally, and
more importantly, establishes a correlation between the configuration of system
AE after the measurement interaction and the quantum state of system S at
some time prior to the measurement interaction.
A Few Points About Measurement in Bohm’s Theory
In the Bohmian model of quantum measurement, AE’s configuration qAE , which
lies in the region of AE’s configuration space where the value of φi(y) ≡
〈y|ai, Ei〉 (|ai, Ei〉 ≡ |ai〉 ⊗ |Ei〉 and y denotes position in the total configu-
ration space of AE ) is non-negligible, for some i, becomes correlated to the
state si(x) ≡ 〈x|si〉 - not, in general, to S’s configuration qS . The ‘outcome’
of a measurement corresponds to a particular index i; the Bohmian configu-
ration qAE of system AE ‘registers’ the outcome i if it lies in a region where
φi(y) is non-negligible. This aspect of effective collapse in pilot wave theory is
consistent with our usual notion of collapse from conventional quantum theory.
The ‘outcome’ of the measurement is identified by the index i corresponding
to the packet that the total system point enters. Thus, a measurement occurs
in Bohm’s theory when the Bohmian configuration specifically of the external
degrees of freedom succeed, irreversibly, in picking out a branch of the total
system’s wave function. In the case where the states |si〉 are eigenstates of
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an operator AˆS that is degenerate, the dynamics will associate qAE with some
subspace of states in S’s Hilbert space, rather than with an individual state.
The configuration qS , on the other hand, does not play a major role in the
measurement process. By equivariance, it is constrained to lie in a region where
one of the si(x) is non-negligible. However, unlike the states φi(y), the different
si(x) may and often do have substantial overlap in S’s configuration space (for
example, in a measurement of angular momentum), so that the configuration
qS does little to distinguish among them. It is the fact that φi(y) do not have
substantial configuration space overlap that is crucial to ensuring a well-defined
measurement outcome in this example.
For convenience, we define the set AEi(t) ⊂ QAE , where QAE is the config-
uration space of AE, as the the subset of AE’s configurations that ‘register’ the
outcome i:
AEi(T ) ≡ suppǫ[φi(y)], (2.21)
where I call suppǫ[f(y)] ≡ {y ∈ QB| |f(y)| > ǫ,where ǫ > 0} the ‘ǫ-support’
of the function f (though occasionally I may abuse terminology and refer to it
simply as the support). Note that as long as the configuration space decoherence
condition is satisfied, and one does not choose ǫ too small, AEi(t)∩AEj(t) = ∅
for i 6= j - that is, the sets AEi are disjoint. Thus, the measurement has
outcome i if the regions defined by (2.21) are disjoint, and if qAE(t) ∈ AEi(t).
Note that on this definition, the measurement can only have an outcome if the
wave packets φi(y) have disjoint ǫ-support, for some sufficiently small value of
ǫ. Also note that the smallest value ǫ such that the AEi(t) are disjoint serves to
characterize the strength of the correlations between qAE and si(x) established
by the measurement; measurements can be characterized as ‘strong’ or ‘weak’
depending on the minimum value of ǫ that leads to disjoint AEi(t). Unless
stated otherwise, I will assume that the minimum value of ǫ that yields disjoint
AEi in a measurement in Bohm’s theory is extremely small - in other words,
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that configuration space decoherence has taken effect - making the measurement
strong.
To address the measurement problem, an interpretation of quantum theory
must both explain the appearance of determinate measurement outcomes and
the fact that measurement outcomes conform to Born Rule probabilities. In the
Bohm theory, there is no indeterminacy about the systems configuration - the
Bohmian configuration is always well-defined at every moment in time. Why
then the need for any kind of decoherence at all? Because, even in spite of
the determinacy of the Bohmian configuration, the measurement outcome itself
will not be determinate if the configuration space decoherence condition is not
satisfied. Moreover, regarding the second matter of the Born Rule probabilities,
if measurement outcomes are not clearly defined or determinate to begin with,
it will not be possible to assign probabilities to them.
Addressing the matter of determinacy of outcomes first, the configuration
qAE only registers a measurement outcome if the regions AEi are disjoint; this,
in turn, requires that the configuration space decoherence condition is satisfied.
In the absence of configuration space decoherence, the regions AEi may overlap;
if qAE lies in the overlap of more than one of the regions AEi, the measurement
will be indeterminate, since in this case qAE fails to single out a unique branch of
the quantum state. Even though the configuration qAE itself is determinate, the
outcome is not. Thus, on Bohm’s theory, a measurement process is indetermi-
nate for the simple and fairly banal reason that it fails dynamically to establish
a correlation between the configuration of AE and the state of S, much as a
measurement in classical mechanics would be indeterminate if the configuration
of the pointer on a measuring device were not dynamically correlated in the
appropriate manner with the state of the system being measured.
On a separate matter, it is worth noting that in cases where there is a
continuous infinity of branches in the total quantum state, the disjointness of
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the branches’ configuration space supports does not entail effective collapse as
straightforwardly as it does in cases where the number of branches is discrete. In
the discrete case, the configuration space decoherence condition guarantees the
existence of regions of configuration space between any two adjacent branches
such that the wave function is effectively zero there; by equivariance, if the
configuration is in the support of one branch, it will not be able to transition
to another branch because the Bohmian dynamics do not permit it to tra-
verse regions where the wave function is effectively zero. Thus, for as long as
the branches remain disjoint, the configuration is guaranteed to remain in its
branch. The same reasoning does not apply in the case where the expansion of
the quantum state consists of a continuous infinity of disjoint branches. For,
although two branches sufficiently separated in their indices may have disjoint
supports, there may be a continuum of intermediate branches between them,
such that the magnitude of the quantum state between the branches never be-
comes negligible 3. The suppression of drift between disjoint branches of the
Bohmian configuration in this case takes more effort to see. In the remainder
of my analysis, I assume without proof that disjointness of branches precludes
drift between those branches even in the case of continuously indexed branches;
the reader should take this as a conjecture - which I henceforth refer to as the
‘No Drift Conjecture’ - awaiting proof.
2.3.3 Environmental Decoherence: Localisation as a Re-
sult of Environmental Scattering
Generally speaking, ‘decoherence’ is the process whereby the degrees of freedom
external to some system - whether these degrees of freedom consist of some
purpose-constructed measuring apparatus or particles of dust, air, radiation,
etc. in the environment - interact and become entangled with that system.
Assume that the system S consisting of the degrees of freedom of interest and
the system E consisting of any degrees of freedom external to S are iniitially in
3Thanks to David Wallace for pointing this out to me.
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some product state:
|ψ〉 ⊗ |E0〉 = (α|ψ1〉+ β|ψ2〉)⊗ |E0〉. (2.22)
Assume further that the interaction between S and E is such that over time
scales where the internal dynamics of S can be ignored,
|ψ1〉 ⊗ |E0〉 → |ψ1〉 ⊗ |E1〉 (2.23)
|ψ2〉 ⊗ |E0〉 → |ψ1〉 ⊗ |E2〉, (2.24)
as will be the case when |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 belong to the set of pointer states of S,
where ‘pointer states’ here are defined as those states of S that suffer minimal
entanglement with E as a result of the interaction between S and E (much of
the analysis in this subsection draws on [94] and [57]). From these assumptions,
it follows that
(α|ψ1〉+ β|ψ2〉)⊗ |E0〉 → α|ψ1〉 ⊗ |E1〉+ β|ψ2〉 ⊗ |E2〉 (2.25)
over timescales where the internal dynamics of S can be ignored. The reduced
density matrix of the system S is
ρˆS =
1
2
{|ψ1〉〈ψ1|+ |ψ2〉〈ψ2|+ |ψ1〉〈ψ2|〈E2|E1〉+ |ψ2〉〈ψ1|〈E1|E2〉} (2.26)
When 〈E2|E1〉 ≈ 1, the state of the combined systems is a product state and they
are completely unentangled (as is the case at the beginning of the interaction).
If 〈E2|E1〉 ≈ 0, then
ρˆS ≈ 1
2
{|ψ1〉〈ψ1|+ |ψ2〉〈ψ2|} . (2.27)
The macroscopic objects of our everyday experience interact perpetually
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with their environments, which include degrees of freedom associated, for ex-
ample, with dust particles, air molecules, neutrinos and photons, via the scat-
tering of these particles off of the object in question. It is well-known that the
pointer states of typical macroscopic systems under such scattering interactions
are states that are localised both in position and in momentum; more specifi-
cally, they are the coherent states |q, p〉, where q and p denote the position or
spatial configuration q and the momentum p about which the coherent state is
peaked (see, for instance, [117] for arguments to this effect).
Thus, if |ψ1〉 = |q1, p1〉 and |ψ2〉 = |q2, p2〉, then
|q1, p1〉 ⊗ |E0〉 → |q1, p1〉 ⊗ |E1〉 (2.28)
|q2, p2〉 ⊗ |E0〉 → |q2, p2〉 ⊗ |E2〉, (2.29)
and
(α|q1, p1〉+ β|q2, p2〉)⊗ |E0〉 → α|q1, p1〉 ⊗ |E1〉+ β|q2, p2〉 ⊗ |E2〉 (2.30)
over timescales on which the internal dynamics of S can be ignored. The reduced
density matrix of the system S is
ρˆS =
1
2
{|q1, p1〉〈q1, p1|+ |q2, p2〉〈q2, p2|+ |q1, p1〉〈q2, p2|〈E2|E1〉+ |q2, p2〉〈q1, p1|〈E1|E2〉}
(2.31)
If 〈E2|E1〉 ≈ 0, then
ρˆS ≈ 1
2
{|q1, p1〉〈q1, p1|+ |q2, p2〉〈q2, p2|} . (2.32)
If the environment just consists of a single particle, then if the wavelength
of the environmental particle is sufficiently small, the single particle will be
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sufficient to result in orthogonality of environmental states: 〈E2|E1〉 ≈ 0. If,
on the other hand, the wavelength is large in comparison with q1 − q2 and the
scattering sufficiently weak, then we will have 〈E2|E1〉 ≈ 1 as the result of a
single scattering event. By contrast, if the environment consists of sufficiently
many long-wavelength particles all of which scatter off of S, then this will also
cause orthogonality of environmental states 〈E2|E1〉 ≈ 0 . For models in which
there are many individual scattering events, but in which each on its own is
insufficient to induce a strong measure of entanglement, it is possible to show
for a variety of models of the environment that
〈E2|E1〉 ∝ e−Λ(q1−q2)2t, (2.33)
where the constant Λ is determined by the details of the scattering process
in question. In the limit where |q1 − q2| becomes sufficiently large that each
individual scattering event is sufficient to resolve the difference between the two
wave packets,
〈E2|E1〉 ∝ e−Γt (2.34)
where Γ is the total scattering rate, again a constant determined by the details
of the scattering process (see [94], Chs. 2 and 3 for a more detailed explanation
of these effects).
More generally, if one considers the density matrix ρˆS of S obtained by
tracing over the degrees of freedom in E in the total density matrix for the
combined system SE, then in cases of many weakly entangling scattering events
it can be shown that on timescales for which the internal dynamics of S can be
ignored (as a result of the large of mass of S), ρˆS evolves so that
〈q′|ρˆS(t)|q〉 = 〈q′|ρˆS(0)|q〉e−Λ(q−q′)2t, (2.35)
where again, Λ is a constant determined by the details of the model in question.
113
That is, the off-diagonal elements of the position-space density matrix will decay
exponentially in time, and with the square of the position-space width |q − q′|
of the initial coherent superposition.
Typically, the time scales on which coherence of superpositions of macro-
scopically different positions of S is lost in such models will be extremely short
- much shorter than timescales on which the S’s internal dynamics, associated
with the Hamiltonian HˆS , will induce significant changes in the state of S, or
of SE as a whole. On the basis of such models, calculations of decoherence
timescales for various kinds of macro-(or meso-)scopic systems have been per-
formed (see, for instance, [94], p. 135). For example, a dust grain (diameter
about 10−3cm) in a coherent superposition of different positions typically will
lose coherence within 10−31s as a result of its interaction with the atmosphere
around it. In the best laboratory vacuum that we are able to create, decoher-
ence due to whatever few air molecules remain, as well as due to things like
background radiation and neutrinos which we are unable to screen out, will
typically occur in a dust grain in about 10−18s. As one would expect, the larger
the object, the more it interacts with its environment and the harder it is to
screen off from interaction with the environment.
Moreover, although the fundamental equations of our quantum models are
all time-reversible, the process of environmental decoherence is in practice irre-
versible (at least on timescales short of Poincare recurrence timescales). When
a system becomes entangled with its environment, the coherence of the super-
position that is initially localised in the system itself becomes a property of the
total system SE. In practice, this process cannot be reversed since we do not
control the behavior of all degrees of freedom in the environment. For discussion
of how the effective irreversibility of decoherence process is to be reconciled with
the reversibility of the fundamental quantum mechanical equations of motion,
the reader can consult [110], Ch.9.
To summarise, for typical macroscopic systems, environmental decoherence
will very rapidly destroy the coherence of any superpositions of macroscopically
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differing positions - typically on timescales much shorter than the characteristic
timescales of the system’s own internal dynamics. However, if the macroscopic
system is in a spatially narrowly localised state - specifically, a coherent state
that is also narrowly peaked in momentum - then entanglement with the envi-
ronment will not occur for as long as this continues to be the case. The combined
system SE will evolve as a product state, and the system S will evolve unaffected
by E, solely according to the internal dynamics prescribed by HˆS .
Decoherence Master Equations
Much of the study of environmental decoherence focuses on effective equations of
motion for the reduced density matrix ρˆS . Equations derived for a wide variety
of environments all have the same general form, known as the Caldeira-Leggett
equation:
i
dρˆS
dt
= [HˆS+
1
2
MΩ2Xˆ2, ρˆS ]−iΛηkBT
[
Xˆ,
[
Xˆ, ρˆS
]]
+
η
2M
[Xˆ, {Pˆ , ρˆS}]. (2.36)
Caldeira and Leggett first derived this equation in the context of a model,
known as the Caldeira-Leggett model. in which the environment consists of
many independent harmonic oscillators whose positions couple linearly with
that of S [22]; since this model was originally proposed, the general form of the
Caldeira-Leggett equation has found much broader applications beyond this
particular model (see [94] for a more detailed discussion of this equation and
of the Caldeira-Leggett model).The right-hand side of this equation consists of
four components: 1) The system S’s unitary dynamics, prescibed by HˆS , 2) a
renormalisation term (the term proportional to Ω2), 3) A decoherence term (the
term proportional to Λ), 4) a dissipation term (the last term), which accounts
for effects of classical friction. The constants Ω, η and Λ are all determined by
the particular model in question, while M is simply the mass that enters into
the Hamiltonian HˆS . In the systems that I consider here, the renormalisation
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and dissipation terms can be neglected by comparison with the other two terms.
It is the decoherence term that is ultimately responsible for supression of macro-
scopic coherence of superpositions on the very rapid timescales characteristic of
decoherence.
2.3.4 The Decoherent Histories Framework
The decoherent histories framework, originally developed by Griffiths and Gell-
Mann and Hartle, is an effective tool for analysing the branching structure
of the quantum state under the unitary evolution prescribed by Schrodinger’s
equation (see, for example, [43], [38], [31], [45]; for a briefer introduction, see for
instance [64]). It is especially useful when considering the behavior of closed,
macroscopic quantum systems, and for this reason has become a cornerstone of
quantum cosmology. It also provides an illuminating perspective from which to
examine the appearance of classical behavior in quantum systems.
The decoherent histories formalismmakes essential use of PVM’s and POVM’s
reviewed in section 2.3.1. While many presentations of the decoherent histories
framework present it within the context of the Heisenberg picture (see, for exam-
ple, [45]), so that the pertinent PVM and POVM operators are time-dependent,
as in most (though not all) of the thesis I remain in the Schrodinger picture,
where PVM and POVM operators are time independent and it is the quantum
state, rather than the operators, that evolves. I adopt the Schrodinger picture
partly because it facilitates the extension of the analysis to the Bohm theory,
but also because the picture that it offers, in terms of states evolving in a Hilbert
space, is arguably more intuitive than that offered by the Heisenberg picture
(though this latter point is likely to be a matter of personal preference to some
extent).
Consider the usual time evolution equation for a closed quantum system in
a pure state:
|χ(t)〉 = e−iHˆt|χ0〉. (2.37)
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Given an arbitrary PVM, we may divide the time interval t into N equal slices,
inserting a factor of the identity
∑
ik
Pˆik at each time interval:
|χ(t)〉 =
(∑
iN
PˆiN
)
e−iHˆ
t
N ...e−iHˆ
t
N
(∑
i1
Pˆi1
)
e−iHˆ
t
N |χ0〉 (2.38)
=
∑
i1,...,iN
[
PˆiN e
−iHˆ t
N ... e−iHˆ
t
N Pˆi1 e
−iHˆ t
N
]
|χ0〉. (2.39)
Define the history operators Cˆi,
Cˆi ≡ Cˆi1,...,iN ≡ PˆiN e−iHˆ
t
N ...e−iHˆ
t
N Pˆi1e
−iHˆ t
N , (2.40)
and note that
∑
i1,...,iN
Cˆi1,...,iN = e
−iHˆt. (2.41)
Eqn. (2.38) can be rewritten
|χ(t)〉 =
∑
i1,...,iN
Cˆi1,...,iN |χ0〉. (2.42)
This expansion is completely general and places no restrictions on the evolution
of the state beyond those already imposed by the Schrodinger evolution. More-
over, nothing prevents the use of different PVM’s at different times, though
there will be no need for this generalisation here. A sequence of PVM operators
constitutes a history, and can be identified by its associated sequence of indices
(i1, ..., iN ). The set of all such sequences of projectors, associated with set of
index sequences {(i1, ..., iN )}, constitutes a history space. A history (i1, ..., iN )
is realised iff Cˆi1,...,iN |χ0〉 6= 0. 4 For ease of notation, I will denote the history
(i1, ..., iN ) by i, and the history space {(i1, ..., iN)} by {i}. Note further that
two histories i ≡ (i1, ..., iN) and i′ ≡ (i′1, ..., i′N ) differ if they differ if they differ
4or, more precisely, iff
∣∣∣Cˆi1,...,iN |χ0〉
∣∣∣ > ǫ where ǫ is the very small but finite threshold
below which the weight of the history is drowned out by the ‘noise’ of the miniscule but finite
residual interference terms that remain between effectively decohered branches.
117
with respect to any ik, where 1 ≤ k ≤ N .
Following Gell-Mann and Hartle, a coarse graining {i¯} of the history space
{i} is a partitioning of {i} such that every history i belongs to exactly one
element i¯ of the partition, entailing
∑
i¯
Cˆi¯ =
∑
i
Cˆi = e
−iHˆt (2.43)
where
Cˆi¯ ≡
∑
i∈i¯
Cˆi =
∑
i1,...,iN∈i¯
Cˆi1,...,iN . (2.44)
The coarse-grained history operators Cˆi¯ are sums of alternating sequences of
PVM and time evolution operators, but may not themselves expressible as such
sequences - that is, they may not be expressible in the form (2.40). Note that
if the projection operators {Pˆ ′i } in a PVM each can be expressed as the sum of
some projection operators in some other PVM {Pˆj}, then the history operators
formed using the Pˆ
′
i clearly are coarse-grainings of the history operators formed
using the Pˆj .
The weights
∣∣∣Cˆi¯|χ0〉∣∣∣2 of the different coarse-grained histories (¯i) can be
construed as probabilities for these histories only if they satisfy the axioms of
probability theory. In particular, for two histories i¯ and i¯′, it is necessary that
Pr(¯i or i¯′) = Pr(¯i) + Pr(¯i′), (2.45)
Since
Pr(¯i or i¯′) = 〈χ0|(Cˆ†i¯ + Cˆ†i¯′ )(Cˆi¯ + Cˆi¯′)|χ0〉, (2.46)
Pr(¯i) = 〈χ0|Cˆ†i¯ Cˆi¯|χ0〉, (2.47)
and
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Pr(¯i′) = 〈χ0|Cˆ†i¯′ Cˆi¯′ |χ0〉, (2.48)
eqn. (2.45) amounts to the requirement that
〈χ0|(Cˆ†i¯ + Cˆ
†
i¯′
)(Cˆi¯ + Cˆi¯′)|χ0〉 = 〈χ0|Cˆ†i¯ Cˆi¯|χ0〉+ 〈χ0|Cˆ
†
i¯′
Cˆi¯′ |χ0〉. (2.49)
But, in general
〈χ0|(Cˆ†i¯ + Cˆ
†
i¯′
)(Cˆi¯ + Cˆi¯′)|χ0〉 (2.50)
= 〈χ0|Cˆ†i¯ Cˆi¯|χ0〉+ 〈χ0|Cˆ
†
i¯′
Cˆi¯|χ0〉+ 〈χ0|Cˆ†i¯ Cˆi¯′ |χ0〉+ 〈χ0|Cˆ
†
i¯′
Cˆi¯′ |χ0〉, (2.51)
so for (2.45) or (2.49) to be satisfied, it is necessary and sufficient that the
condition, known as weak decoherence,
Re
(
〈χ0|Cˆ†i¯ Cˆi¯′ |χ0〉
)
≈ 0 for i¯ 6= i¯′ (2.52)
be satisfied (since the imaginary components of the cross-terms cancel each other
automatically). In practice, though, in cases where this condition is satisfied,
the stronger condition,
D(¯i, i¯′) ≡ 〈χ0|Cˆ†i¯′ Cˆi¯|χ0〉 ≈ 0 for i¯ 6= i¯′, (2.53)
known as medium decoherence, usually is also satisfied. The term D(¯i, i¯′) is
known as the decoherence functional. A set {i¯} of coarse-grained histories is
consistent if D(¯i, i¯′) ≈ 0 for i¯ 6= i¯′. The probability of a history i¯ in this case is
given by
Pr(¯i) = D(¯i, i¯) = 〈χ0|Cˆ†i¯ Cˆi¯|χ0〉 =
∣∣∣Cˆi¯|χ0〉∣∣∣2 , (2.54)
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and
∑
i¯
Pr(¯i) = 1. (2.55)
Beyond the above conditions, though, it is usually also required that individual
histories belonging to different coarse-grained histories satisfy either the weak,
or more often the medium, decoherence condition, so that
D(i, i′) ≡ 〈χ0|Cˆ†i′Cˆi|χ0〉 ≈ 0 for i ∈ i¯ and i′ ∈ i¯′ with i¯ 6= i¯′. (2.56)
This can be written more explicitly as
D(i, i′) ≡ 〈χ0|Cˆ†i′1,...,i′N Cˆi1,...,iN |χ0〉 ≈ 0 for i ∈ i¯ and i
′ ∈ i¯′ with i¯ 6= i¯′. (2.57)
This then implies that
D(¯i, i¯′) ≡ 〈χ0|
 ∑
i′1,...,i
′
N
∈i¯′
Cˆ†i′1,...,i′N
 ∑
i1,...,iN∈i¯
Cˆi1,...,iN
 |χ0〉 ≈ 0 for i¯ 6= i¯′,
(2.58)
which is just another way of writing eqn. (2.53).
Decoherent Histories in Bohm’s Theory
Moving to Bohm’s theory, Hartle has claimed that the probabilities associated
with decoherent histories and those associated with the histories prescribed by
the Bohmian trajectories themselves predict different probabilities [48]. Har-
tle’s analysis defines histories in the Bohmian context directly in terms of the
trajectories of Bohmian configurations, and compares the probabilities of histo-
ries defined in this manner, as specified by Bohm’s theory, to the probabilities
of corresponding histories within the decoherent histories framework. I argue
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here that the requirement of configuration space decoherence offers a more per-
spicuous way of understanding the connection between the decoherent histories
framework and Bohm’s theory, andmoreover ensures agreement between the
probabilities predicted by the decoherent histories framework within the con-
texts of the Bare/Everett theory and of the Bohm theory.
However, what Hartle does not observe in his analysis is that if the histories
as defined in the context of the decoherent histories framework satisfy the con-
figuration space decoherence requirement, rather than merely the decoherence
requirement, with respect to the initial quantum state |χ0〉, the probabilities
of histories as predicted by the Bare/Everett theory (which is at least formally
equivalent to the decoherent histories framework as Hartle defines it) and the
Bohm theory will be the same. That is, the proper way to understand the
significance of the decoherent histories formalism for Bohm’s theory is through
the result that the probabilities the probabilities predicted by the Bohm theory
for the histories i¯, as defined in the decoherent histories framework, will be the
same as those in the ordinary decoherent histories formalism if the following
stronger decoherence condition on histories is satisfied:
DX (¯i, i¯
′) ≡ 〈χ0|Cˆ†i¯′ |X〉〈X |Cˆi¯|χ0〉 ≈ 0 for all X if i¯ 6= i¯′, (2.59)
where |X〉 is a eigenstate of configuration. The condition (2.59) entails (2.53),
but more importantly, guarantees that the coarse-grained branches Cˆi¯|χ0〉 are
disjoint (in the sense of the ǫ-support defined above) in the configuration space
of the system, which in turn ensures that the configuration Q of the system
selects only one such branch (again, putting aside for the moment the worry
about Bohmian effective collapse in the case of continuous pointer bases).
Typically, it will also be the case that the condition requiring states associ-
ated with individual subhistories within distinct coarse-grained histories to be
disjoint, namely,
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DX(i, i
′) ≡ 〈χ0|Cˆ†i′1,...,i′N |X〉〈X |Cˆi1,...,iN |χ0〉 ≈ 0 for allX, with i ∈ i¯, i
′ ∈ i¯′ and i¯ 6= i¯,′
(2.60)
is satisfied. This then implies
DX (¯i, i¯
′) ≡ 〈χ0|
 ∑
i′1,...,i
′
N
∈i¯′
Cˆ†i′1,...,i′N
 |X〉〈X |
 ∑
i1,...,iN∈i¯
Cˆi1,...,iN
 |χ0〉 ≈ 0 for i¯ 6= i¯′,
(2.61)
which is just another way of writing eqn. (2.59).
2.3.5 Branching of the Quantum State
The Everett or Many Worlds interpretation is often said to associate an array
of dynamically independent ‘worlds’ with the branches of the total quantum
state. But what is exactly is meant by the claim that the quantum state has a
branching structure?
The discussion here closely follows that in Chapter 3 of Wallace’s [110]. First,
define the weight of a projector Pi at some time t as
Wi(t) ≡
∣∣∣Pˆi e−iHˆt|χ0〉∣∣∣2 = 〈χ0|eiHˆtPˆi e−iHˆt|χ0〉 (2.62)
The transition weight between projector Pˆi at time t and projector Pˆ
′
i′ at time
t′ (which may belong to a completely different PVM from Pˆi), where t′ > t, is
defined as
T (i, t; i′, t′) ≡
∣∣∣Pˆ ′i′e−iHˆ(t′−t)Pˆi e−iHˆt|χ0〉∣∣∣2∣∣∣Pˆi e−iHˆt|χ0〉∣∣∣2 (2.63)
=
〈χ0|eiHˆtPˆieiHˆ(t′−t)Pˆ ′i′e−iHˆ(t
′−t)Pˆie−iHˆt|χ0〉
〈χ0|eiHˆtPˆi e−iHˆt|χ0〉
. (2.64)
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In cases where
∣∣∣Pˆi e−iHˆt|χ0〉∣∣∣2 = 0, the above expression for the transition
weight is not defined, so define T (i, t; i′, t′) = 0. If a history (i1, ..., iN) is realised,
it is straightforward to see that T (in, tn; in+1, tn+1) 6= 0 for all 0 ≤ n ≤ N .
The evolution of the quantum state exhibits branching relative to the given
PVMs if it is the case that
Branching Condition: if T (i, t; i′, t′) 6= 0 and T (j, t; i′, t′) 6= 0,
then i = j,
so that no two distinct projectors at an earlier time have non-zero transition
weights into the same projector at a later time.
Branching and Decoherence
If a space of histories (i1, ..., iN) is decoherent in the sense specified by (2.57),
then the set of operators
Pˆ ki1,...,ik ≡ Cˆi1,...,ik |χ0〉〈χ0|Cˆ†i1,...,ik , (2.65)
one for each sequence (i1, ..., ik), form an approximate PVM. This can be seen
from the fact that the first condition to be a PVM,
∑
i1,...,ik
Pˆ ki1,...,ik = Iˆ , (2.66)
is satisfied straightforwardly as a consequence of (2.41) (where the resulting
evolution operators cancel to give the identity), and the second condition
Pˆ ki1,...,ikPˆ
k
i′1,...,i
′
k
≈ δi1,i′1 ... δi1,i′1 Pˆ ki1,...,ik (2.67)
follows straightforwardly from the definition of the Pˆ ki1,...,ik and from the deco-
herence condition (2.57).
It then follows that the evolution of the quantum state exhibits branching -
in accordance with the Branching Condition above - with Pˆi in the expression
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for the transition weight above equal to Pˆ ki1,...,ik at some earlier time t = k∆t
and the PVM Pi′ in the transition weight equal to Pˆ
k+m
i′1,...,i
′
k
,i′
k+1,...,i
′
k+m
at some
later time t′ = (k + m)∆t (where i and i′ are to be regarded as collective
indices for (i1, ..., ik) and (i
′
1, ..., i
′
k, i
′
k+1, ..., i
′
k+m), respectively). The Branching
Condition is satisfied for arbitrary m, as can be seen by using the expansion
|χ(t)〉 =∑i1,...,iN Cˆi1,...,iN |χ0〉 and the definition of the Pˆ ki1,...,ik ; specifically, the
transition weight between Pˆ ki1,...,ik and Pˆ
k+m
i′1,...,i
′
k
,i′
k+1,...,i
′
k+m
will be zero unless
(i′1, ..., i
′
k) = (i1, ..., ik), thereby entailing that there is a unique projector at any
earlier time that contributes to the weight of the projector Pˆ k+mi′1,...,i′k,i′k+1,...,i′k+m
at any later time, namely Pˆ ki′1,...,i′k
.
Condensing notation so that ik ≡ (i1, ..., ik), we have that
T [ik, k∆t; jk+m, (k+m)∆t] ≈ 0 unless ik is the initial segment of jk+m (2.68)
thereby entailing that only one projector in the time-k PVM contributes to the
weight of any projector in the time-(k +m) PVM.
2.4 DS Reduction of the CMModel to the Bare/Everett
Model
In Chapter 1, I discussed the case of the DS reduction of the CM Model to the
Bare/Everett model without environment. However, as Wallace argues in [110],
in cases where the degrees of freedom in question are associated with macro-
scopic degrees of freedom such as centers of mass of macroscopic bodies, there
are a number of significant problems with attempts to model the Newtonian
behavior of these systems as isolated from external degrees of freedom:
• It is unrealistic to treat macroscopic degrees of freedom as isolated, given
that actual macroscopic systems interact constantly with external degrees
of freedom in their environment.
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• Narrow wave packets are needed to underpin the appearance of classical
trajectories. However, wave packets do not necessarily remain narrow on
acceptably long timescales to account for the appearance of trajectories,
even for macroscopic systems. As Wallace observes, systems whose classi-
cal description incorporates dynamics that are chaotic may have initially
narrow wave packets spreading to macroscopic coherence lengths on rel-
atively short timescales. For instance, Zurek and Paz have argued that
in the case of Saturn’s moon Hyperion, such chaotic effects may produce
wavefunctions with macroscopic coherence lengthsfrom an initially narrow
wave packet on a time scale of about 10 years [118].
I turn, then, to the more realistic model of classical behavior that incorporates
the interaction between the macroscopic degrees of freedom and the environ-
ment.
In the case of the Bare/Everett model with environment, the DS reduction
is more subtle than it was in the example given in Chapter 1, given the addi-
tional effects of environmental decoherence at play. As in the case considered
in Chapter 1, in the case where the environment is incorporated, the relevant
bridge map for the reduction of the NM model described above to the corre-
sponding Bare QM model is given by the expectation values of the position
and momentum operators of the central system, in this case consisting of the
centers of mass of some macroscopic bodies. However, in the more realistic case
where the environment is taken into account, the domain of states does not
consist simply of narrow wave packets in the Hilbert space of the macroscopic
degrees of freedom; rather, it consists of so-called ‘branch states’ in the total
Hilbert space of the centers of mass and environment. These branch states are
components of the total quantum state of the macroscopic degrees of freedom
and their environment, and are determined by the stucture that decoherence
gives to this state. As we will see shortly, the decoherent histories formalism
will prove an especially useful tool for describing branch states. Much of the
material concerning branching of the quantum state relative to an approximate
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coherent state PVM is adapted from Chapter 3 of Wallace’s [110].
While the domain of classical behavior in the quantum model here does not
consist simply of narrow wave packets in HS , narrow wave packets still have a
crucial role to play in the reduction of models of macroscopic classical behavior
to the Bare QM model with environment. Their significance is two-fold. First,
they comprise the so-called ‘decoherence-preferred’ basis of states in HS - that
is, the states that suffer minimal entanglement with the environment, which
also form a basis for HS . Second, as observed in Chapter 1, they are the states
that exhibit approximately Newtonian behavior through Ehrenfest’s Theorem,
allbeit only on timescales for which wave packet spreading can be ignored. Nev-
ertheless, we will see in section 2.4.2 that it is important to distinguish between
the sort of narrow wave packet that suffers minimal entanglement under inter-
action with the environment - a ‘pointer state’ wave packet - and the typically
more inclusive category of wave packets that approximately follow a Newtonian
trajectories - an ‘Ehrenfest’ wave packet.
2.4.1 Decoherence and Branching in Phase Space
Define ‘quasiclassical’ histories as those in which the state of S relative to a par-
ticular branch is always localised about a particular phase space point z ≡ (q, p),
but in which that phase space point does not necessarily traverse an approxi-
mately Newtonian trajectory. Define ‘classical’ histories as those quasiclassical
histories in which the state of S relative to a particular branch does traverse
an approximately Newtonian trajectory (to within some margin of error and
relative to some timescale). In this subsection, we will see how environmental
decoherence leads generically (or at least in a very wide set of cases) to quasi-
classical histories; in the next, we will discuss how those quasiclassical histories
also turn out in certain circumstances to be classical.
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Decoherence Relative to a Coherent State Basis
Let us examine the evolution of the quantum state of the system SE, given
only the assumption that the pointer states of S - that is, states of S which
suffer least entanglement upon interaction with the environment E - are the
coherent states |q, p〉. For brevity, I will use the condensed notation z ≡ (q, p),
|z〉 ≡ |q, p〉. An arbitrary quantum state of SE at some initial time t = 0 can
be expressed in the form,
|χ0〉 =
∫
dz0 α(z0) |z0〉 ⊗ |ξ(z0)〉. (2.69)
Let us examine the evolution of an individual element of this superposition,
|z0〉⊗ |ξ(z0)〉. Note that, initially, the |ξ(z0)〉 need not be orthogonal. However,
after a very brief time τ (on the order of some typical decoherence timescale),
as a result of environmental scattering,
|z0〉 ⊗ |ξ(z0)〉 τ⇒ |z0〉 ⊗ |φ(z0)〉, (2.70)
where 〈φ(z′0)|φ(z0)〉 ≈ 0 for z0 and z′0 sufficiently different. On the longer time
scale ∆t characteristic of the Hamiltonian HˆS , over which HˆS induces significant
changes on HS , we have that
|z0〉 ⊗ |φ(z0)〉 ∆t=⇒
∫
dz1β(z0, z1)|z1〉 ⊗ |φ(z0, z1)〉 (2.71)
where 〈φ(z′0, z′1)|φ(z0, z1)〉 ≈ 0 for z0 and z′0, or z1 and z′1, sufficiently different.
Moreover, we should expect that if 〈φ(z′0)|φ(z0)〉 ≈ 0, then it will turn out to
be the case that 〈φ(z′0, z′1)|φ(z0, z1)〉 ≈ 0 irrespective of the values of z1 and z
′
1
since the environmental particles whose scattering caused the initial decoherence
process will now be spread widely across the environment’s configuration space;
for this reason, later scatterings of certain particles in the environment are
generally unlikely to disrupt the orthogonality of environmental states resulting
from earlier scatterings of other particles. Likewise, evolving each element of
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this last superposition by ∆t, we have
|z1〉 ⊗ |φ(z0, z1)〉 ∆t=⇒
∫
dz2β(z0, z1, z2)|z2〉 ⊗ |φ(z0, z1, z2)〉, (2.72)
where 〈φ(z′0, z′1, z′2)|φ(z0, z1, z2)〉 ≈ 0 for z0 and z′0, or z1 and z′1, or z2 and z′2,
sufficiently different. Iterating this process N times, we obtain,
|z0〉 ⊗ |φ(z0)〉 N∆t=⇒
∫
dz1...
∫
dzN B(z0, z1, ..., zN) |zN 〉 ⊗ |φ(z0, z1, ..., zN )〉
(2.73)
where
B(z0, z1, ..., zN) ≡ β(z0, z1) β(z0, z1, z2) ... β(z0, ..., zN−1, zN ). (2.74)
By linearity of the Schrodinger evolution, we then have
|χ(t)〉 =
∫
dz0dz1...dzN α(z0)B(z0, z1, ..., zN ) |zN〉 ⊗ |φ(z0, z1, ..., zN)〉, (2.75)
with
〈φ(z′0, z′1, ..., z′N)|φ(z0, z1, ..., zN)〉 ≈ 0 for zk and z′k sufficiently different for any 0 ≤ k ≤ N.
(2.76)
These last two equations provide a completely general expression for the quan-
tum state of SE evolved up to some arbitrary time N∆t, under the assumption
that the coherent states |z〉 are the decoherence-preferred states of S under its
interaction with E.
It will prove helpful for our purposes to examine this evolution also from
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the perspective of the decoherent histories formalism. The approximate PVM
of eq. (2.14) can be extended to an approximate PVM on HS ⊗ HE simply
by tensoring the projectors with the identity IˆE on HE , taking the operators
{Πˆi ⊗ IˆE} to constitute the extended approximate PVM. Using this PVM, the
evolution of a state on HS ⊗HE can be expressed generally as
|χ(t)〉 =
∑
i1,...,iN
(
ΠˆiN ⊗ IˆE
)
e−iHˆ
t
N ...
(
Πˆi1 ⊗ IˆE
)
e−iHˆ
t
N
(
Πˆi0 ⊗ IˆE
)
|χ0〉
(2.77)
=
∑
i0,i1,...,iN
Cˆi0,i1,...,iN |χ0〉 (2.78)
where
Cˆi0,i1,...,iN |χ0〉 ≡
(
ΠˆiN ⊗ IˆE
)
e−iHˆ
t
N ...e−iHˆ
t
N
(
Πˆi1 ⊗ IˆE
)
e−iHˆ
t
N
(
Πˆi0 ⊗ IˆE
)
.
(2.79)
This history operator corresponds to a coarse-grained trajectory in phase space
that successively traverses the sequence (Σi0 ,Σi1 , ...,ΣiN ) of cells in the phase
space partition. Using the defintion of the operators Πˆi, we can rewrite the
history operators as follows:
Cˆi0,i1,...,iN |χ0〉 (2.80)
≡
∫
Σi0
∫
Σi1
...
∫
ΣiN
dz1...dzN
(
|zN〉〈zN | ⊗ IˆE
)
e−iHˆ
t
N ...e−iHˆ
t
N
(
|z1〉〈z1| ⊗ IˆE
)
e−iHˆ
t
N
(
|z0〉〈z0| ⊗ IˆE
)
|χ0〉
(2.81)
≡
∫
Σi0
∫
Σi1
...
∫
ΣiN
dz1...dzN Cˆz0,z1,...,zN |χ0〉, (2.82)
where
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Cˆz0,z1,...,zN ≡
(
|zN 〉〈zN | ⊗ IˆE
)
e−iHˆ
t
N ...
(
|z1〉〈z1| ⊗ IˆE
)
e−iHˆ
t
N
(
|z0〉〈z0| ⊗ IˆE
)
.
(2.83)
Moreover, note that
Cˆz0,z1,...,zN |z0〉 = |zN 〉 ⊗
[∑
i
|ei〉〈zN , ei|e−iHˆ tN
(
|zN−1〉〈zN−1| ⊗ IˆE
)
(2.84)
...
(
|z1〉〈z1| ⊗ IˆE
)
e−iHˆ
t
N
(
|z0〉〈z0| ⊗ IˆE
)
|z0〉
]
(2.85)
= |zN 〉 ⊗
[∑
i
|ei〉〈zN , ei|e−iHˆ tN Cˆz0,z1,...,zN−1 |z0〉
]
(2.86)
= |zN 〉 ⊗ |φ˜(z0, z1, ..., zN )〉 (2.87)
where {ei} is an arbitrary basis for HE and
|φ˜(z0, z1, ..., zN)〉 ≡
∑
i
|ei〉〈zN , ei|e−iHˆ tN Cˆz0,z1,...,zN−1 |z0〉. (2.88)
The vectors |φ˜(z0, z1, ..., zN)〉 will not in general be normalised. If w(z0, z1, ..., zN) ≡
〈φ˜(z0, z1, ..., zN)|φ˜(z0, z1, ..., zN)〉, then we can define
|φ(z0, z1, ..., zN )〉 ≡ 1
w1/2(z0, z1, ..., zN)
|φ˜(z0, z1, ..., zN )〉, (2.89)
which are normalised. In terms of these normalised states, we then have
Cˆz0,z1,...,zN |z0〉 = w1/2(z0, z1, ..., zN)|zN 〉 ⊗ |φ(z0, z1, ..., zN )〉, (2.90)
and
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|χ(N∆t)〉 = e−iHˆN∆t|χ0〉 (2.91)
=
∫ ∫
...
∫
dz0dz1...dzN Cˆz0,z1,...,zN |χ0〉 (2.92)
=
∫ ∫
...
∫
dz0dz1...dzN α(z0)w
1/2(z0, z1, ..., zN)|zN 〉 ⊗ |φ(z0, z1, ..., zN )〉
(2.93)
Note further that if 〈φ(z′0, z′1, ..., z′N )|φ(z0, z1, ..., zN)〉 ≈ 0 for zk and z′k suffi-
ciently different, for any 0 ≤ k ≤ N , then 〈χ0|Cˆ†i′0,i′1,...,i′N Cˆi0,i1,...,iN |χ0〉 ≈ 0 for
ik 6= i′k for 0 ≤ k ≤ N - assuming that the partitioning of phase space is such
that zk and z
′
k are ‘sufficiently different’ when they belong to different elements
of the phase space partition.
Branching
From the above analysis, we can conclude that because the history space associ-
ated with sequences of coherent state projectors Πˆik is decoherent, the quantum
state has branching structure relative to the history space associated with se-
quences of projectors Pˆni0,i1,...,in ≡ 1w(i0,i1,...,in) Cˆi0i1,...,in |χ0〉〈χ0|Cˆ
†
i0,i1,...,in
, for
successive n, where w(i0, i1, ..., in) ≡ 〈χ0|Cˆ†i0,i1,...,inCˆi0,i1,...,in |χ0〉. Using the
abbreviation in ≡ (i0, i1, ..., in), we can write
|χ(t)〉 =
∑
i1,...,iN
(
PˆiN ⊗ IˆE
)
e−iHˆ
t
N ...
(
Pˆi1 ⊗ IˆE
)
e−iHˆ
t
N
(
Pˆi0 ⊗ IˆE
)
|χ0〉 (2.94)
=
∑
i0,i1,...,iN
Kˆi0,i1,...,iN |χ0〉. (2.95)
where Kˆi0,i1,...,iN |χ0〉 ≡
(
PˆiN ⊗ IˆE
)
e−iHˆ
t
N ...
(
Pˆi1 ⊗ IˆE
)
e−iHˆ
t
N
(
Pˆi0 ⊗ IˆE
)
|χ0〉.
Thus, the set of histories in this history space corresponds to the set of sequences
(of sequences) of the form (i0, i1, ..., iN ). To say that the quantum state has
branching structure relative to this history space entails that any two realised
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histories that agree on their nth index - that is, that share the index in - agree
with respect to all previous indices ik with 0 ≤ k < n. This is indeed the case
since, as one can show quite straightforwardly, the only realised histories are
those for which in is an initial sequence of in+1 for all 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1. Thus,
any two histories that agree on in necessarily agree on all previous indices since
all of these indices are uniquely determined by in.
Thus, we can write the state evolution in terms of a sum restricted only
to histories (i0, i1, ..., iN ) that obey the restriction that each subsequence in is
the initial sequence of the next, in+1. Abbreviating this condition by writing
in ⊂ in+1, we have
|χ(t)〉 ≈
∑
in⊂in+1
Kˆi0,i1,...,iN |χ0〉, (2.96)
where (again) the condition below the summation symbol indicates that only
sequences for which each element of the sequence is a subsequence of all elements
that come after it are included in the sum.
Note moreover that the history space associated with the set of sequences
(i0, i1, ..., iN), formed using the approximate coherent state PVM, is not branch-
ing since it is entirely possible (because of wave packet spreading) that two
realised (but mutually decoherent) histories agree on some index in, with 1 ≤
n ≤ N , but not with respect to some or any of the previous indices ik, where
0 ≤ k < n.
Finally, note that the history space associated with the set of sequences
(i0, i1, ..., iN) is a coarse-graining of the history space associated with the set of
sequences (i0, i1, ..., iN ), since
Cˆi0,i1,...,iN |χ0〉 = CˆiN |χ0〉 =
∑
i0,i1,...,iN−1
Kˆi0,i1,...,iN |χ0〉, (2.97)
where the reader should note that only the indices (i1, ..., iN−1) have been
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summed over.
Returning to the history space associated with sequences of coherent state
PVM’s (as opposed to the history space associated with sequences of such se-
quences), the sum in eq. (2.77) includes all histories (i1, ..., iN) in the history
space associated with the approximate PVM of eq. (2.14). Typically, not all
histories in the history space associated with the set of sequences (i1, ..., iN ) will
be realised - that is, for many of these histories, we will have
Cˆi1,...,iN |χ0〉 ≈ 0. (2.98)
For this reason, one can to a good approximation restrict the sum in eq. (2.77)
to only those histories that are realised. If we denote the set of realised histo-
ries (where realised histories are defined as those whose weights surpass some
arbitrarily specified but small threshold ǫ) as Ir, then we have,
|χ(t)〉 ≈
∑
(i1,...,iN)∈Ir
Cˆi1,...,iN |χ0〉. (2.99)
What can we say, then, about which histories tend to be realised in a model like
the Bare/Everett model described above, in which the central system S consists
of some macroscopic centers of mass interacting through a conservative time-
independent potential, as well as with some external environment E? As we will
see in the next subsection, under certain conditions and for a certain measure of
coarse graining, the realised histories will be those that traverse approximately
Newtonian trajectories.
2.4.2 The Occurrence of Classical Newtonian Trajectories
Thus far, decoherence has explained why a branch of the total quantum state
should be such that the state of S relative to that branch evolves quasiclassically.
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However, the analysis above has not offered any suggestion as to why the state
of S relative to each branch should traverse a classical trajectory - i.e., why its
evolution should conform approximately to Newtonian equations of motion. It
is here that Ehrenfest’s Theorem enters the analysis.
Ehrenfest’s Theorem for Open Systems
As we saw in Chapter 1, Ehrenfest’s Theorem applies only to systems that
evolve unitarily in a pure state. However, as I explain here, the theorem can be
straightforwardly generalised to certain models of open quantum systems. In
situtations of the sort considered in this thesis, the interaction between system
and environment is typically sufficiently weak that the dissipation and renor-
malisation terms in (2.36) can be ignored (see, for instance, [110], section 3.6)
so that only a ‘pure decoherence’ term, −iΛ
[
Xˆ,
[
Xˆ, ρˆS
]]
, remains:
i
dρˆS
dt
= [HˆS , ρˆS]− iΛ
[
Xˆ,
[
Xˆ, ρˆS
]]
(2.100)
5. In this model, the time derivative of the expectation value of momentum
〈Pˆ 〉 = Tr[ρˆSPˆ ] can be calculated by multiplying both sides of this equation by
the operator Pˆ and then taking the trace of both sides. Using the commutation
relations [Xˆ, Pˆ ] and the cyclic property of the trace, one can show that
Tr
{[
Xˆ,
[
Xˆ, ρˆS
]]
Pˆ
}
= 0. (2.101)
Thus,
i
d〈Pˆ 〉
dt
= Tr
{
[HˆS , ρˆS ]Pˆ
}
. (2.102)
But this equation is the same as the equation for the evolution of 〈Pˆ 〉 under
the unitary dynamics prescribed by HˆS , the primary difference from the closed
5I have not encountered this generalisation of Ehrenfest’s Theorem elsewhere in the lit-
erature on decoherence, though the calculation required for the generalisation is sufficiently
straightforward, and the motivation sufficiently obvious, that I will refrain from claiming any
originality for the result.
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system case being that ρˆS in this case will not in general be pure. Just as in
the derivations of Ehrenfest’s Theorem in the case of a closed system governed
solely by the Hamiltonian HˆS =
Pˆ 2
2M +V (X) - which does not rely on the purity
of ρˆS - we then have
d〈Pˆ 〉
dt
= −
〈
ˆ∂V (X)
∂X
〉
. (2.103)
thus furnishing a generalisation of Ehrenfest’s Theorem to systems whose inter-
action with their environment is characterised approximately by ‘pure decoher-
ence.’
Specialising now to the case where ρS(X,X
′) ≡ 〈X ′|ρˆS |X〉 represents a state
with narrow ensemble width - i.e., such that the diagonal elements ρS(X,X)
are narrowly peaked about some particular value of X - we have that 〈f(Xˆ)〉 ≈
f(〈Xˆ〉), so that
d〈Pˆ 〉
dt
≈ −∂V (〈Xˆ〉)
∂〈Xˆ〉 , (2.104)
thereby furnishing an approximate version of Newton’s Second Law for expec-
tation values. The relation d〈Xˆ〉dt =
〈Pˆ 〉
M also continues to hold as long as the
interaction Hˆint depends only on position Xˆ and not on the momentum Pˆ , as
is the case in all models considered here - and notably, in particular, in the
Caldeira-Legett model. Note that the expectation value in this relation is taken
relative to the total quantum state of system S, not its state relative to a par-
ticular branch of the quantum state. While ‘branch-relative’ expectation values
will prove crucial to my analysis of Newtonian behavior below, it is crucial
to recognise that the expectation values here average across multiple mutually
decohered branches.
From this generalisation of Ehrenfest’s Theorem, we can conclude that po-
sition and momentum expectation values even of decohering systems will follow
approximately classical trajectories, so long as the internal dynamics HˆS does
not cause ρS(X,X) to become too spread out; if it does become too spread out
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relative to the characteristic length scales on which the potential V (X) varies,
the relation
〈
ˆ∂V (X)
∂X
〉
≈ ∂V (〈Xˆ〉)
∂〈Xˆ〉 will cease to hold, and approximate Newtonian
behavior will no longer be guaranteed.
The Dual Role of Narrow Wave Packets
At this point, it is worth underscoring the fact that narrow wave packets play a
dual role in accounting for the classical behavior of macroscopic open quantum
systems: first, among them are the states of S - the coherent states - that are
minimally entangled with the environment on timescales short relative to the
characteristic timescales associated with HˆS ; second, they evolve in approxi-
mately Newtonian fashion, even when S is open.
However, it is also crucial to distinguish two corresponding senses of nar-
rowness here: one that relates to considerations of environmental decoher-
ence, which ensures quasi-classicality of the state evolution (at least on the
Bare/Everett model), and the other that relates to approximate Newtonian be-
havior, which ensures approximate classicality of the evolution. The former
requires narrowness in the sense of not being wider than the typical coherence
length of the system under its interaction with the environment, which is char-
acteristed by the position-space width of a coherent pointer state |q, p〉. The
latter requires narrowness of ρS(X,X) relative to the dimensions of the poten-
tial V (X); assuming that V (X) varies significantly only on macroscopic length
scales, this notion of narrowness will include wave packets that are narrow in
the first sense as well as those whose widths exceed typical coherence lengths of
the system S.
As a result of these considerations, there is a regime of behavior in which
wave packets may spread to width beyond the coherence length - thereby induc-
ing decoherence and the branching that goes along with it - but remain narrow
with respect to the relevant dimensions of the potential V (X). This will be a
regime in which it is both the case that: 1) on any given branch, expectation
values of position and momentum evolve along approximately deterministic,
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Newtonian trajectories, to within a certain margin of error associated with the
distribution ρS(X,X) ; 2) branching still occurs on length scales below this mar-
gin of error, which one might characterise as being associated with ‘quantum
fluctuations’ around an average classical, deterministic trajectory.
Thus, macroscopic classical behavior is underwritten quantum mechanically
by a wave packet for S that spreads out, as it does so rapidly becoming replaced
by an incoherent superposition of localised states. Each of the localised states
in the incoherent mixture will in turn spread out and be replaced by its own
incoherent superposition of localised states. Eventually, an initially narrowly
peaked ρS(X,X) will spread incoherently to a width comparable to the scales
on which V (X) varies significantly, and at this point Newtonian behavior cannot
be expected even as an approximation.
Factors Affecting the Rate of Wave Packet Spreading
The primary factors that determine the rate of wave packet spreading in S are
1. the size of the masses M appearing in HˆS : other factors being equal, larger
masses typically correlate to slower spreading; a simple back-of-the-envelope
calculation for the case of a free particle indicates that it would take an
initially narrow wave packet of an object with macroscopic mass, localised
on atomic length scales, longer than the age of the universe to spread to
macroscopic size (say 1cm.);
2. the presence of chaotic effects: these can significantly accelerate the rate
of wave packet spreading; in systems with macroscopic mass where HˆS
is strongly chaotic (i.e., in which closely spaced initial conditions diverge
on short timescales), a wave packet initially localised on atomic length
scales may spread to macroscopic length scales over much shorter time
periods than in cases where the effects of chaos are weak or absent; for
example, Zurek and Paz have argued convincingly that Saturn’s moon Hy-
perion, which tumbles chaotically in its orbit, should exhibit macroscopic
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divergences from Newtonian predictions on a timescale of about 10 years
[118];
3. pure decoherence: the pure decoherence term characterising the influence
of E on S in the master equation (2.36) typically will also increase the
rate of wave packet spreading; while this term constantly suppresses the
coherent spreading of S’s state, it actually results in a slight increase in
the rate of ensemble spreading in S (see, for example, [94], p. 145 ).
Parallel Coarse-Grained Classical Histories
Consider an arbitrary initial superposition at time t = 0:
|χ0〉 =
∫
dz0 α(z0) |z0〉 ⊗ |φ(z0)〉. (2.105)
Let us examine the evolution of a single element of this superposition,
|z0〉 ⊗ |φ(z0)〉. (2.106)
The position space density matrix associated with this state, ρz0S (X,X
′, 0), is
pure and has both a narrow coherence length and ensemble width, which are
both equal to the position space width of the packet |z0〉. Over some time ∆t,
the wave packet will spread both under the influence of the internal dynamics
HˆS and as a result of the influence of the environment; however, as long as
the ensemble width remains narrow by comparison with the potential V (X),
the expectation value of X in this incoherent superposition will continue to
evolve along an approximately Newtonian trajectory to within a margin of error
determined by the the ensemble width. The total state of SE will evolve to a
state of the form
∫
Σ1
dz1β1(z0, z1)|z1〉 ⊗ |φ(z0, z1)〉, (2.107)
such that 〈φ(z′0, z′1)|φ(z0, z1)〉 ≈ 0 for z0 and z′0, or z1 and z′1, sufficiently dif-
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ferent, and such that the integral over z1 can, to a good approximation, be
restricted to a small cell Σ1 containing the classical future evolute of z0 up to
time ∆t. The density matrix ρz0S (X,X
′,∆t) associated with this state will have
narrow coherence length equal to the width of a pointer coherent state, while
the ensemble width will have spread beyond this; thus, it will be more spread
out along the diagonal direction than along the off-diagonal direction. A single
element |z1〉⊗|φ(z0, z1)〉 of this last superposition will evolve over the next inter-
val ∆t into a superposition of the form
∫
Σ2
dz2β2(z0, z1, z2)|z2〉 ⊗ |φ(z0, z1, z2)〉,
where Σ2 is the classical future evolute of of z0 up to time 2∆t. Thus, the total
state to which |z0〉 ⊗ |φ(z0)〉 has evolved by time 2∆t is
∫
Σ1
∫
Σ2
dz1dz2β2(z0, z1, z2)β1(z0, z1)|z2〉 ⊗ |φ(z0, z1, z2)〉, (2.108)
Iterating this procedure, then, the single initial state |z0〉 ⊗ |φ(z0)〉 will evolve
over some time N∆t into a state of the form
∫
Σ1
...
∫
ΣN
dz1...dzNB(z0, z1, ..., zN )|zN 〉 ⊗ |φ(z0, z1, ..., zN)〉, (2.109)
where
B(z0, z1, ..., zN ) ≡ βN (z0, z1, ..., zN )βN−1(z0, z1, ..., zN−1)...β1(z0, z1), (2.110)
and
〈φ(z′0, z′1, ..., z′N)|φ(z0, z1, ..., zN)〉 ≈ 0 for zk and z′k sufficiently different for any 0 ≤ k ≤ N.
(2.111)
The function B(z0, z1, ..., zN ) differs substantially from zero only when (z0, z1, ..., zN )
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all lie close to the classical trajectory associated with z0. The density matrix
ρz0S (X,X
′, N∆t) will be an incoherent mixture of localised wave packets, with
coherence length equal to the position width of one coherent pointer state and
the ensemble width growing progressively larger for increasing values of N .
As we have seen, decoherence of the form we have been discussing lends the
evolution of the quantum state a branching structure. However, even as this
branching occurs, the histories associated with the different branches of the to-
tal state will remain concentrated around a single classical trajectory for as long
as the ensemble width ρz0S (X,X
′, N∆t) remains sufficiently narrow relative to
the dimensions of the potential V (X). For systems in which chaotic effects on
wave packet spreading are significant, the timescales on which this narrowness
is maintained will be significantly shorter than for those in which chaotic effects
can be neglected. Nevertheless, even for chaotic systems there will be some
time scale on which Newtonian predictability holds to within some reasonable
margin of error.
The preceding analysis has shown that if we restrict our consideration to
timescales less than those on which the ensemble width of S becomes com-
parable to the relevant dimensions of the potential V (X), then the evolution
of a single initial wave packet |z0〉 ⊗ |φ(z0)〉 gives rise to multiple decohered
branches, with the histories associated with different branches of the quantum
state all concentrated around the single classical trajectory associated with z0.
Because the ensemble width will typically grow with time, the average deviation
of these branches from the classical trajectory also will tend to increase with
time. Eventually, when the ensemble width becomes comparable to the scale
on which the potential V (X) changes significantly, it will be the case note only
that the individual branches will be be prone to deviate more widely from the
mean, but also that the mean itself will cease to evolve approximately classically.
Thus, the time scales on which one should generally expect Newtonian behavior
are limited by the scale on which the ensemble width of an initial narrow wave
packet product state |z0〉⊗ |φ(z0)〉 expands to a scale comparable to the spatial
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dimensions of V (X). Before this point, one still may observe deviations from
classicality that can be characterised as fluctuations around some mean classical
behavior; but after this time, classicality ceases to hold even in the mean.
Given that for a single wave packet, the evolution is
e−iHˆN∆t (|z0〉 ⊗ |φ(z0)〉) ≈
∫
Σ1(z0)
...
∫
ΣN (z0)
dz1...dzNB(z0, z1, ..., zN )|zN 〉 ⊗ |φ(z0, z1, ..., zN )〉
(2.112)
≈
∫
Σ1(z0)
...
∫
ΣN (z0)
dz1...dzN Cˆz0,z1,...,zN |z0〉, (2.113)
the linearity of the Schrodinger evolution entails that
|χ(N∆t)〉 = e−iHˆN∆t|χ0〉 (2.114)
≈
∫
dz0 α(z0)
∫
Σ1(z0)
...
∫
ΣN (z0)
dz1...dzNB(z0, z1, ..., zN)|zN 〉 ⊗ |φ(z0, z1, ..., zN )〉
(2.115)
=
∫
dz0 α(z0)
∫
Σ1(z0)
...
∫
ΣN (z0)
dz1...dzN Cˆz0,z1,...,zN |z0〉 (2.116)
where (Σ1(z0), ...,ΣN (z0)) are all concentrated around the classical trajectory
whose initial condition is z0, and where
〈z0|Cˆ†z′0,z′1,...,z′N Cˆz0,z1,...,zN |z0〉 ≈ 0 for zk and z
′
k sufficiently different for any 0 ≤ k ≤ N,
(2.117)
since
〈φ(z′0, z′1, ..., z′N)|φ(z0, z1, ..., zN)〉 ≈ 0 for zk and z′k sufficiently different for any 0 ≤ k ≤ N,
(2.118)
which in turn, as we have seen, will be satisfied as a result of environmental
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scattering.
Rather than examine the evolution of the total state at the level of individ-
ual wave packets, we can examine it on a more coarse-grained scale, in terms
of histories defined using approximate coherent state PVM’s. If the cells of the
partitions {Σik} associated with approximate coherent state PVMs {Πˆik} are of
a certain intermediate size - somewhere between the phase space volume of a sin-
gle coherent state |z〉 and the phase space volumes associated with macroscopic
differences of position and momentum - then the associated history space will be
decoherent and the realised histories, while all close to a Newtonian trajectory
(assuming the ensemble width of ρz0S remains sufficiently narrow by comparison
with V (X)) will also exhibit branching behavior. The state evolution can be
expressed in the form,
|χ(N∆t)〉 =
∑
i0,i1,...,iN
Cˆi0,i1,...,iN |χ0〉 (2.119)
where
Cˆi0,i1,...,iN |χ0〉 = ΠˆiN e−iHˆ∆t...Πˆi1e−iHˆ∆tΠˆi0 |χ0〉 (2.120)
=
∫
Σi0
∫
Σi1
...
∫
ΣiN
dz0dz1...dzN Cˆz0,z1,...,zN |χ0〉 (2.121)
and, as a consequence of (2.117),
〈χ0|Cˆ†i′0,i′1,...,i′N Cˆi0,i1,...,iN |χ0〉 ≈ 0 if ik 6= i
′
k for 0 ≤ k ≤ N, (2.122)
and, in addition, all realised histories are such that the sequence of regions
(Σi0 ,Σi1 , ...,ΣiN ) associated with each history fall close, to within some rea-
sonable margin of error, to some Newtonian trajectory (though they will ex-
hibit fluctuations around this trajectory associated with their branching be-
havior). As we have seen, by virtue of satisfying this decoherence condition,
142
the quantum state will possess a branching structure relative to the history
space associated with a time-indexed sequence of PVM’s that take the form
{Pˆ ki0,...,ik ≡ Cˆi0,...,ik |χ0〉〈χ0|Cˆi0,...,ik}, where {Pˆ ki0,...,ik} is the PVM assigned to
time k∆t.
However, by choosing a history space such that the phase space partitions
{Σ′kjk} used to define the associated coherent state PVM’s are allowed to de-
pend on the time index k and such that the partition cells Σ′kjk are large in
comparison with the regions ΣN (z0) of phase space over which a coherent wave
packet spreads on the timescale in question, and also large in comparison with
the elements of the more fine-grained partition {Σik} just discussed, we can
find a set of time-indexed PVM’s {Πˆ′kjk} such that the quantum state evolution
approximately takes the form of parallel, non-interfering classical histories on
phase space - that is, such that at any given time N∆t within the appropriate
timescale,
|χ(N∆t)〉 =
∑
j0,j1,...,jN
Cˆj1,...,jN |χ0〉 ≈
∑
j0
Cˆj0,jc1 ,...,jcN |χ0〉. (2.123)
where
Cˆj0,j1,...,jN |χ0〉 ≡ Cˆj1,...,jN Πˆ′0j0 (2.124)
= Πˆ′NjN e
−iHˆ∆t...Πˆ′1j1e
−iHˆ∆tΠˆ′0j0 |χ0〉 (2.125)
=
∫
Σ′0
j0
∫
Σ′1
j1
...
∫
Σ′N
jN
dz0dz1...dzN Cˆz0,z1,...,zN |χ0〉 (2.126)
=
∫
Σ′0
j0
∫
Σ′1
j1
...
∫
Σ′N
jN
dz0dz1...dzN B(z0, z1, ..., zN)|zN 〉 ⊗ |φ(z0, z1, ..., zN )〉,
(2.127)
and where the only realised histories will be those indexed by sequences of the
form (j0, j
c
1, ..., j
c
N ), where the superscript c indicates that a given index j
c
k is
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associated with a partition cell {Σ′kjc
k
that contains the classical phase space
points future-evolved up to k∆t from the initial region Σ0j0 (so, the value j
c
k
implicitly depends on the value of j0 at the beginning of the sequence).
These histories, of course, satisfy the decoherence condition:
〈χ0|Cˆ†j0,j′1,...,j′N Cˆj0,j1,...,jN |χ0〉 ≈ 0 if jk 6= j
′
k for 0 ≤ k ≤ N. (2.128)
In most cases, this is a consequence of the fact that Cˆj0,j1,...,jN |χ0〉 ≈ 0 or
Cˆj′0,j′1,...,j′N |χ0〉 ≈ 0 - i.e., one of the histories simply isn’t realised. The condition
is satisfied non-trivially between two realised classical histories by virtue of
(2.117).
Except at t = 0, when the initial superposition becomes decohered, the quan-
tum state evolution exhibits branching relative to the history space (j0, j1, ..., jN )
only in a trivial sense: for a given jk, with 0 < k < N , the transition amplitude
T (jk, k∆t; jk+1, (k+1)∆t) for any projector Pˆ
k
jk
into Pˆ k+1jk+1 is zero for all but one
value of jk+1, whereas archetypal branching behavior involves non-zero transi-
tion amplitudes from one projector into more than one future projector. As we
will see presently, the uniqueness of the future projectors into which the present
projector has non-zero transition amplitude helps to account for the appearance
of determinism on a coarse-grained level.
The appropriate bridge map BCMMW (where the MW is for ‘Many Worlds’) for
the reduction of the given model of CM to the given model of the Bare/Everett
theory is given by the expectation value of the extended position and momentum
operators, Xˆ ⊗ IˆE and Pˆ ⊗ IˆE for S:
Bridge Map:
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B
CM
MW : HS ⊗HE −→ ΓN
B
CM
MW : |χ〉 7−→
(
〈χ|Xˆ ⊗ IˆE|χ〉, 〈χ|Pˆ ⊗ IˆE|χ〉
)
.
(2.129)
At any given time N∆t, the domain of states from which we should expect ap-
proximately classical behavior is the set of branch states defined by decoherence
and the appropriate level of coarse-graining that serves to mask the branching
behavior that occurs on smaller scales:
Domain:
dCM =
{
|χ(N∆t)〉 ∈ HS ⊗HE
∣∣∣∣ |χ(N∆t)〉 = 1W 1/2(j0, jc1, ..., jcN ) Cˆj0,jc1 ...,jcN |χ0〉
}
.
(2.130)
Through this bridge map, the dynamics associated on a given branch will induce
a dynamics on the phase space Γ:
Bridge Rule:
(
X
′(N∆t), P ′(N∆t)
)
≡
(
〈χ(N∆t)|Xˆ ⊗ IˆE|χ(N∆t)〉, 〈χ(N∆t)|Pˆ ⊗ IˆE|χ(N∆t)〉
)
.
(2.131)
Note that, as a consequence of the coarse-graining, the branch states here do
not actually ‘branch’ in the sense of one projector’s weight contributing to the
weights of many projectors at a later time, but rather evolve in such a way
that one projector contributes only to a single, unique future projector, in this
respect serving to mimic dynamics that are effectively deterministic.
The foregoing considerations entail that expecation values of Xˆ⊗ IˆE and Pˆ⊗ IˆE ,
which I abbreviate 〈Xˆ〉 and 〈Pˆ 〉 respectively, will, for states in the specified do-
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main, follow an approximately Newtonian trajectory. The dynamical equations
of the image model are
Image Model:
d〈Pˆi〉
dt
≈ −∂V (〈Xˆ〉)
∂〈Xˆi〉
(2.132)
d〈Xˆi〉
dt
≈ 1
Mi
〈Pˆi〉. (2.133)
Recall that if the image model holds then the DSR condition is satisfied. The
analogue model is obtained straighforwardly from the image model by the bridge
rule substitutions (X ′, P ′) ≡
(
〈Xˆ〉, 〈Pˆ 〉
)
:
Analogue Model:
dP ′i
dt
≈ −∂V (X
′)
∂X ′i
(2.134)
dX ′i
dt
≈ 1
Mi
P ′i . (2.135)
Note finally that the condition of strong analogy is simply a rephrasing of the
DSR condition and requires that
‘Strong Analogy’:
|X(N∆t)−X ′(N∆t)| < δX
|P (N∆t)− P ′(N∆t)| < δP .
(2.136)
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for 0 ≤ N∆t ≤ τ . This condition will be satisfied as long as the laws of the
image model hold to good approximation. The margins of error δX and δP are
determined by the size of the partition cells - i.e. the measure of coarse-graining
- associated with elements of the history space {(j0, j1, ..., jN )}. Given these
margins of error, the timescale τ will depend on the sizes of the mass parameters
in HˆS , on the strength of chaotic effects associated with this Hamiltonian, and
on the value of the coefficient Λ characterising the strength of environmental
decoherence (recall that the decoherence term in (2.100) can increase the rate
of ensemble spreading while constantly maintaining the coherence length below
a certain threshold).
2.5 DS Reduction of the CMModel to the Bohm
Model
As in the case of the Bare/Everett theory, it is instructive when considering
the reduction of classical models of macroscopic systems to the Bohm theory
to begin by considering the idealised case in which the relevant macroscopic
degrees of freedom S are isolated from any environment. I consider two existing
approaches to reducing classical mechanics to Bohm’s theory that for the most
rely on the assumption that the relevant degrees of freedom in question are iso-
lated. I refer to these approaches as the ‘narrow wave packet approach’ and the
‘quantum potential approach.’ I then explain the need to consider the environ-
ment in explaining macroscopic classical behavior in Bohm’s theory. Finally, I
provide a template for the DS reduction of the N -center-of-mass classical model
described above to the corresponding Bohm model, including the environment.
2.5.1 The Narrow Wave Packet Approach
Let us first consider the evolution of a narrowwave packet |q, p〉 in S with average
position q and average momentum p at some time t0. Given our assumptions
about the non-spreading of wave packets, Ehrenfest’s Theorem, which states
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that for a general wave function,
m
d2〈xˆ〉
dt2
= −〈∂V (xˆ)
∂xˆ
〉 (2.137)
dictates that such a wave packet will approximately satisfy the stronger condi-
tion
m
d2〈xˆ〉
dt2
≈ −∂V (〈xˆ〉)
∂〈xˆ〉 (2.138)
and that the wave packet therefore will follow an approximately classical tra-
jectory as long as it remains sufficiently narrow. More specifically, it will follow
the classical trajectory whose position and momentum at time t0 are q and p.
If the wave packet follows a classical trajectory, then by equivariance, es-
sentially all of the Bohmian trajectories associated with that wave packet will
also be approximately classical; by the phrase ‘essentially all of the Bohmian
trajectories,’ I am referring to an ensemble of possible Bohmian trajectories cor-
responding to different possible initial configurations. Thus, it seems initially
that the system S being in a narrow wave packet suffices to ensure that Bohmian
trajectories are classical. Among others, Bowman has been a strong advocate
of this approach, although, as I discuss below, he begins to incorporate effects
of the environment after considering this result for the base of isolated systems.
However, narrow wave packets constitute only a very restricted subset of
possible solutions to the Schrodinger equation, and the most general solution
will not necessarily be narrowly peaked in both position and momentum space.
The most general solution will rather be a superposition of narrow wave packets,
of the form
|Ψ〉 =
∫
dq dp α(q, p) |q, p〉, (2.139)
where each |q, p〉 traverses its own classical trajectory.
But such a solution will not, in general, yield a classical trajectory for the
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Bohmian configuration. For example, consider the simple case where S consists
of a single center of mass with a free Hamiltonian HˆS =
Pˆ 2
2m ; the mass may be
macroscopic, though this does not affect my conclusion in this instance. Let the
wave function of this system initially take the form of two spatially separated
wave packets moving toward each other with opposite average momenta, so that
they overlap at some point in time and then pass through each other:
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
[|q1, p〉+ |q2,−p〉]. (2.140)
Initially, the set of Bohmian trajectories associated in the ensemble with each of
these packets will, by equivariance, follow the same classical path that its wave
packet follows. However, this will cease to be true when the packets overlap.
Because Bohmian trajectories associated with a single pure state can never
cross, when the packets overlap and pass through each other, the trajectories
will not be able to follow suit. Instead, they will reverse direction and leave the
region of overlap in the packet in which they did not begin. This reversal of
direction represents a highly non-classical effect on the trajectories in S, since
if the trajectories were classical, they would simply follow a straight line path
with the same wave packet all the way through.
We can see more generally that this sort of non-classical behavior on the
part of the Bohmian trajectory will occur whenever the expansion (2.139) of
the wave function in terms of spatially localized wave packets (e.g., coherent
states) contains wave packets that are initially separated and later come to
overlap in configuration space. If α(q, p) and α(q′, p′) are non-zero for any two
initially non-overlapping wave packets |q, p〉 and |q′, p′〉 whose future evolutions
cause them to overlap in configuration space at some point in time, the Bohmian
trajectories associated with |Ψ〉 will become non-classical. Thus, non-classical
Bohmian trajectories can result from a very wide variety of wave functions, even
when the mass is large.
Since generic states of S yield nonclassical trajectories for the Bohmian
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configuration, we cannot explain the emergence of classical trajectories at the
macroscopic scale in terms of an isolated set of macroscopic degrees of freedom
without excluding a very broad class of solutions to the Schrodinger equation
as viable physical descriptions of the system in question. Since one would have
to exclude any wave functions that contain a pair of wave packets that inter-
sect in configuration space, the set of wave functions that one must discard will
depend heavily on the dynamics of the particular system, which makes such an
exclusion seem especially ad hoc.
Bowman has suggested invoking environmental decoherence - and therefore
abandoning the assumption of isolation - as the explanation for a restriction to
narrow wave packets; while the analysis that I provide below agrees with this
approach, Bowman’s analysis overlooks certain subtleties involving the need
specifically for configuration space decoherence, and is less comprehensive in
that it does not consider the stucture of the total pure state of the closed system
SE, but only that of the mixed state of the open system S.
As in the case of Bare/Everett theory, another problem with attempting
to model classical behavior using an isolated macroscopic system is that the
assumption of isolation is highly unrealistic. While microscopic environmental
degrees of freedom are often ignored in classical descriptions of macroscopic sys-
tems, the extreme succeptibility of macroscopic superpositions in these systems
to entanglement with their environment requires us to consider the effect of the
environment when we are examining such systems at the quantum level. In
section 2.5.4, we shall see in more detail what sort of effect interaction with the
environment can have on such a system.
2.5.2 The Quantum Potential Approach
The most popular approach to explaining Newtonian behavior on the basis of
Bohm’s theory is the so-called ‘quantum potential’ approach (see, e.g., [51] Ch.6,
[1], [15] ). Consider a closed system, such as the system S we have been dis-
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cussing, and assume initially, as before, that there is no interaction or entangle-
ment with any external environment E. If one plugs in the polar decomposition
of the wave function, ψ(x, t) = R(x, t) exp[ iS(x,t)
~
], where R and S are real, into
the time-dependent Schrodinger equation, one obtains the following pair of cou-
pled differential equations for R and S (one corresponding to the real part of
Schrodinger’s equation and one to the imaginary part):
∂S
∂t
+
1
2m
(∇S)2 + V − ~
2
2m
∇2R
R
= 0, (2.141)
∂R2
∂t
+∇ · (R2∇S
m
) = 0. (2.142)
The first of these equations is the Hamilton-Jacobi equation, but with an ad-
ditional ‘quantum potential’ term, Q ≡ − ~22m ∇
2R
R , added to the usual classical
potential V . The second is a continuity equation for the probability distibution
R2. In the limit Q → 0, the solution S becomes a solution to the classical
Hamilton-Jacobi equation, and the trajectories that it determines through the
guidance equation (which also appears in classical Hamilton-Jacobi theory),
q˙i =
1
m
∇S(x, t), (2.143)
are Newtonian in form.
Moreover, from (2.141) and (2.143) one can deduce the following Bohmian
version of Newton’s Second Law:
m
d2q
dt2
= −∇V −∇Q. (2.144)
The term −∇Q, which I denote Q′ for short, is sometimes referred to as the
‘quantum force.’ Here, the classical equation of motion is retrieved if Q′ van-
ishes.
Thus, the Bohmian trajectories q(t) of an isolated quantum system like S
are approximately classical in form whenever the conditions Q′ → 0 and Q→ 0,
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sometimes called the ‘canonical conditions’ for classicality in pilot wave theory,
are satisfied; in fact, they will be classical in form as long as Q is a constant.
Here, just as in classical mechanics, one has macroscopic centers of mass travers-
ing classical trajectories. For this reason, it is tempting in Bohm’s theory to
characterise macroscopic classical motion in terms of an isolated quantum sys-
tem like S, in which the conditions Q′ → 0 and Q→ 0 are satisfied.
There are two primary flaws with this approach.
1) First, the quantum potential cannot be relied upon to remain small even
in isolated macroscopic systems with large mass.
It may appear on the surface that in order for the center of mass to follow
a classical trajectory, it suffices for the system to have large mass because the
quantum potential Q = − ~22m ∇
2R
R , which characterizes deviations of Bohmian
trajectories from classicality, becomes negligible as the mass m becomes macro-
scopically large. However, it may happen as a rather generic phenomenon that
the term ∇
2R
R in the quantum potential becomes large enough to cancel out the
effects of m being large. As we saw in the last section, when two initially sepa-
rated wave packets converge in configuration, the no-crossing rule for Bohmian
trajectories (associated with a single pure state) prevents these trajectories from
following the wave packet in which they initially lay. The Bohmian trajectories
become highly non-classical, and, returning to equation (2.141) or (2.144), it
is easy to see that this non-classical effect must be attributed to the quantum
potential or force.
2) The second reason that the quantum potential approach does not work
is that the quantum potential and force, as they occur in the above equations,
and as they ordinarily are presented, are only well-defined for systems in a pure
state. When the system S is open to the environment E, the above equations
involving the quantum potential and quantum force on system S no longer
apply. Yet it is these equations that form the basis for the quantum potential
approach to explaining classical behavior of S in Bohm’s theory. Thus, the
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quantum potential approach, as it usually presented, does not apply to the
systems for which we ought to expect actual classical behavior to occur. Some
accounts of classical motion in pilot wave theory do attempt incorporate the
effects of environmental decoherence into a quantum potential approach [1],
[15]. However, these accounts do not offer any specific suggestions as to how to
quantum potential should be defined in the context of open systems, or why it
should be negligible in the context of such systems. One can define the quantum
potential for the closed system SE, but since behavior of the microscopic degrees
of freedom in the environment should be non-classical in nature (consider an
electron in one of the atoms of the macroscopic body), we would not expect this
quantum potential to be zero.
While it may be possible to modify the quantum potential approach so as
to address these criticisms, no such modification has yet been given in the
literature.
2.5.3 Other Approaches
Unlike the most other accounts of classicality in Bohm’s theory, which rely on
the quantum potential, Bowman has suggested in [16] and [17] that narrow wave
packets and Ehrenfest’s theorem lie at the root of classical behavior; moreover,
he asserts, as I do below, that decoherence lies at the root of explaining why
macroscopic systems can reliably be expected to be in states which are effectively
narrow wave packets. However, Bowman’s analysis is approached from the
perspective of S’s being a open system, without analysing the full dynamics of
the closed system SE in which S is contained. Moreover, he does not recognise
the insufficiency or decoherence simpliciter to account for classical behavior in
Bohm’s theory, and the need specifically for configuration decoherence. The
analysis that I provide in a number of respects extends Bowman’s approach to
fill these gaps.
Appleby, also, has examined the behavior of Bohmian trajectories in the con-
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text specifically of a quantum Brownian motion model, investigating through
extensive calculation the effects of environmental decoherence on the velocities
of Bohmian configurations, when the system under investigation begins in an
approximate energy eigenstate. While his results are consistent with the classi-
cal evolutions of the Bohmian configuration of the central degrees of freedom,
they do not necessarily imply it. From a template-based perspective, Appleby’s
analysis focuses on a set of narrowly prescribed parameters for a rather specific
model, obscuring the general mechanisms at work in the occurrence of macro-
scopic classical behavior [3], [4].
Below, I offer what I believe to be a more transparent account of macroscopic
classical motion that makes no reference to the quantum potential or force,
and that fills certain gaps or corrects certain flaws in other decoherence-based
accounts. Before doing so, however, I explain why it is essential to consider the
effects of environmental decoherence in explaining the classical trajectories for
macroscopic systems, and how doing so can address the difficulties encountered
in the case of isolated systems.
2.5.4 The Need to Consider the Environment
Above, I considered an example where S was an isolated free system in which
two initially separated wave packets overlap, passing through each other, and
in which the overlap of the packets caused the associated Bohmian trajectories
to become non-classical. Returning to that example, let us now abandon our
assumption that S is isolated and allow the center of mass to become entangled
with the external degrees of freedom in the environment E. Suppose that at
every time the wave function of the closed system SE consisting of the center
of mass and its environment (which may consist of photons, neutrinos, or other
particles of matter) takes the form
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
[|q1, p〉 ⊗ |φ1〉+ |q2,−p〉 ⊗ |φ2〉], (2.145)
154
for some values of q1, q2, and p, where the states |φ1〉 and |φ2〉 belong to E’s
Hilbert space HE and are assumed always to have disjoint supports in E’s
configuration space QE . The disjointness of the supports can be expressed as
the condition
〈φ1|y〉〈y|φ2〉 ≈ 0 for all y ∈ QE (2.146)
where |y〉 is a position (or more accurately, configuration) eigenstate of the en-
vironment. Note that this is the condition for configuration space decoherence,
which implies, but is not equivalent to, the condition that |φ1〉 and |φ2〉 are
orthogonal, the condition for decoherence.
Because of the disjointness of the supports of |φ1〉 and |φ2〉, the two wave
packets comprising |Ψ〉 will never overlap in the total configuration space of the
combined system SE, although the profiles of these wave packets with respect
to the configuration space of the center of mass will overlap. The motion of
Bohmian trajectories in the total system SE’s configuration space follows the
motion of the wave packets in this space. Since these packets never overlap, there
is never any reversal of direction of the Bohmian trajectories. In the center
of mass’ configuration space, the Bohmian trajectories of the center of mass
associated with the two wave packets pass right through each other, and continue
in a straight line. Thus, they remain classical, even though the profiles of the
wave packets with respect to the center of mass configuration space overlap.
This example illustrates how configuration space decoherence suppresses the
non-classical effects of wave packet overlap in S, by virtue of the fact that it
prevents wave packets from overlapping in the total configuration space of the
entire system SE. Note that the above analysis applies irrespective of whether
the environment contains 1 degree of freedom or 1023 degrees of freedom. An
example of the former case is a single high frequency photon or electron destroy-
ing macroscopic coherence of a wave function in position space. Macroscopic
superpositions are extremely sensitive to interactions with environmental de-
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grees of freedom that in a classical description of the same system would exert
negligible influence - providing one among several reasons why the environment
cannot be ignored when attempting to provide a pilot wave, or any quantum,
description of macroscopic systems. In cases where the environment consists of
a very large number of degrees of freedom, this fact typically serves to make the
destruction of coherence effectively irreversible.
The fact that we require a special kind of decoherence, characterised by
equation (2.146), to enforce classicality of the central system’s trajectory also
implies a constraint on the evolution of the environment’s configuration. Since
the environmental states correlated to different wave packets for the central
system have disjoint supports, by equivariance, the Bohmian configuration of
the environment must lie in one of these supports. Equivariance further entails
that this configuration must lie in the support of the environmental state which
is correlated to the wave packet in which the Bohmian configuration of the
central system lies. In this manner, decoherence, which we originally invoked
in order to enforce classicality of the central system’s Bohmian trajectory, also
causes the Bohmian configuration of the environment E to become correlated
strongly with that of the central system S (though this is only the case because
the pointer states in S are narrowly peaked in S’s configuration space).
2.5.5 A DS Template for the Reduction of the CM Model
to the Bohm Model
As we saw in section 2.4, under the dynamical assumptions made there, a fairly
generic 6 quantum state at t = 0, which can be written
|χ0〉 =
∫
dz0 α(z0) |z0〉 ⊗ |φ(z0)〉, (2.147)
can be expected to evolve into a state of the form,
6The time-reversibility of the quantum dynamics requires us to impose some restrictions,
which I will not discuss further here.
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|χ(N∆t)〉 ≈
∫
dz0 α(z0)
∫
Σ1(z0)
...
∫
ΣN (z0)
dz1...dzN Cˆz1,...,zN |z0〉
≈
∑
(i1,...,iN)∈Ir
Cˆi1,...,iN |χ0〉
≈
∑
j0
Cˆj0,jc1 ,...,jcN |χ0〉
(2.148)
where, again, the sequence of integration regions (Σ1(z0), ...,ΣN (z0)) falls ap-
proximately along a Newtonian trajectory starting at z0; likewise, the more
coarse-grained sequence of regions (Σi1 , ...,ΣiN ) falls approximately along New-
tonian trajectories beginning in some region Σi0 , and the still more coarse-
grained sequences (Σ′1jc1 , ...,Σ
′N
jc
N
) fall along the Newtonian trajectories beginning
in some region Σ′0j0 . However, in the context of the Bohm theory, the fact that
these sets of histories are decoherent does not suffice to induce irreversible ef-
fective collapse of the state |χ0〉 , and so as a criterion for classical Newtonian
behavior on the Bohm model we must impose the stronger condition of config-
uration space decoherence 7:
〈χ0|Cˆ†z′
N
,...,z1
|X, y〉〈X, y|CˆzN ,...,z1|χ0〉 ≈ 0
for all X, y, if zi and z
′
i are sufficiently different, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
(2.149)
In fact, we should impose the even stronger condition,
〈φ(z′N , ..., z′0)|y〉〈y|φ(zN , ..., z0)〉 ≈ 0
for all y, if zi and z
′
i are sufficiently different, for any 0 ≤ i ≤ N ,
(2.150)
which will ensure irreversibility of the collapse, given that the number of degrees
7Note that while this condition may be logically stronger than simple decoherence, the
question as to whether it is stronger in practice depends on the dynamics of the system and
more specifically on whether the state comes to satisfy the ordinary decoherence condition,
without configuration space decoherence, on the way to satisfying the configuration space
decoherence condition.
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of freedom in the environment is very large. As a consequence of these relations,
configuration space decoherence also holds among histories in the more coarse-
grained history spaces:
〈χ0|Cˆ†i′1,...,i′N |X, y〉〈X, y|Cˆi1,...,iN |χ0〉 ≈ 0 for all X , y, if ik 6= i
′
k, for any 0 ≤ k ≤ N .
(2.151)
〈χ0|Cˆ†j′0,j′c1 ,...,j′cN |X, y〉〈X, y|Cˆj0,jc1,...,jcN |χ0〉 ≈ 0 for all X , y, if j0 6= j
′
0. (2.152)
Assuming that the quantum state has the structure specified by these relations,
the disjointness in configuration space entails that the total configuration of SE
will not drift between branches (taking for granted the No Drift Conjecture),
and that all but one branch effectively can be ignored in assessing the Bohmian
configuration’s dynamics. At the most coarse-grained level, we can ignore all but
one branch, so the state |χ(N∆t)〉 can be replaced by the effectively collapsed
state corresponding to a single branch, so that
|χeff (N∆t)〉 = 1
W (j0, jc1, ..., j
c
N )
Cˆj0,jc1,...,jcN |χ0〉 (2.153)
=
1
W (j0, jc1, ..., j
c
N )
∫
Σ0
j0
∫
Σ1
jc
1
...
∫
ΣN
jc
N
dz0dz1...dzN B(z0, z1, ..., zN)|zN 〉 ⊗ |φ(z0, z1, ..., zN )〉
(2.154)
for some j0.
Turning to configuration space, Q = QS ⊕QE, we have for the ǫ-support in
Q of the branch 1W (j0,jc1,...,jcN )
Cˆj0,jc1,...,jcN |χ0〉
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SEj0,jc1 ,...,jcN ≡ suppǫ
[
Cˆj0,jc1 ,...,jcN |χ0〉
]
=
⋃
z0∈Σ0j0 ,...,zN∈Σ
N
jc
N
(SzN × EzN ,...,z0) ,
(2.155)
where SzN ≡ suppǫ
(|zN〉) and EzN ,...,z0 ≡ suppǫ(|φ(zN , ..., z0)〉). After effective
collapse, we have that
Q ∈ SEj0,jc1 ,...,jcN ⊂ Q (2.156)
for some branch (j0, j
c
1, ..., j
c
N ). Defining Ej0,jc1,...,jcN ≡
⋃
z0∈Σ0j0 ,...,zN∈Σ
N
jc
N
EzN ,...,z0,
and SΣN
jc
N
≡ ⋃zN∈ΣNjc
N
SzN , it follows that
QS(N∆t) ∈ SΣN
jc
N
⊂ QS (2.157)
qE(N∆t) ∈ Ej0,jc1 ,...,jcN ⊂ QE . (2.158)
Since the region SΣN
jc
N
proceeds roughly along a Newtonian trajectory for in-
creasing N , the configuration QS(N∆t) will do the same. Furthermore, since
Ej0,jc1 ,...,jcN ∩ Ej′0,j′c1 ,...,j′cN = ∅ if j0 6= j′0, (2.159)
the configuration qE becomes correlated through the dynamics to the entire past
trajectory of the wave packet |zN 〉, and since |zN 〉 has narrow support in S’s
configuration space, also to the entire past trajectory of QS .
In order to frame this analysis within the DS approach to reduction, we can
adopt the bridge map
Bridge Map:
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BCMBM : H×Q −→ ΓN
BCMBM : (|χ〉, Q) 7−→
(
QS,MQ˙S
)
,
(2.160)
which is, notably, distinct from the bridge map employed in the reduction to
the Bare/Everett model (the subscript BM stands for ‘Bohmian Mechanics’).
Also note that the bridge map only depends on the Bohmian configuration QS
of the macroscopic system S, and not on the quantum state |χ〉, and not on
qE .
The dynamical equations of the image model are
Image Model:
d
dt
(MiQ˙S,i) ≈ −∂V (X)
∂X
∣∣
X=QS
(2.161)
dQS,i
dt
≈ 1
Mi
(MiQ˙S,i), (2.162)
where, recall, the validity of the image model is equivalent to satisfying the DSR
condition. The domain of the image model is
Domain:
dCM =
{
(|χ〉, Q) ∈ (HS ⊗HE)× (QS ⊕QE) ∣∣∣∣
|χ(N∆t)〉 =
∑
j0
Cˆj0,jc1 ,...,jcN |χ0〉
}
,
(2.163)
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where the decoherence of branches and other restrictions on the state
∑
j0
Cˆj0,jc1 ,...,jcN |χ0〉
that were discussed should be taken as implicit. Note that I have made no men-
tion of the Bohmian configuration in the specification of the domain because
there is no need to; if the quantum state lies within the specified domain, the
dynamics of the Bohm model ensure that the Bohmian configuration, what-
ever it happens to be, will follow an approximately Newtonian trajectory. Note
also that no restriction to a particular branch has been made, either in the do-
main or in the bridge map, again because none is needed; the dynamics of the
Bohmian configuration automatically entail this restriction through the process
of effective collapse.
With the bridge rule substitutions:
Bridge Rule:
(X ′(N∆t), P ′(N∆t)) ≡
(
QS(N∆t),mQ˙S(N∆t)
)
. (2.164)
the analogue model is obtained straighforwardly from the image model:
Analogue Model:
dP ′i
dt
≈ −∂V (X)
∂Xi
∣∣
X=X′
(2.165)
dX ′i
dt
≈ 1
Mi
(P ′i ). (2.166)
The ‘strong analogy’ condition 8 states,
8I continue to use the term ‘strong analogy’ only to emphasise the parallels of DS reduction
with the GNS account; ‘approximate agreement’ would more adequately reflect the nature the
relationship in question.
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‘Strong Analogy’:
|X(N∆t)−X ′(N∆t)| < δX
|P (N∆t)− P ′(∆t)| < δP ,
(2.167)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ , and is satisfied as long as the image model holds, which we should
expect to be the case on the same timescale as in the Everettian/Bare-QM case.
2.6 Summary
From the analyses of reduction performed in this chapter, we can see that the
occurrence of approximate classical behavior at the macroscopic scale, whether
in the Bare/Everett or in the Bohm model, is grounded in the following sequence
of insights:
1. In the Bare-QMmodel, environmental decoherence is responsible for quasi-
classicality - that is, approximate localisation - of the the branch-relative
state of S; this localisation permits us to speak of a ‘trajectory’ for S
relative to a particular branch of the total quantum state. In the Bohm
model, quasi-classicality comes automatically as a result of the localisation
of the particle configurations.
2. Ehrenfest’s Theorem, as generalised to the case of open systems, is re-
sponsible for approximate classicality - that is, conformity to Newtonian
equations - of the trajectory of the localised relative state of S over certain
timescales. In the case of the Bohm model, this combined with the fur-
ther requirement of configuration space decoherence ensures approximate
classicality of S’s trajectory on the same timescales.
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3. Three factors determine the rate of wave packet spreading, and therefore
the timescales on which classicality reliably holds in S: the mass of S,
and the strength of chaotic effects on S’s evolution, and pure decoher-
ence. For systems in which chaotic effects are strong, the timescales on
which classicality holds are typically much shorter than for systems in
which these effects can be ignored, in both the Bare/Everett and Bohm
models (in both models ,quasi-classicality, unlike classicality, is ensured
for all times irrespective of chaotic effects). Nevertheless, even for systems
in which chaotic effects are small or nonexistent, the relatively small mea-
sure of wave packet spreading that does occur still causes branching when
the state evolution is examined on sufficiently small scales of length and
momentum.
We will see in Chapter 4 that the same basic pattern of reasoning - decoherence
or definiteness of configurations ensuring quasi-classicality, Ehrenfest’s Theorem
further imposing approximate classicality for narrow wave packets, wave packet
spreading limiting the timescales on which approximate classicality holds - will
apply, in broad outline, to the reduction of classical field theory models to
quantum field theory ones.
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Chapter 3
Quantum Field Theory -
Preliminaries
Chapters 4 and 5 provide templates for the DS reduction of certain models of
classical field theory and of certain models of nonrelativistic quantum mechan-
ics to relativisitic quantum field theory. While quantum field theory is usually
presented in the manifestly covariant Heisenberg picture, or in terms of path
integrals, it will prove particularly helpful in the analysis of DS reduction within
these contexts to approach the reduction from the perspective of the less con-
ventional - and also less fully developed - Schrodinger picture of quantum field
theory, most obviously because it formulates the models quantum field theory
as dynamical systems. In addition, the Schrodinger picture of QFT facilitates
an analysis of decoherence and effective collapse in QFT that closely parallels
the analysis of these subjects in the context of NRQM. Finally, the Schrodinger
picture of QFT forms the basis for Bohmian versions of QFT that have been
proposed in the literature. In section 3.1, I offer a basic introduction to vari-
ous models of quantum field theory in the Schrodinger picture. In section 3.2,
I present the Bohmian versions of several models of QFT. For an extensive
overview of QFT in the Schrodinger picture, the reader may consult Hatfield’s
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[49], Jackiw’s [55], and Jackiw and Floreannini’s [54]. For reviews of the ma-
jor approaches to Bohmian QFT, see Struyve and Westman’s [99], Colin and
Struyve’s [26], and Struyve’s [98].
I emphasise here that, as regards the question of mathematical rigor, there
are a number of approaches one can take to QFT. Arguably the most mathe-
matically rigorous of the approaches to QFT is the algebraic approach, though
currently there do not exist any formulations of realistic, interacting, quantum
field theories within the framework of algebraic QFT; thus, for the moment
at least, in return for the added mathematical sophistication of the algebraic
approach we must incur the rather severe cost of not being able to link the
mathematical models to empirical data, or generally generally to reproduce the
empirical successes of QFT as it is practiced most physicists. It is for this reason
that I adopt an alternative, but admittedly more heuristic, approach to founda-
tional analysis of QFT that has been developed more closely in line with QFT
as it is practiced by most physicists and taught in most textbooks - namely,
what David Wallace has dubbed the ‘cutoff’ approach to QFT, which involves
performing a foundational analysis on QFTs not in the case where the models
are taken to incorporate an infinite number of degrees of freedom, but rather
in the case where the model in question has been regularised by some cutoff
(typically either a lattice or strict bounds on momentum) so that it incorpo-
rates only a large-but-finite number of degrees of freedom, thereby making the
model more mathematically and conceptually tractable. For further details of
the cutoff approach, the reader may consult [108]. For an introduction to and
overview of the algebraic approach, the reader may consult [47].
3.1 QFT in the Schrodinger Picture
In this section, I present the Schrodinger picture models for free scalar and
fermionic quantum field theories, and for interacting scalar quantum field theory
(with λφ4 interaction term) and relativistic QED. As in the case of NRQM,
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quantum field theories can be modelled in terms of a state space
S = H (3.1)
for some Hilbert spaceH, and some Schrodinger dynamics on that Hilbert space,
i
∂
∂t
|Ψ〉 = Hˆ|Ψ〉, (3.2)
for some hermitian Hamiltonian Hˆ on H, and some |Ψ〉 ∈ H. Note that the
although all QFT’s that I consider are relativistically covariant at the level of
the amplitudes that they predict, the Schrodinger picture destroys manifest
Lorentz covariance of the theory by specialising to a particular reference frame
with a particular time parameter t. (Bohmian QFT’s, on the other hand, destroy
more than merely the manifest Lorentz invariance; the dynamics at the level of
the beables breaks fundamental Lorentz invariance as well, while maintaining
Lorentz invariance at the level of the theory’s empirical predictions.)
The choice of the Hilbert space corresponds to a particular choice of rep-
resentation for the quantum field theory’s commutation or anti-commutation
relations. If the number of degrees of freedom in the quantum field theory is
infinite - that is, if no cutoffs are imposed in the infrared and ultraviolet - then
there will be infinitely many unitarily inequivalent representations of these re-
lations. Partly for this reason, algebraic approaches to quantum field theory
attempt to model these theories without specialising to a particular represen-
tation on some Hilbert space, as is done in the Schrodinger picture, but rather
solely on the basis of the algebraic properties of the theory’s observables. I do
not adopt this approach here; for more on the algebraic approach to QFT, the
reader may consult, for instance, [44] or [47]. The approach to quantum field
theory taken here is to address the various difficulties generated by QFT’s infi-
nite degrees of freedom by adopting a large but finite UV cutoff throughout my
analysis (and where necessary, an infrared cutoff as well). The reader should
assume these cutoffs to be implicit in my notation. For a discussion of the con-
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ceptual foundations of the cutoff approach to QFT, see Wallace’s [108]. Most
material here is adapted from the QFT texts of Peskin and Schroeder, Hatfield,
and Srednicki.
3.1.1 Free Scalar Field Theory
The Hamiltonian for a free scalar quantum field theory, also known as Klein-
Gordon theory, is
HˆKG =
1
2
∫
d3x
[
πˆ2(x) +
(
∇φˆ(x)
)2
+m2φˆ2(x)
]
, (3.3)
where φˆ(x) and πˆ(x) are, respectively, field operators and field momentum op-
erators associated with each point in 3-space x, satisfying the canonical com-
mutation relations
[
φˆ(x), πˆ(y)
]
= iδ3(x− y), (3.4)
with all other commutators zero. The Hilbert space of the theory, however it is
defined, must carry a representation of these commutation relations.
Particle Representation
Define the creation and annihilation operators,
aˆ(k) =
∫
d3x eikx
[
Ekφˆ(x) + iπˆ(x)
]
(3.5)
aˆ†(k) =
∫
d3x e−ikx
[
Ekφˆ(x) − iπˆ(x)
]
, (3.6)
with Ek ≡
√
k2 +m2. For later use, the inverse of these relations is
φˆ(x) =
∫
d˜3k
[
e−ikxaˆ(k) + eikxaˆ†(k)
]
(3.7)
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πˆ(x) =
∫
d˜3k iEk
[
e−ikxaˆ(k) − eikxaˆ†(k)] . (3.8)
where, following Srednicki’s notation,
d˜3k ≡ d
3k
(2π)32Ek
. (3.9)
One can prove on the basis of (3.4) that the aˆ†(k) and aˆ(k) satisfy the commu-
tation relations
[
aˆ(k), aˆ†(k′)
]
= (2π)32Ekδ
3(k − k′). (3.10)
HˆKG then can be rewritten
HˆKG =
1
2
∫
d˜3k Ek
[
aˆ†(k)aˆ(k) + aˆ(k)aˆ†(k)
]
=
∫
d˜3k Ek
[
aˆ†(k)aˆ(k) + (2π)3Ekδ3(0)
] (3.11)
The term (2π)3Ekδ
3(0) (although divergent with the theory’s UV cutoff) is a
constant and so has no detectable effect, so for convenience we can redefine
HˆKG as
HˆKG =
∫
d˜3k Ek aˆ
†(k)aˆ(k). (3.12)
If |0〉 is the ground state, or vacuum, of HˆKG, so that HˆKG|0〉 = 0, then it is
easily proven that the eigenstates of HˆKG are states of the form
|k1, ..., kn〉 ≡ aˆ†(kn)...aˆ†(k1)|0〉 (3.13)
for n = 1, 2, 3, ..... That is,
HˆKG|k1, ..., kn〉 = (Ek1 + ...+ Ekn) |k1, ..., kn〉. (3.14)
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The states {|0〉, |k1, ..., kn〉} (being eigenstates of a Hermitian operator) form an
orthonormal basis for the state space H of the theory, known as the Fock basis.
In this basis, the identity operator takes the form,
Iˆ = |0〉〈0|+
∞∑
n=1
∫
d3k1...d
3kn |k1, ..., kn〉〈k1, ..., kn|. (3.15)
Thus, a general state |Ψ〉 ∈ H can be expressed in the form
|Ψ〉 = ψ0|0〉+
∞∑
n=1
∫
d3k1...d
3kn ψ˜n(k1, ..., kn) |k1, ..., kn〉 (3.16)
where ψ0 ≡ 〈0|Ψ〉 and ψ˜n(k1, ..., kn) ≡ 〈k1, ..., kn|Ψ〉. The inner product of two
states in this representation is
〈Φ|Ψ〉 = φ0ψ0 +
∞∑
n=1
∫
d3k1...d
3kn φ˜
∗
n(k1, ..., kn) ψ˜n(k1, ..., kn). (3.17)
The Schrodinger equation for free Klein-Gordon QFT,
i
∂
∂t
|Ψ〉 = HˆKG|Ψ〉, (3.18)
entails
i
∂
∂t
ψ0 = 0
i
∂
∂t
ψ˜n(k1, ..., kn, t) = (Ek1 + ...+ Ekn) ψ˜n(k1, ..., kn, t).
(3.19)
This, in turn, entails that the general time-dependent solution takes the form
|Ψ(t)〉 = ψ0(t = 0)|0〉+
n∑
i=1
∫
d3k1...d
3kn ψ˜n(k1, ..., kn, t = 0) e
−i(Ek1+...+Ekn)t |k1, ..., kn〉.
(3.20)
Turning attention from k-space to x-space, define the n-particle position space
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wave function as
ψn(x1, ...xn) ≡
∫
d˜3k1...d˜3kn ψ˜n(k1, ..., kn) e
−i(k1x1+...+knxn)
= 〈0|φˆ(x1)...φˆ(xn)|Ψ〉.
(3.21)
The inner product between two states in this representation takes the form
〈Φ|Ψ〉 = φ0ψ0 +
∞∑
n=1
∫
d3x1...d
3xn φ
∗
n(x1, ..., xn) ψn(x1, ..., xn). (3.22)
The Klein-Gordon Schrodinger equation entails that
i
∂
∂t
ψ0 = 0
i
∂
∂t
ψn(x1, ...xn, t) =
(√
∇2x1 +m2 + ...+
√
∇2xn +m2
)
ψn(x1, ...xn, t)
(3.23)
where
√∇2 +m2f(x) ≡ C ∫ dk √k2 +m2 f˜(k) e−ikx (C is a convention-
dependent normalisation constant for the Fourier integral).
The k-space and x-space expansion coefficients ψ˜n(k1, ..., kn, t) and ψn(x1, ...xn, t)
are the n-particle momentum and position space wave functions, respectively.
Ultimately, the justification for this association must come from a demonstra-
tion that these functions characterise the behavior of n-particle systems - either
quantum or classical - in the appropriate circumstances. At the present stage
of the analysis, though, one major motivation for identifying the operator aˆ†(k)
as creating a single particle of momentum k is that, associating k with momen-
tum and Ek with energy, the state aˆ
†(k)|0〉 exhibits the appropriate relativistic
relationship between energy and momentum: namely E2 − k2 = m2.
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Field Representation
An alternative to the Fock basis for the Hilbert space H is the basis of simula-
taneous eigenstates of the field operators φˆ(x). The field operators ˆφ(x) form a
complete set of commuting operators. The eigenstates of this complete set are
the states |φ〉 which are simultaneous eigenstates of all field operators ˆφ(x):
φˆ(x)|φ〉 = φ(x)|φ〉 for all x, (3.24)
where, note, φ(x) is a number representing an eigenvalue of the operator φˆ(x).
The field eigenstates constitute an eigenbasis {|φ〉}, known sometimes as the
field basis. (It is worth noting here that in the case of an inifinite number of
degrees of freedom, the Hilbert space is non-separable since it does not admit a
countable orthonormal basis; however, given the cutoff approach adopted here,
the number of degrees of freedom will typically be taken to be large-but-finite;
the reader should keep this in mind when interpreting my admittedly heuristic
use of notation here.) Being orthonormal, the states {|φ〉} satisfy the relation
〈φ′|φ〉 = δ[φ− φ′], (3.25)
where δ[φ−φ′] is the functional delta function (for a review of functional calculus,
see Hatfield [49]). In this basis, the identity operator on H takes the form
Iˆ =
∫
Dφ |φ〉〈φ|, (3.26)
where
∫ Dφ designates a functional integral over field configurations. The quan-
tum state |Ψ〉 can thus be represented as
|Ψ〉 =
∫
Dφ Ψ[φ] |φ〉, (3.27)
where Ψ[φ] ≡ 〈φ|Ψ〉. Note that this is simply an alternative, equivalent rep-
resentation of |Ψ〉 to the representation provided by (5.1). We can use this
expression for the state |Ψ〉 to determine the action of the operator φˆ on an
171
arbitrary state in H:
φˆ(x)|Ψ〉 =
∫
Dφ φ(x) Ψ[φ] |φ〉. (3.28)
The momentum operator πˆ(x) must be defined to act on Ψ[φ] in such a way
as to produce a representation of the commutation relations (3.4). Define the
action of πˆ(x) by
πˆ(x)|Ψ〉 =
∫
Dφ − i δ
δφ(x)
Ψ[φ] |φ〉 (3.29)
where δδφ(x) is the functional derivative with respect to the variable φ(x). It is
then straightforward, using the rules of functional differentiation, to check that
[
φˆ(x), πˆ(y)
]
|Ψ〉 =
∫
Dφ−i
(
φ(x)
δ
δφ(y)
− δ
δφ(y)
φ(x)
)
Ψ[φ] |φ〉 =
∫
Dφ iδ3(x−y) Ψ[φ] |φ〉 = iδ3(x−y)|Ψ〉.
(3.30)
Employing the representation of the identity, we obtain an expression for the
inner product of two states:
〈Φ|Ψ〉 =
∫
Dφ Φ∗[φ]Ψ[φ] (3.31)
In the field representation, the Schrodinger equation for free Klein-Gordon field
theory,
i
∂
∂t
|Ψ〉 = HˆKG|Ψ〉, (3.32)
entails
i
∂
∂t
Ψ[φ, t] =
[
− δ
2
δφ(x)2
+ (∇φ(x))2 +m2φ2(x)
]
Ψ[φ, t]. (3.33)
Because the Hamiltonian is time-independent, the solution takes the form
Ψ[φ, t] = Ψ[φ]e−iEt, (3.34)
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and the corresponding time-independent Schrodinger equation takes the form
[
− δ
2
δφ(x)2
+ (∇φ(x))2 +m2φ2(x)
]
Ψ[φ] = EΨ[φ]. (3.35)
where E is an energy eigenvalue. Note that the Schrodinger equation is more
straightforwardly solved in the momentum space particle representation, where
the Hamiltonian is diagonal.
Transforming Between Field and Particle Representations
It is possible to transform between the field and particle representations by
means of straightforward insertions of the identity operator.
Transforming first from the field to the particle representation, we have
ψ0 = 〈0|Ψ〉 =
∫
Dφ 〈0|φ〉〈φ|Ψ〉 =
∫
Dφ Ψ∗0[φ] Ψ[φ] (3.36)
ψ˜n(k1, ..., kn) = 〈k1, ..., kn|Ψ〉 =
∫
Dφ 〈k1, ..., kn|φ〉〈φ|Ψ〉 =
∫
Dφ Ψ∗k1,...,kn [φ] Ψ[φ]
(3.37)
ψn(x1, ..., xn) = 〈x1, ..., xn|Ψ〉 =
∫
Dφ 〈0|φˆ(x1), ..., φˆ(xn)|φ〉〈φ|Ψ〉 =
∫
Dφ φ(x1)...φ(xn) Ψ∗0[φ] Ψ[φ],
(3.38)
where Ψ∗0[φ] is the conjugate vacuum state wave functional and Ψ
∗
k1,...,kn
[φ]
the conjugate wave functional of an n-particle state with momenta (k1, ..., kn).
Explicit expressions for the former and certain of the latter with low particle
numbers can be found in Hatfield [49]. Note that the wave functional for an
n-particle state localised about (x1, ..., xn) is simply φ(x1)...φ(xn) Ψ0[φ].
Transforming in the reverse direction, from the particle to the field repre-
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sentation, we have
Ψ[φ] = 〈φ|Ψ〉 = 〈φ|
(
|0〉〈0|+
n∑
i=1
∫
d3k1...d
3kn |k1, ..., kn〉〈k1, ..., kn|
)
|Ψ〉
= Ψ0[φ] ψ0 +
n∑
i=1
∫
d3k1...d
3kn Ψk1,...,kn [φ] ψ˜n(k1, ..., kn),
(3.39)
where I have inserted the identity operator in the momentum space particle
representation rather than in the field representation.
3.1.2 Theory of the Free EM Field
The Hamiltonian for a free electromagnetic field quantised in Coulomb gauge,
∇ · ~ˆA = 0, is
HˆEM =
∫
d3x
[
~ˆE2 + ~ˆB2
]
=
∫
d3x
[
~ˆE2(x) +
(
∇× ~ˆA(x)
)2]
, (3.40)
where the vector potential operator ~ˆA(x) and electric field operator ~ˆE satisfy
the canonical commutation relations
[
Aˆi(x), Eˆj(y)
]
= −iδTij(x − y), (3.41)
where δTij(x − y) is transverse delta function, defined by
δTij(x− y) ≡
(
δij − ∂i∂j∇2
)
δ3(x− y) =
∫
d3k
(2π)3
eik·(x−y)
(
δij − kikj|k|2
)
. (3.42)
It is straightforward to see that, when integrated against an arbitrary vector
vield vi(x), the transverse delta function returns the transverse component of
this vector field (where, recall, this is defined as the vector field whose Fourier
transform is obtained by projecting out the component of vi(x)’s Fourier trans-
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form parallel to ~k, for each ~k.) So,
vTi (x) =
∫
d3y δTij(x− y) vj(y). (3.43)
As in the case of the free scalar field, the EM field state has both particle and
field representations. I consider the particle representation first.
Particle Representation
To extract a particle representation from the model, expand the operators ~ˆA(x)
and ~ˆE(x) as
~ˆA(x) =
∫
d˜3k
∑
λ=1,2
~ǫ(k, λ)
(
aˆ(k, λ) eik·x + aˆ†(k, λ) e−ik·x
)
(3.44)
~ˆE(x) =
∫
d˜3k
∑
λ=1,2
~ǫ(k, λ) i|k| (−aˆ(k, λ) eik·x + aˆ†(k, λ) e−ik·x ) (3.45)
where again,
d˜3k ≡ d
3k
(2π)32Ek
, (3.46)
with Ek = |k| and the ~ǫ(k, λ) two linear polarisation vectors satifying transver-
sality, ~k · ~ǫ(k, λ) = 0, and orthogonality ~ǫ(k, λ) · ~ǫ(k, λ′) = δλλ′ . The expansion
(3.45) reproduces the canonical commutation relations for ~ˆA(x) and ~ˆE(x) if
[
aˆ(k, λ), aˆ†(k′, λ′)
]
= (2π)32Ekδ
3(k − k′)δλλ′ , (3.47)
with all other commutators among the a’s and a†’s zero. The Hamiltonian of
the theory then takes the form, after dropping dropping an infinite (or rather
divergent with the UV cutoff) constant,
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HˆEM =
∑
λ=1,2
∫
d˜3k Ek aˆ
†(k′, λ′)aˆ(k, λ). (3.48)
The identity in this representation takes the form
Iˆ = |0EM 〉〈0EM |+
2∑
λ1,...,λn=1
∞∑
n=1
∫
d3k1...d
3kn aˆ
†(kn, λn)...aˆ†(k1, λ1)|0EM 〉〈0EM | aˆ(k1, λ1)...aˆ†(kn, λn)
(3.49)
and a general state |Φ〉 ∈ HEM can be expressed in the form
|Φ〉 = φ0|0〉+
2∑
λ1,...,λn=1
∞∑
n=1
∫
d3k1...d
3kn φ˜
λ1,...,λn
n (k1, ..., kn) aˆ
†(kn, λn)...aˆ†(k1, λ1)|0EM 〉
(3.50)
with φ˜λ1,...,λnn (k1, ..., kn) the n-photon momentum space wave function. Insert-
ing this into the Schrodinger equation as an initial condition, the general solution
for the time evolution of the state is
|Φ〉 = φ0|0〉+
2∑
λ1,...,λn=1
∞∑
n=1
∫
d
3
k1...d
3
kn φ˜
λ1,...,λn
n (k1, ..., kn, t = 0) e
−i((|k1|+...+|kn|)t aˆ
†(kn, λn)...aˆ
†(k1, λ1)|0EM 〉
(3.51)
We could go on to consider the position space representation for the free EM
field state in a manner analogous to the analysis for the free scalar field, but I
will have no use for it in my later analysis.
Field Representation
An alternative representation of the quantum state of the free EM field is pro-
vided by the field eigenstates | ~A〉, which satisfy
~ˆA(x)| ~A〉 = ~A(x)| ~A〉 for all x, (3.52)
where, note, ~A(x) is a number representing an eigenvalue of the operator ~ˆA(x).
Since ∇ · ~ˆA = 0 and ∇ · ~ˆA| ~A〉 = ∇ · ~A| ~A〉, all eigenvalue field configurations
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are also transverse: ∇ · ~A = 0. As a reminder that the field configurations
are transverse, I will designate them as ~AT . The field eigenstates constitute an
eigenbasis {| ~AT 〉}; being orthonormal, they satisfy the relation
〈 ~AT ′ | ~AT 〉 = δ[ ~AT − ~AT ′ ], (3.53)
where δ[ ~AT − ~AT ′ ] is the functional delta function, satifying
f [ ~AT0 ] =
∫
DAT f [ ~AT ] δ[ ~AT − ~AT0 ] (3.54)
where
∫ DAT ≡ ∫ DA δ[∇ · ~A] designates a functional integral only over trans-
verse field configurations; note that the delta functional δ[∇ · ~A] enforces the
restriction to transverse field configurations in the integral. In the field basis,
the identity operator on H takes the form
Iˆ =
∫
DAT | ~AT 〉〈 ~AT |, (3.55)
so the quantum state |Φ〉 thus can be represented as
|Φ〉 =
∫
DAT Φ[ ~AT ] | ~AT 〉, (3.56)
where Ψ[ ~AT ] ≡ 〈 ~AT |Φ〉. We can use this expression for the state |Φ〉 to deter-
mine the action of the operator ~ˆAT (x) on an arbitrary state in H:
AˆTi (x)|Φ〉 =
∫
DAT ATi (x) Φ[ ~AT ] | ~AT 〉. (3.57)
The canonically conjugate electric field operator Eˆi(x) must be defined to act
on Φ[ ~AT ] in such a way as to produce a representation of the commutation
relations (3.41). Define the action of ~ˆE(x) by
Eˆi(x)|Φ〉 =
∫
DAT i δ
δATi (x)
Φ[ ~AT ] | ~AT 〉 (3.58)
where δ
δAT
i
(x)
≡
(
δij − ∂i∂j∇2
)
δ
δAi(x)
is the functional derivative with respect to
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ATj (x). It is then straightforward, using the rules of functional differentiation,
to check that
[
Aˆi(x), Eˆj(y)
]
|Φ〉 =
∫
DAT i
(
ATi (x)
δ
δATj (y)
− δ
δATj (y)
ATi (x)
)
Φ[ ~AT ] | ~AT 〉
= −iδTij(x− y)
∫
DAT Φ[ ~AT ] | ~AT 〉,= −iδTij(x− y)|Φ〉,
(3.59)
where I have used the result δ
δAT
j
(y)
ATi (x) = δ
T
ij(x − y), which can be proven
straightforwardly using the rules of functional differentiation and the defini-
tion of the transverse projection operator. Employing the representation of the
identity, we obtain an expression for the inner product of two states:
〈Φ|Ψ〉 =
∫
DAT Φ∗[ ~AT ]Ψ[ ~AT ] (3.60)
In the field representation, the Schrodinger equation for free EM field theory,
i
∂
∂t
|Φ〉 = HˆEM |Φ〉, (3.61)
entails
i
∂
∂t
Φ[ ~AT , t] =
∫
d3x
[
− δ
2
δ ~AT (x)2
+
(
∇× ~AT
)2]
Φ[ ~AT , t], (3.62)
where δ
2
δ ~AT (x)2
≡ ∑3i=1 δ2δAT
i
(x)2
is the fuctional Laplacian. Because the Hamil-
tonian is time-independent, the solution takes the form
Φ[ ~AT , t] = Φ[ ~AT ]e−iEt, (3.63)
and the Schrodinger equation takes the form
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∫
d3x
[
− δ
2
δ ~AT (x)2
+
(
∇× ~AT
)2]
Φ[ ~A] = EΦ[ ~AT , t]. (3.64)
where E is the energy eigenvalue. Note that the Schrodinger equation is much
more straightforwardly solved in the momentum space particle representation,
where the Hamiltonian is diagonal.
Coherent States of the EM Field
A particular set of states of the electromagnetic field, known as coherent states,
will prove central to the discussion in the next two chapters. Before defining a
coherent state of the field, though, it is helpful to define the notion of a coherent
state for a single mode k of the field, which in the free theory has the dynamics
of a simple quantum harmonic oscillator. A coherent state |αk〉 of the mode
(k, λ) is defined as an eigenstate of the annihilation operator aˆk:
aˆk|α〉k = α|α〉k, (3.65)
where, because aˆk is not Hermitian, the eigenvalue α may be complex. Inserting
a complete set of energy eigenstates for the mode (which are just the eigenstates
of the quantum harmonic oscillator associated with that mode),
∑
n |nk〉〈nk|,
one has after some calculation that
|α〉k = e− 12 |α|
2 ∑
nk
(
αn√
n!
)
|nk〉. (3.66)
Noting that aˆk =
1√
2ωk
(
ωk
ˆ˜Ak + i
ˆ˜Ek
)
and designating α = 1√
2ωk
(
ωkA˜
0
k + iE˜
0
k
)
For the wave function of the mode k, we have
φ(A˜k) ≡ 〈A˜k|α〉k =
(ωk
π
) 1
4
e−
ωk
2 (A˜k−A˜0k)
2
+iE˜0kA˜k (3.67)
Having defined a coherent state of a single mode of the field, we can now define
a coherent state of the whole field, which consists simply of the tensor product
of coherent state wave functions for all modes:
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|α〉 =
⊗
k,λ
|α〉λk (3.68)
As a functional of the whole field configuration, specified by the field Fourier
transform ~˜A(k), the coherent state takes the form
α[ ~˜A] =
∏
k,λ
(ωk
π
) 1
4
e−
ωk
2 (A˜k−A˜0k)
2
+iE˜0kA˜k
=
∏
k,λ
(ωk
π
) 1
4
 e− ∫ d3k ωk2 (A˜k−A˜0k)2+iE˜0kA˜k . (3.69)
This functional over the field Fourier transform ~˜A(k), describes a product of
states each narrowly peaked about a particular configuration ~˜A0(k) of the field
Fourier transform and simultaneously (to within constraints established by the
canonical field commutators), a particular configuration of E˜0(k) of the field
momentum Fourier transform. This state, in turn, corresponds to a wave func-
tional narrowly peaked about a particlar spatial field configuration ~A0(x) and
a particular spatial field momentum configuration ~E0(x). In later chapters,
I designate the coherent state centered on field configuration ~A(x) and field
momentum configuration ~E(x), | ~A, ~E〉.
3.1.3 Free Fermionic Field Theory
The Hamiltonian for a free fermionic field theory, also known as free Dirac field
theory, is
HˆD =
∫
d3x ψˆ†(x) (−i~α · ∇+ βm) ψˆ(x) (3.70)
where ψˆ(x) and ψˆ†(x) are, respectively, 4-spinor field operators and their canon-
ically conjugate field momentum operators associated with each point in 3-space
x, αi = γ0γi, i = 1, 2, 3 and β = γ0, where the γ’s are Dirac matrices. The field
operator and conjugate momentum operator in this theory are stipulated to
180
satisfy the canonical anti-commutation relations,
{ψˆa(x), ψˆ†b(y)} = iδabδ3(x− y), (3.71)
where the 4-spinor indices on the field operators have been made explicit. The
Hilbert space of the theory, however it is defined, must carry a representation
of these anticommutation relations.
Particle Representation
Designating the energy eigenstates of the free Dirac equation ur(k), vs(k) with
r, s = 1, 2, we have
(−i~α · ∇+ βm)ur(k) = Ekur(k), (3.72)
(−i~α · ∇+ βm) vs(k) = −Ekvs(k), (3.73)
where Ek =
√
k2 +m2. Expand the field operators ψˆ(x) and ψˆ†(x) in terms of
these eigenspinors,
ψˆ(x) =
∫
d˜3k
∑
r
(
bˆr(k) ur(k) eikx + cˆ†r(k) vr(k) e−ikx
)
(3.74)
ψˆ†(x) =
∫
d˜3k
∑
r
(
bˆ†r(k) u†r(k) e−ikx + cˆr(k) v†r(k) e−ikx
)
(3.75)
where, in the context of the fermionic theory d˜3k has been redefined as
d˜3k =
d3k√
2Ek
. (3.76)
Stipulating the operators bˆr(k), bˆ†r(k), cˆr(k), and cˆ†r(k) to satisfy the anticom-
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mutation relations
{bˆr(k), bˆs†(k′)} = (2π)3δrsδ3(k − k′)
{cˆr(k), cˆs†(k′)} = (2π)3δrsδ3(k − k′),
(3.77)
with all other anticommutators zero, the above expansions of the the field op-
erators reproduces the anticommutators (3.71). In terms of creation and anni-
hilation operators, and subtracting the usual infinite constant, the Hamiltonian
is
HˆD =
∑
r
∫
d3k
(2π)3
Ek[bˆ
r†(k)bˆr(k) + cˆr†(k)cˆr(k)]. (3.78)
Designating the ground state of this Hamiltonian |0D〉, we can define the n-
particle, l-antiparticle states cˆsl†(pl)...cˆs1†(p1) bˆrn†(kn)...bˆr1†(k1)|0D〉, we can
write the identity operator on the Hilbert space HD as in earlier field theories
(the expression is cumbersome and straightforward generalisation of those that I
have written down earlier, so I forego writing it down here). Since the eigenstates
of HˆD constitute a basis, we can expand any state inHD in terms of these states:
|Ψ〉 = ψ0|0D〉
+
∞∑
n=1
∑
r1,...,rn
∫
d3k1...d
3kn ψ˜
r1,...,rn
n,0 (k1, ..., kn) bˆ
†,rn
kn
...bˆ†,r1k1 |0D〉
+
∞∑
l=1
∑
s1,...,sl
∫
d3p1...d
3pl ψ˜
s1,...,sl
0,l (p1, ..., pl) cˆ
†,sl
pl
...cˆ†,s1p1 |0D〉
+
∞∑
n,l=1
∑
r1,...,rn,
s1,...,sl
∫
d3k1...d
3kn d
3p1...d
3pl ψ˜
r1,...,rn,
s1,...,sl
n,l (k1, ..., kn; p1, ..., pl)cˆ
†,sl
pl
...cˆ†,s1p1 bˆ
†,rn
kn
...bˆ†,r1k1 |0D〉,
(3.79)
where ψ˜
r1,...,rn,
s1,...,sl
n,l (k1, ..., kn; p1, ..., pl) ≡ 〈0|bˆr1k1 ...bˆrnkn cˆs1p1 ...cˆslpl |Ψ > and likewise for
the (n, 0), (0, l) and (0, 0) coefficients. Thus, the quantum state of a Dirac field
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with n particles and l antiparticles is encoded in the 2n+l functions ψ˜
r1,...,rn,
s1,...,sl
n,l (k1, ..., kn; p1, ..., pl).
A general state of the field is given by an arbitrary (normalized) superposition
of these states for all positive integral values of n and l and of the vaccuum.
The Schrodinger equation for the free fermionic field is
i
∂
∂t
|Ψ〉 = HˆD|Ψ〉, (3.80)
In the momentum space particle representation, this yields the following uncou-
pled (as in the previous free theories we have considered) dynamical equations
for ψ˜
r1,...,rn,
s1,...,sl
n,l (k1, ..., kn; p1, ..., pl) and the other momentum space coefficients:
i
∂
∂t
ψ0 = 0
i
∂
∂t
ψ˜
r1,...,rn
n,0 (k1, ..., kn, t) =
(√
|k1|2 +m2 + ...+
√
|kn|2 +m2
)
ψ˜
r1,...,rn
n,0 (k1, ..., kn, t)
i
∂
∂t
ψ˜
s1,...,sl
0,l (s1, ..., sl, t) =
(√
|p1|2 +m2 + ...+
√
|pl|2 +m2
)
ψ˜
s1,...,sl
0,l (p1, ..., pl, t)
i
∂
∂t
ψ˜
r1,...,rn,
s1,...,sl
n,l
(k1, ..., kn; p1, ..., pl, t) =
(√
|k1|2 +m2 + ...+
√
|kn|2 +m2
+
√
|p1|2 +m2 + ...+
√
|pl|2 +m2
)
ψ˜
r1,...,rn,
s1,...,sl
n,l
(k1, ..., kn; p1, ..., pl, t)
(3.81)
with solutions
ψ0 = ψ0(t = 0)
ψ˜
r1,...,rn
n,0 (k1, ..., kn, t) = e
−i
(√
|k1|2+m2+...+
√
|kn|2+m2
)
t
ψ˜
r1,...,rn
n,0 (k1, ..., kn, t = 0)
ψ˜
s1,...,sl
0,l (p1, ..., pl, t) = e
i
(√
|p1|2+m2+...+
√
|pl|
2+m2
)
t
ψ˜
s1,...,sl
0,l (p1, ..., pl, t = 0)
ψ˜
r1,...,rn,
s1,...,sl
n,l
(k1, ..., kn; p1, ..., pl, t) =e
−i(
√
|k1|2+m2+...+
√
|kn|2+m2−
√
|p1|2+m2−...−
√
|pl|
2+m2)tψ˜
r1,...,rn,
s1,...,sl
n,l
(k1, ..., kn; p1, ..., pl, t = 0)
(3.82)
The Schrodinger equation for free Dirac theory can also be given a position rep-
resentation. For example, defining ψ
a1,...,an,
b1,...,bl
n,l (~x1, ..., ~xn; ~y1, ..., ~yl) ≡ 〈0D|ψˆa1( ~x1)...ψˆan( ~xn)ψˆ†b1(~y1)...ψˆ
†
bl
(~yl)|Ψ >,
we have
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i
∂
∂t
ψ
a1,...,an,
b1,...,bl (~x1, ..., ~xn; ~y1, ..., ~yl; t) =
{[− i~α · ~∇1 + βm]a1c1δa2c2 ... δancn + δa1c1[− i~α · ~∇2 + βm]a2c2δa3c3 ... δancn
+ ...+ δa1c1 ... δan−1cn−1
[− i~α · ~∇n + βm]ancn
+
[− i~α · ~∇1 + βm]b1d1δb2d2 ... δbldl + δb1d1[− i~α · ~∇2 + βm]b2d2δb3d3 ... δbldl
+ ...+ δb1b1 ... δbl−1dl−1
[− i~α · ~∇l + βm]bldl} ψc1,...,cn,d1,...,dl (~x1, ..., ~xn; ~y1, ..., ~yl; t)
(3.83)
and likewise for the other coefficients. Note that in both the momentum and po-
sition representations, the free Schrodinger equation keeps states with different
(n, l) uncoupled.
Field Representation
Due to the anticommuting, rather than commuting, nature of fermionic field
operators, there do not exist states in HD that are simultaneously eigenstates
of all the field operators ψˆ(x) at all positions x. Thus, in the fermionic case,
there is no field eigenbasis in the same way that there is in the case of bosonic
quantum field theory. However, there do exist representations of the canonical
anticommutation relations on a Hilbert space of fermionic functionals, otherwise
understood as elements of an infinite-dimensional Grassman algebra (or rather
very high-dimensional with the cutoffs). There exist strong formal analogies
between the functional formulation of fermionic field theory and the functional
formulation of bosonic field theory; however, because the particle representation
of fermionic field theories will suffice for my purposes, I do not review the
functional formulation of fermionic field theory here. For two distinct Grassman
algebra representations of the fermionic field, see [49] and [35].
3.1.4 Interacting Scalar Field Theory
The Hamiltonian for scalar field theory with a φˆ4(x) interaction term is
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Hˆint =
1
2
∫
d3x
[
πˆ2(x) +
(
∇φˆ(x)
)2
+m2φˆ2(x) +
1
4!
λφˆ4(x)
]
. (3.84)
The Hilbert space in this theory is the same as in the case of the free Klein-
Gordon theory, as the presence of an interaction term in the dynamics does not
alter the state space, only the evolution of states within it. The perturbative
calculation of amplitudes such as S-matrix elements produces the famous di-
vergences of quantum field theory at order λ2 and higher in the perturbation
expansion.
However, through the process of renormalisation, the amplitudes predicted
by the theory can be made finite by absorbing the divergences of the theory into
the definitions of m, λ and the normalisation of the field and field momenum
operators φˆ(x) and πˆ(x). Specifically, we can rewrite Hˆint in the form
Hˆint = Hˆ
r
int + HˆCT = Hˆ
r
KG + Hˆ
r
I + HˆCT , (3.85)
where Hˆrint = Hˆ
r
KG + Hˆ
r
I and,
HˆrKG ≡
1
2
∫
d3x
[
πˆ2r(x) +
(
∇φˆr(x)
)2
+m2rφˆ
2
r(x)
]
HˆrI ≡
1
4!
∫
d3x λrφˆ
4
r(x)
HˆCT ≡ 1
2
∫
d3x
[
−δZ
Z
πˆ2r(x) + δZ
(
∇φˆr(x)
)2
+ δm2 φˆ2r(x) +
1
4!
δλ φˆ4r(x)
]
,
(3.86)
where φˆ(x) = Z
1
2 φˆr(x), πˆ(x) = Z
− 12 πˆr(x), so that
[
φˆr(x), πˆr(y)
]
= iδ3(x − y)
), and where δZ ≡ Z − 1, δm ≡ Zm − mr, and δλ ≡ Z2λ − λr; the field
renormalisation Z is defined by Z = |〈Ω|φˆ(0)|λ0〉|2, where |Ω〉 is the vacuum of
the fully interacting Hamiltonian Hˆint and |λ0〉 is an eigenstate of Hˆint with field
momentum zero, so ~ˆP |λ0〉 = 0 (for further discussion of the field renormalisation
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constant and its significance, see [79]).
The renormalised mass mr and renormalised coupling λr are finite values
fixed by measurements of particular amplitudes of the theory, which establish
the so-called renormalisation conditions of the theory. If λr is sufficiently small,
the renormalisation conditions can be used to perturbatively compute the values
of the counterterms order by order in λr.
The Schrodinger equation for λφˆ4 theory is
i
∂
∂t
|Ψ〉 = Hˆint|Ψ〉. (3.87)
Splitting Hˆint into the renormalised free Hamiltonian Hˆ
r
KG, whose solutions we
know, and the perturbative interaction term Vˆ ≡ HˆrI + HˆCT , we can write
i
∂
∂t
|Ψ〉 =
[
HˆrKG + Vˆ
]
|Ψ〉. (3.88)
Expressed in this form, it is possible to solve for the perturbed energy eigenvalues
and energy eigenstates using the traditional Rayleigh-Schrodinger perturbation
theory familiar from nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. That is, designating
the perturbed energy Ek1,...,kn , the unperturbed energy E
(0)
k1,...,kn
, the order λr
correction E
(1)
k1,...,kn
, the order λ2r correction E
(2)
k1,...,kn
, and so on, we have
Ek1,...,kn = E
(0)
k1,...,kn
+ E
(1)
k1,...,kn
+ E
(2)
k1,...,kn
+ ... (3.89)
and likewise for eigenstates of the Hamiltonian,
|k1, ..., kn〉 = |k1, ..., kn〉(0) + |k1, ..., kn〉(1) + |k1, ..., kn〉(2) + ... (3.90)
where |k1, ..., kn〉(0) is the eigenstate of the renormalised free Hamiltonian HˆrKG
with momenta (k1, ..., kn), and |k1, ..., kn〉 the corresponding eigenstate of the
perturbed Hamiltonian Hˆint. Rayleigh-Schrodinger theory enables us to calcu-
late the corrections to the energy eigenvalues and eigenstates order by order in
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λr. For example,
E
(1)
k1,...,kn
= (0)〈k1, ..., kn|Vˆ |k1, ..., kn〉(0) (3.91)
|k1, ..., kn〉(1) =
∑
E
(0)
p1,...,pm
6=E(0)
k1,...,Ekn
(0)〈p1, ..., pm|Vˆ |k1, ..., kn〉(0)
E
(0)
k1,...,kn
− E(0)p1,...,pm
|p1, ..., pm〉(0).
(3.92)
Hatfield has performed this calculation up to first order for the vacuum state
and for one- and -two particle states. (As far as I am aware, no calculation to
1-loop order in this framework has been published.)
3.1.5 Quantum Electrodynamics
The Hamiltonian for quantum electrodynamics, quantised canonically in Coulomb
gauge, is
HˆQED =
∫
d3x
[
ψˆ†(−i~α·∇+βm)ψˆ+1
2
( ~ˆE2+ ~ˆB2)+eψˆ†~α· ~ˆAψˆ]+ e2
8π
∫
d3x d3y
ρˆ(x)ρˆ(y)
|x− y| ,
(3.93)
where ρˆ(x) ≡ eψˆ†(x)ψˆ(x). The commutation relations for the fermionic and
bosonic field operators are the same as in the respective free field versions of
these theories, and the fermionic and bosonic operators commute with each
other. The state space of the theory is the tensor product of the fermionic
Hilbert space and the electromagnetic Hilbert space:
HQED = HD ⊗HEM . (3.94)
Note that the operators ψˆ, ψˆ†, and therefore ρˆ, are operators onHD, while ~ˆA, ~ˆB,
and ~ˆE are operators on HEM . In the Hamiltonian, they should be understood
as operators extended to the full Hilbert space by tensoring with the identity on
the Hilbert on which they are not originally defined: e.g., ψˆ†⊗ IˆEM , or IˆD ⊗ ~ˆA.
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As in the case of the interacting scalar field, we can rewrite the Hamiltonian by
splitting it into renormalised and counterterm parts:
HˆQED = Hˆ
r
QED + HˆCT = Hˆ
r
D + Hˆ
r
EM + Hˆ
r
I + Hˆ
r
C + HˆCT , (3.95)
where
HˆrD ≡
∫
d3x
[
ψˆ†r(−i~α · ∇+ βmr)ψˆr
HˆrEM ≡
∫
d3x
1
2
(
~ˆE2r +
~ˆB2r
)
HˆrI ≡ er
∫
d3x ψˆ†r~α · ~ˆArψˆr
HˆrC ≡
e2r
8π
∫
d3x d3y
ρˆr(x)ρˆr(y)
|x− y|
HˆCT ≡ 1
2
∫
d3x
[
ψˆ†r(−iδ2~α · ∇+ βδm)ψˆr +
1
2
δ3
(
~ˆE2r +
~ˆB2r
)
+ δe ψˆ†r~α · ~ˆArψˆr
]
,
(3.96)
where ψˆ(x) = Z
1/2
2 ψˆr(x), Aˆi = Z
1/2
3 Aˆ
r
i , δm = Z2m−mr, and δe ≡ Z2Z1/23 e−er.
The field renormalisation constant Z2 is defined by the relation 〈Ω|ψˆ(0)|p, s〉 =
√
Z2u
s(p) (again, see [79] for further discussion of the field renormalisation’s
signficance). As in the case of interacting scalar field theory, the renormalised
mass and coupling are defined by suitable renormalisation conditions, which I do
not include since they go beyond what is needed for the analysis provided in the
next two chapters; I do, however, assume that the renormalisation conditions
fix mr at the usual value for the electron mass and er at the usual value for the
electron charge.
The Schrodinger equation for QED is
i
∂
∂t
|Ξ〉 = HˆQED|Ξ〉, (3.97)
where |Ξ〉 ∈ HQED. To apply perturbation theory in the coupling er, we can
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rewrite this in the form
i
∂
∂t
|Ξ〉 =
[
HˆrD + Hˆ
r
EM + Hˆ
r
C + Vˆ
]
|Ξ〉, (3.98)
where Vˆ ≡ HˆrI + HˆCT describes the interaction between the fermionic and
bosonic degrees of freedom of the theory. Note that the renormalised Coulomb
portion of the Hamiltonian, HˆrC , introduces a nonlinear interaction among the
momentum modes within HD, but does not cause any interaction between the
fermionic degrees of freedom described by states in HD and the bosonic degrees
of freedom described by states in HEM since it is an operator only on HD.
As we have seen, multiple representations of states in both factor spaces are
possible; to each pair of bases{|fi〉 ∈ HD}, {|bj〉 ∈ HEM}, there corresponds a
basis {|fi〉 ⊗ |bj〉 ∈ HQED} of HQED, and therefore a distinct representation of
the state |Ξ〉:
|Ξ〉 =
∑
i,j
ci,j |fi〉 ⊗ |bj〉, (3.99)
where the sum also may be understood as an integral and the indices as contin-
uous variables for the case of continuously indexed bases.
Applying the Rayleigh Schrodinger formulas in a manner directly analogous
to their application in the case of self-interacting scalar field theory, we may
obtain a perturbative expansion of the energies and energy eignenstates of the
unperturbed Hamiltonian Hˆr0 ≡ HˆrD + HˆrC + HˆrEM . Note that the unperturbed
eigenstates will be product states of fermionic and bosonic eigenstates. The
bosonic eigenstates are simply the eigenstates of the free renormalised EM field
Hamiltonian HˆrEM ; the fermionic eigenstates, because of the presence of the
Coulomb term HˆrC , will not be the simple momentum states, but rather will
consist of both a discrete set of bound n-particle, l-antiparticle states and a
continuum of unbound n-particle, l-antiparticle states, for each pair of non-
negative integers (n, l).
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3.2 Bohmian QFT
In this section, I review two Bohmian models of quantum field theory, one for
scalar field theory and the other for QED. Both models are deterministic models
with field beables. For a deterministic model of QED with particle beables, see
Colin’s [26]. For a stochastic model of QFT, see for instance Bell’s [9].
3.2.1 Scalar Field Theory
A Bohmian model of scalar field theory can be formulated by close analogy
with the case of NRQM; the guidance equations and posited probability dis-
tributions are not affected by the presence of the λφ4 interaction term, so the
following points apply to both the interacting and free theories. Assume a field
configuration beable η(x). With the choice of field beable, the natural represen-
tation of the quantum state to use is the field or wave functional representation
Ψ[φ, t]. Expanding the wave functional in polar form Ψ[φ, t] = R[φ, t]eiS[φ,t], the
Schrodinger equation (3.87) yields a continuity equation and Hamilton-Jacobi
equation as in the NRQM case. From this, one can extract that the probability
P [φ, t] = |Ψ[φ, t]|2 (3.100)
is preserved equivariantly by the guidance equation,
∂η(x, t)
∂t
=
δS[φ, t]
δφ(x)
∣∣∣∣
φ(x)=η(x)
. (3.101)
That is, if the probability over the possible beable configurations is |Ψ[φ, t = 0]|2
at time t = 0, then it will be |Ψ[φ, t]|2 at all later times.
Effective Collapse
For effective collapse to take place in this theory, the branches of the wave
function, as defined by the ordinary decoherence condition, must be disjoint
specifically with respect to the field configuration space. In the decoherent
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histories framework, this disjointness can be expressed as the condition that
〈Ψ0|Cˆi′n,...,i′1 |φ〉〈φ|Cˆin ,...,i1 |Ψ0〉 for all φ ∈ Q and for ik 6= i′k for any 1 ≤ k ≤ n
(3.102)
thus guaranteeing that the branches defined by decoherence are disjoint specif-
ically with respect to the beable configuration space.
3.2.2 Struyve and Westman’s Minimalist Model of QED
Struyve and Westman proposed a Bohmian model of QED in which the sole
beables are those associated with the transverse components ~AT of the elec-
tromagnetic field. The state space of the theory consists of the Hilbert space
of QED, HQED, discussed above, in addition to the field beable configuration
space QEM :
S = HQED ×QEM . (3.103)
Thus, a full specification of the state in this model is (|Ξ〉,~aT ) ∈ HQED ×QEM
(where I have used a lowercase a to distinguish the beable ~aT from the eigenvalue
~AT ). The dynamics of the quantum state of the model, |Ξ〉, has been specified in
eqn. (3.97). The model is thus fully specified once we have provided a guidance
equation for the beable ~aT and a probability distribution over the beables that
is equivariant with respect to the dynamics. Before reproducing Struyve and
Westman’s guidance equation here, a few preliminary remarks will be necessary.
Struyve and Westman begin by Fourier transforming the transverse field and
field momentum operators as follows:
~ˆAT (x) =
1
(2π)3
2∑
λ=1
∫
d3k eikx ~ǫλ(k)qˆλ(k) (3.104)
~ˆET (x) =
1
(2π)3
2∑
λ=1
∫
d3k e−ikx ~ǫλ(k)πˆλ(k) (3.105)
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with
[qˆλ(k), πˆλ′ (k
′)] = δλ,λ′ δ3(q − q′), (3.106)
and all other commutators for the EM Hilbert space zero. Note that these are
simply the canonical commutation relations (3.41) as applied to the Fourier
transforms of the transverse field and field momentum operators. The operator
qˆλ(k) is the Fourier transform of the field operator corresponding to polarisa-
tion λ; πˆλ′(k
′) is the Fourier transform of the transverse momentum operator
corresponding to polarisation λ′. Also, ~ǫλ(k) is a transverse polarisation vec-
tor, with ~ǫλ(k) · ~k = 0,
∑2
λ=1 ǫ
i
λ(k)ǫ
j
λ(k) = δij − kikj|k|2 , ~ǫλ(k) · ~ǫλ′(k) = δλ,λ′ ,
~ǫλ(k) = ~ǫλ(−k). The operators ~ˆAT and ~ˆET are Hermitian, so qˆλ(k) = qˆ†λ(−k)
and πˆλ(k) = πˆ
†
λ(−k).
Struyve and Westman take as a basis for the Hilbert space the eigenstates
|q1, q2〉, where qˆλ(k)|q1, q2〉 = qλ(k)|q1(k), q2(k)〉 for all k. That is, each state
|q1(k), q2(k)〉 is a simultaneous eigenstate of qˆλ(k) for every k and λ, and is also
an eigenstate of the Fourier transformed field operator
ˆ˜
~A(k), whose eigenvalues
yield a particular Fourier transform function ~˜A(k) =
∑
λ~ǫλ(k)qλ(k). Moreover,
the eigenvalues qλ(k) satisfy the relation qλ(k) = q
∗
λ(−k), as do the eigenvalues
of the Fourier transformed field operator, ~˜A(k) = ~˜A∗(−k).
Struyve and Westman then posit beables for the values of (q1(k), q2(k)), for
every k. Since these values are equivalent to specifying the value of the field
Fourier transform, they are equivalent (at least mathematically, if arguably
not ontologically) to specifying the spatial configuration of the field itself. As
preparation for writing down the guidance equation, let the QED quantum state
|Ξ〉 be written as
|Ξ〉 =
∑
q1,q2
∑
f
Ξ(f ; q1, q2)|f〉 ⊗ |q1, q2〉 (3.107)
where f indexes any basis for the fermionic Hilbert space HD and Ξ[f ; q1, q2] ≡
〈f ; q1, q2|Ξ〉, with |f ; q1, q2〉 ≡ |f〉 ⊗ |q1, q2〉. The probability distribution over
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the beables (q1(k), q2(k)) that Struve and Westman posit is
P [q1, q2; t] =
∑
f
|Ξ[f ; q1, q2]|2. (3.108)
Note that this is simply the ordinary Born Rule probability integrated over the
fermionic degrees of freedom. Writing the state expansion coefficient in polar
form, we have Ξ[f ; q1, q2; t] = R[f ; q1, q2; t]e
iS[f ;q1,q2;t]. The guidance equation,
which is explicitly consitructed to be equivariant with respect to the probability
distribution P , then can be written in the form
∂ql(k, t)
∂t
=
1
P (q1, q2, t)
∑
f
|Ξ[f ; q1, q2]|2 δS[f ; q1, q2; t]
δq∗l (k)
∣∣∣∣
q1,q2
. (3.109)
The evolution of (q1(k), q2(k)) determined by this guidance equation determines
the evolution of the beable field configuration ~aT (x) through the relation
~aT (x, t) =
1
(2π)3
2∑
λ=1
∫
d3k eikx ~ǫλ(k)qλ(k, t). (3.110)
The full dynamics of the theory are thereby specified.
Struyve and Westman further make a point of noting that while the only
beables in this theory are associated with the transverse electromagnetic field,
one may, without any change to the theory’s predictions, attribute beables to the
fermionic degrees freedom simply by choosing some Hermitian operator on HD
and defining the beable as the expectation value of this operator conditional
on the EM field beable configuration. For example, take the charge density
operator ρˆ(x) = eψˆ†(x)ψˆ(x). The beable associated with this operator is
ρ(x, t) ≡
∑
f,f ′ Ξ[f ; q1, q2] ρf,f ′(x) Ξ[f
′; q1, q2]
P [q1, q2; t]
∣∣∣∣
q1(t),q2(t)
(3.111)
where ρf,f ′(x) ≡ 〈f ′|ρˆ(x)|f〉. This equation entails that ρ(x, t) has no dynam-
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ics of its own and is merely ‘along for the ride,’ with its value and evolution
determined entirely by the quantum state |Ξ〉 and the beables (q1(k, t), q2(k, t)).
Effective Collapse in the QED Minimalist Model
Assume that the total state |Ξ〉 of QED consists of a number of approximately
orthogonal branches, so that
|Ξ〉 =
∑
i
ci|Ξi〉 (3.112)
where 〈Ξi|Ξj〉 ≈ 0 for i 6= j. For effective collapse onto one of these branches to
take place, the probability distribution at any given point (q1, q2 in the config-
uration space QEM should be the probability distribution associated with just
one of the branches. That is, effective collapse requires that
P [q1, q2] ≈ Pi[q1, q2] for some i, for all (q1, q2) ∈ QEM . (3.113)
Expanding P [q1, q2] for the state (3.112), we have
P [q1, q2] ≡
∑
f
|Ξ[f ; q1, q2]|2 =
∑
f
∣∣∑
i
Ξi[f ; q1, q2]
∣∣2
=
∑
i
Pi[q1, q2] +
∑
i6=j
∑
f
Ξ∗i [f ; q1, q2]Ξj [f ; q1, q2]
(3.114)
If we impose the two conditions
∑
f
Ξ∗i [f ; q1, q2]Ξj [f ; q1, q2] ≈ 0 for all (q1, q2) ∈ Q for i 6= j, (3.115)
Pi[q1, q2; t]Pj [q1, q2; t] ≈ 0 for all (q1, q2) ∈ Q for i 6= j (3.116)
the condition (3.113) will be satisfied. Thus, in the case of the minimalist model,
there are two conditions for effective collapse. Alternatively, but equivalently,
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one can formulate these two conditions in terms of spatial configurations ~AT ,
in which case we have
∑
f
Ξ∗i [f ; ~A
T ]Ξj [f ; ~A
T ] ≈ 0 for all ~AT ∈ Q for i 6= j, (3.117)
Pi[ ~A
T ]Pj [ ~A
T ] ≈ 0 for all ~AT ∈ Q for i 6= j. (3.118)
This case illustrates how the effective collapse conditions in Bohm’s theory de-
pend on the choice of beable.
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Chapter 4
The Classical Domain of
Relativistic Quantum
Electrodynamics
In this chapter, I provide templates for the DS reduction of certain models of
classical electrodynamics to the Bare/Everett and Bohm models of quantum
electrodynamics. Classical electrodynamics (CED) describes a vast and dis-
parate array of systems, ranging from the propagation of electromagnetic waves
through various media, to the behavior of electrical circuits, to the motions of
and radiation produced by elementary particles in an electromagnetic field. In
this chapter, I will be considering the reduction of classical to quantum electro-
dynamics for a very particular kind of system: a small number of elementary
charges, such as electrons, interacting with an electromagnetic field in empty
space. One can find instances of such applications in particle accelerators, where
the laws of classical electrodynamics are used to guide beams of charged ele-
mentary particles, and also to describe the radiation emitted by these particles
[86].
Before beginning to formulate the DS reduction for these cases, I discuss
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a challenge to the internal consistency of CED that was raised by Frisch, and
that was addressed by Muller, Belot, Vickers and Zuchowski. While I agree
that these authors are collectively successful in rebutting Frisch’s particular
concern about the internal consistency of CED, it is important to keep in mind
that the claim of the internal consistency of CED still has yet to be proven.
For the purposes of my analysis here, the question of internal consistency of
CED does not enter in any crucial way since the reductions that I perform
are reductions not of the full theory of CED, whose consistency is at issue,
but of approximations to CED in which either the charge/current distribution
or the electromagnetic field is independently prescribed, and whose internal
consistency is not in doubt. I designate the approximation to CED in which the
charge/current distribution is independently prescribed and the electromagnetic
field solved for using Maxwell’s equations as the ‘Classical Maxwell’ model;
likewise, I designate the approximation to CED in which the electromagnetic
field is independently prescribed and the motion of charge distribution solved
for using the Lorentz Force Law the ‘Classical Lorentz’ model.
Corresponding to the two classical models of CED that I consider in the
context of DS reduction are two models of QED that likewise are only approx-
imations to the full theory of QED; I consider both models in the context of
both the Everettian/Bare and Bohmian interpretations. The first model, which
I call the‘ Quantum Maxwell’ model, takes the evolution of the fermionic degrees
of freedom as classically prescribed and solves for the evolution of the bosonic
quantum state using an effective Hamiltonian where the fermionic charge cur-
rent is given. The second quantum model, which I call the ‘Quantum Lorentz’
model, takes the evolution of the bosonic degrees of freedom as classically pre-
scribed and solves for the evolution of the fermionic degrees of freedom. As we
will see, the Quantum Maxwell and Lorentz models are variations on so-called
‘semiclassical’ models of quantum theory.
After introducing the Quantum Maxwell and Lorentz models, I go on to
derive analogues to Ehrenfest’s Theorem for these models; as I explain shortly,
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the extraction of approximately classical behavior from these models procedes
along lines that are largely analogous to the reduction of nonrelativistic particle
theories considered in Chapter 2, and just as Ehrenfest’s Theorem plays a crucial
role there, so the appropriate analogues to this theorem will here. Subsequently,
I consider the domains of both the Quantum Maxwell and Lorentz models in
the full theory of QED and conclude that they must be product states obeying
a number of other restrictions that I go on to specify. Finally, on the basis of
these considerations, I frame the reduction of the classical to quantum models
in the DS approach.
By analogy with the reduction of classical to quantum models in the nonrela-
tivistic case, we will see that the reduction of classical to quantum models in the
relativistic, field-theoretic context can be understood as proceeding according
to the same basic outline, with modifications:
1. Quasiclassicality: In the Quantum Maxwell and Quantum Lorentz mod-
els, examined the Everttian/Bare context, quasi-classicality can be under-
stood to follow from localisation (either in physical space or in field config-
uration space) that results from decoherence induced by degrees of freedom
external to those under consideration. In the Bohmian context, quasiclas-
sicality in the associated Quantum Maxwell model follows automatically
from the localisation of the electromagnetic field beables; quasiclassicality
in the associated Quantum Lorentz Model is a more complicated matter,
given that the Bohmian minimalist model of QED does not necessarily
incorporate any beables for the fermionic degrees of freedom, so any ap-
pearance of quasiclassicality on the part of these degrees of freedom is
necessarily, in a sense, an illusion created by the behavior of the bosonic
field beables.
2. Ehrenfest Theorems: The appropriate generalisation or analogue of
Ehrenfest’s Theorem in the Quantum Maxwell or Lorentz model ensures,
for special states, approximate classicality of quasiclassical trajectories.
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By analogy with the nonrelativistic case, these special states are also nar-
row, coherent wave packets: to be more specific, in the fermionic sector,
they are states of definite particle number in which all particles are nar-
rowly peaked in both particle position and momentum; in the bosonic
sector, they are coherent states | ~A, ~E〉 of the electromagnetic field nar-
rowly peaked about some classical field configuration and momentum
( ~A, ~E). Moreover, whereas effective collapse of the quantum state in the
Everett/Bare version of these models is ensured by simple decoherence,
in the Bohmian case, disjointness of branches of the state with respect
to the beable configuration space, which amounts to a particular form of
decoherence that is logically stronger than the one required for effective
collapse in the Everett/Bare case, is again required.
3. Wave Packet Spreading and Branching: By disanalogy with the non-
relativistic case, the internal dynamics of the electromagnetic field, as it
turns out, will not generallty cause wave packet coherent states in this
space to spread; this is a consequence of the fact that the free electro-
magnetic field in fact consists of many distinct harmonic oscillators, and
a coherent state of the EM field is built from coherent states for all the
individual oscillators, and the harmonic oscillator is the one system for
which coherent states retain their width. Moreover, because the Maxwell
field couples linearly to its fermionic source term, and because the oper-
ator Maxwell equations are linear in the electromagnetic field operators,
in the Quantum Maxwell model one can always expect expectation values
of the electric and magnetic field operators to exactly obey the classical
Maxwell’s equations. On the other hand, the analogy with the nonrel-
ativistic case does continue to hold in the case of the Quantum Lorentz
model insofar as the internal dynamics of the fermionic sector does typ-
ically cause wave packets in states of definite particle number to spread
out. One should expect that on appropriate timescales, this spreading
will result in branching as the coherent superposition that results from
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the spreading is decohered by interaction either with the electromagnetic
field or with other fermions.
In the Quantum Maxwell model, the factors that affect the rate of
bosonic wave packet spreading are simply those that affect fermionic wave
packet spreading, since bosonic packets do not tend to spread of their own
accord but only indirectly by virtue of their interaction with fermionic de-
grees of freedom (for example, a fermionic state consisting of two widely
separated wave packets for a single particle will tend to generate a su-
perposition of very different classical electromagnetic field configurations,
where each field configuration can be regarded as being generated by a
different one of the quasi-classical fermionic wave packets). In the Quan-
tum Lorentz model, on the other hand, the factors affecting wave packet
spreading are likely to include those that affect wave packet spreading
in the nonrelativistic case: namely the mass of the particles in question
(which, unlike in the nonrelativistic instances I considered, will be small
in the cases I consider here, on the order of the mass of, say, an electron);
it is possible if not likely that chaotic effects also will promote wave packet
spreading in these relativistic cases, though I do not explore this question
in any depth.
The derivation of the Ehrenfest Theorem in the quantum Lorentz model below
is original; in the case of the quantum Maxwell model, as we will see, it is trivial.
The discussion of the reduction of the quantum Maxwell and Lorentz models
to QED, and of the role of decoherence therein, is also original. Finally, the
framing of the reduction of the classical Maxwell and Lorentz models to their
quantum counterparts in the context of the DS approach is also original.
4.1 Models of Classical Electrodynamics
The full theory of classical electrodynamics can be formulated in a Hamiltonian
framework, with state space equal to the Cartesian product of N -particle phase
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space ΓNp and the phase space ΓEM of the transverse electromagnetic field
(continuing to assume the Coulomb gauge condition ∇ · ~A = 0):
S = ΓNp × ΓEM . (4.1)
The equations of motion of the theory take the form
d~qi
dt
=
∂HCED
∂~pi
d~pi
dt
= −∂HCED
∂~qi
(4.2)
∂ ~AT
∂t
=
δHCED
δ ~ET
∂ ~ET
∂t
= −δHCED
δ ~AT
(4.3)
where ~pi = γm~˙qi + e ~A(~qi), and the Hamiltonian HCED, formulated in the
Coulomb gauge ∇ · ~A = 0, is a funcion of the particle positions and canonical
momenta qi and pi, and a functional of the field configuration ~A
T (x) and field
canonical field momentum ~ET (x), which is also the transverse electric field:
HCED(~q, ~p; ~A, ~ET ] =
∑
i
√
(~pi − e ~A(~qi))2 +m2+ e
2
4π
∑
i6=j
1
|~qi − ~qj | +
1
2
∫
d3x
[
~E2T +
~B2
]
.
(4.4)
Jackson, in his canonical text on classical electrodynamics, notes that most ap-
plications of classical electrodynamics are not applications of this model, which
represents the complete theory of classical electrodynamics, but rather applica-
tions of one of two kinds of model that approximate the full laws of classical
electrodynamics in cases where back reaction effects between charges and field
can be neglected [56]:
• Lorentz Model: First, models in which some background electric and
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magnetic fields ~E(~x, t) and ~B(~x, t) are independently prescribed, and the
motion ~x(t) of charged particles is determined on the basis of the Lorentz
Force Law. In this model, the state space is N-particle phase space:
SL = ΓNp. (4.5)
The dynamics are determined by the effective classical Hamiltonian
HeffL (~q, ~p) =
∑
i
√
(~pi − e ~A(~qi), t)2 +m2 + e
2
4π
∑
i6=j
1
|~qi − ~qj | , (4.6)
in which the kinetic term for the electromagnetic field has been ignored
and a prescribed time evolution for the electromagnetic ( ~A(x, t), ~E(x, t)) -
written in boldface to underscore the fact that it is an independently spec-
ified function - inserted instead into the Hamiltonian. With this Hamilto-
nian, the particle Hamilton equations (4.2) yield the Lorentz Force Law:
d
dt
[γm
d~q(t)
dt
] = e ~E(~q(t), t) + e
d~q(t)
dt
× ~B(~q(t), t), (4.7)
where ~E(x, t) = ~ET (x, t) + ~EL(x, t), and ~EL(x) is a longitudinal solution
to the Gauss equation ∇ · ~EL(x) = ρ(x, t) =
∑
i eδ
3(x − qi(t)). Note that
~EL is completely determined by the locations of the charges and therefore
does not constitute an independent degree of freedom of the theory, either
electromagnetic or fermionic.
• Maxwell Model: Second, models in which some possibly time-dependent
charge and current distributions ρ(~x, t) ≡∑i eδ3(~x − ~qi(t)) and ~j(x, t) ≡∑
i e~˙qiδ
3(~x− ~qi(t)) are prescribed, and the resulting electromagnetic field
must be determined on the basis of Maxwell’s equations. In this model,
the state space is the electromagnetic phase space of field configurations
and momenta:
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SM = ΓEM . (4.8)
The dynamics are determined by the effective classical Hamiltonian
HeffM [
~A, ~E] =
∫
d3x
[
~E2T + ~B
2
]
+
∑
i
√(
~pi(t)− e ~A(~qi(t), t),
)2
+m2
(4.9)
where ~qi(t) and ~pi(t) have been written in boldface to indicate that they
are independently prescribed functions. The field Hamilton equations
(4.3) yield Maxwell’s equations:
∂ ~E
∂t
= −∇× ~B + 4π~j, (4.10)
∂ ~B
∂t
= ∇× ~E, (4.11)
where the Maxwell equation ∇ · ~B = 0 is automatically entailed by the
definition ~B ≡ ∇ × ~A, and the Gauss Law ∇ · ~E = ρ does not concern
the electromagnetic degrees of freedom ~ET and ~B, but instead, as a con-
sequence of the Coulomb gauge condition, reflects only the dynamics of
the particle degrees of freedom.
It is on these two models of classical electrodynamics, which should be seen as
approximations to the full dynamics of CED, that I shall focus while discussing
the DS reduction to quantum electrodynamics; the reduction of classical systems
exhibiting back reaction effects is beyond the scope of my analysis. In the next
two sections, I provide distinct templates for the reduction of these models to
QED.
While these two models apply to a wide variety of systems, the specific
applications that I will be considering in my analysis concern the interaction
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of charged elementary particles with the electromagnetic field. As regards ap-
plications of the Lorentz model, the physics used to guide beams of charged
subatomic particles at relativistic energies is nothing other than the classical,
relativistic, Lorentz force law for a single particle in an electromagnetic field.
As regards the description of radiation emitted by a prescribed, generally time-
dependent, charge distribution consisting of a single charged particle, one suc-
cessful application of the Maxwell model is the prediction of the angular and
frequency distribution of synchroton radiation by means of the Lienard-Wiechert
potentials (which in turn are derived from Maxwell’s equations), and also to the
description of low-frequency bremsstrahlung [56]. It is these sorts of relatively
simple, but very important, applications of CED that I seek to understand on
the basis of QED.
While there can be little doubt that classical models have been applied suc-
cessfully to the description of subatomic charged particles and their electromag-
netic interactions, the reader may nevertheless wonder why this should be the
case, given that subatomic particles such as electrons and protons are typically
the types of systems which we expect to behave nonclassically since, because
of their small mass, their wave packets tend to spread on relatively short time
scales. In short, the microscopicness of these systems would seem to preclude
any robust classical behavior on the their part.
However, a little further thought shows that this is not the case. When
particles such as electrons are moving sufficiently quickly, the centers of their
wave packets may traverse a substantial distance in the time it takes their
wave packets to spread. In this time, the position and momentum expectation
values of these wave packets will approximately satisfy Newtonian equations
of motion. To make this assumption more plausible, let us do a back-of-the-
envelope calculation to show that the timescales on which wave packets of a
particle like an electron (mass ∼ 1031kg.) which is moving sufficiently fast (say
106 m/s.) spread are sufficiently long to allow for trajectory-like, Newtonian
behavior to within a reasonable margin of error (say, 10−3m), over the typical
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length of particle tracks observed in a detector (say ∼ 1m.). The timescale on
which a free electron Gaussian wave packet spreads can be determined using
the expression for the width a of the wave packet over time:
a =
√
a20 +
4~2t2
m2a20
. (4.12)
If the initial packet width is on the order of 10−5m. (we do not want to make
it too narrow initially, or else it will spread too quickly), so that a0 ∼ 10−5m.,
then inserting a ∼ 10−3m., m ∼ 10−31kg., and ~ ∼ 10−34kg.m.2/s., we have
t =
√
m2a20
4~2
(a2 − a20) =
ma0
2~
√
(a2 − a20) ≈
ma0a
2~
∼ 10
−3110−510−3
10−34
∼ 10−5s.
(4.13)
If the velocity is semi-relativistic, say 106m./s, then the length of the electron
path over which Newtonian trajecories can be expected to within a margin of
error (trajectory width) of 10−6m is then given approximately by
D = vt ∼ 106m./s10−5s. ∼ 101m. (4.14)
Thus, for particles travelling at velocities that are sufficiently fast, but not nec-
essarily strongly relativistic, Newtonian trajectories can be expected to persist
over length scales of tens of meters, to within a path width of a millimeter.
Thus, behavior in this domain can be approximated as classical, though an
order-of-magnitude adjustment of initial wave packet width or velocity could
disrupt this classicality.
4.2 Worries about the Consistency of Classical
Electrodynamics
Before proceeding to discuss the reduction of CED to QED, it is worth taking a
moment to consider concerns about the internal consistency of CED that have
205
recently received a significant amount of attention in the philosophy of physics
literature. While I do not engage in any depth with this debate here, these
concerns are worth taking note of if only to flag the worry that the theory whose
reduction I am considering contains internal contradictions, which of course
will have bearing on the possibility of reducing it to some more fundamental
theory. While my discussion here is limited to reduction in the context of basic
applications of the Lorentz and Maxwell models (quantum and classical), any
completely comprehensive account of the manner in which the exact CED model
- not just the approximations I consider here - reduces to the full QED model
first must place the consistency of CED on firm footing. Here, I discuss one
worry about the internal consistency of CED recently raised by Frisch and the
responses it has elicited; I focus here on Zuchowski’s reply to Frisch’s argument,
which draws on those of Muller, Belot and Vickers, while also diverging from
them in important respects.
Frisch has argued that CED is inconsistent because, he claims, it prescribes
two mutually contradictory ways of setting up energy conservation in its descrip-
tion of an accelerating charged particle [37]. Frisch starts from what Zuchowski
has dubbed Jackson’s ‘two-step procedure,’ in which one either begins with some
prescribed electromagnetic fields and calculates the resulting particle trajectory
from the Lorentz Force Law or one begins with some prescribed charge and cur-
rent distribution and calculates the resulting electromagnetic field. However,
as Zuchowski has observed, Frisch’s inconsistency claim seems to result at least
partially from a failure to recognise that this two-step procedure does not repre-
sent the theory of CED itself, but rather two separate approximations to CED
that work well only in certain contexts and whose solutions do not represent
exact solutions to the full theory of CED. As with the three-body problem in
classical mechanics, solutions to the fully coupled, exact equations of CED have
thus far resisted any exact, closed-form statement and so most applications of
the theory have, as a result, relied on approximations such as the Maxwell and
Lorentz models.
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First, for a charged particle moving in some prescribed electric and magnetic
fields ~E0 and ~B0 (importantly, that are not generated by the particle itself, but
that may be generated by other charges and currents), the energy transfer from
the field to the particle is determined by the relation
1
2
m~˙x2 =
∫
~Fext( ~E0, ~B0) · d~x (4.15)
where ~Fext( ~E0, ~B0) is the Lorentz force associated with the given fields, ~x is
the position of the particle, and the integration extends over the volume over
which the particle’s charge is distributed. However, this prescription does not
take account of the fact that charged particles radiate when they accelerate (a
fact that is verified empirically and that is also expected on a theoretical basis
from Maxwell’s equations), and so lose energy in the process. This energy loss is
sometimes accounted for by the addition of another term to the energy balance,
associated with an internal or ‘self’ force, due to the fields generated by the
particle itself (which are, in turn, determined by Maxwell’s equations):
1
2
m~˙x2 =
∫
~Fext( ~E0, ~B0) · d~x+
∫
~Fint( ~Ep, ~Bp) · d~x. (4.16)
Here, ~Fint is the Lorentz force associated with the fields ~Ep and ~Bp, which
are generated by the charged particle itself and which are determined using
Maxwell’s equations with the charged particle as source.
The conservation relations (4.15) and (4.16) are clearly in contradiction with
each other. On this basis, Frisch concludes that CED, which he understands
to be a theory that neglects the energy loss associated with the self force in
describing the motion of the particle, does not conserve energy. Frisch further
concludes on this basis that the Lorentz equation (which on its own neglects the
self force) is inconsistent with Maxwell’s equations (which entail the presence
of the fields associated that generate the self-force ), and since these are the
central equations of CED, he concludes that CED itself is inconsistent. However,
as Zuckowski notes, Frisch’s notion of inconsistency seems to deviate from the
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more conventional definition, which regards equations as inconsistent only when
they have no solutions; Frisch does not offer any proof of the claim that there
are no solutions to the combined Maxwell and Lorentz equations, but only the
observation that there are two mutually contradictory, and arguably permissible,
ways of setting up energy conservation.
Muller, Belot, Vickers and Zuchowski have all offered extended critiques of
Frisch’s inconsistency argument [74], [10], [106]. I will not review them all here
as this has already been done in Zuchowski’s [116]. However, Zuchowski has
shown that Frisch’s argument against the constitency of CED fails because one
can show, without invoking any approximations, that full CED does indeed
respect energy conservation; when one considers the fully coupled equations of
CED, rather than the approximate two-step procedure, there is no contradiction
or ambiguity about energy conservation; this apparent contradiction is merely an
artefact of the approximation scheme that Frisch considers, which he incorrectly
identifies with the full theory of CED. The original proof of energy conservation
for an accelerating charged particle was given by Kiessling in [59]; Zuchowski
presents a simplified version of it specialised to the nonrelativistic case.
As Zuchowski emphasizes, her refutation of Frisch’s argument to the effect
that CED is inconsistent should not be taken to entail that CED is in fact
consistent - only that if it happens not to be consistent, then it is not for the
reasons that Frisch cites. I have restricted my attention in this thesis to the
reduction of the classical Maxwell and Lorentz model in part because there is
not space here to fully and properly engage the more general and much more
difficult question of how to reduce the full interacting CED model. If CED is
indeed inconsistent, then it would be unreasonable to attempt a reduction of the
exact theory of CED to QED; rather, we would have to satisfy ourselves with
analysing the reduction of those particular approximations to the full theory,
such as the Lorentz and Maxwell models , that are internally consistent and
that do generate clear empirically well-confirmed predictions. Pending further
developments on this matter, I have limited myself here to considering the DS
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reduction only of two successful approximations to CED that are mathemat-
ically well-understood and empirically well-confirmed. Because these models
can indeed be treated in the framework of dynamical systems theory, and be-
cause, as I demonstrate shortly, one can construct quantum analogues to the
classical Maxwell and Lorentz models that are likewise approximations to the
full QED model, we are in a position to see whether the classical and quantum
versions of these simplified approximations relate to each other in the way that
DS reduction requires.
Of course, once one has considered the question of the internal consistency
of CED, it becomes natural to inquire as to the internal consistency of QED. On
this question, the matter of the so-called ‘Landau pole’ in the renormalisation
group flow of the ‘physical’ electromagnetic coupling is sometimes cited as a
potential source of internal inconsistency in QED. In order to evade such issues
here, one can, without significant alteration to the theory’s low-momentum pre-
dictions, simply set the high-momentum cutoff for the theory at a scale very
much larger than the momenta involved in the pheneomena under considera-
tion, but less than the momentum at which the renormalised coupling diverges
(for further discussion of the Landau pole, see for instance [5], section 9.9, and
[40]) 1.
As Zuchowski also makes a point of emphasising, the sheer technical difficulty
of devising a closed-form solution to the full model of CED - i.e., of solving
the Maxwell and Lorentz equations simultaneously, rather than iteratively and
perturbatively - in no way entails that solutions to this model do not exist.
As an illustration of this point, she refers back repeatedly to the case of the
three-body problem in classical mechanics. Although this problem has for more
than a century resisted the efforts of mathematicians and physicists to devise
a closed-form solution, it is widely acknowledged that these difficulties do not
entail that the model is inconsistent - that is, that it has no solutions. However,
the consistency of the full CED model clearly needs to be proven, and the nature
1Thanks to David Wallace for a helpful discussion on this point.
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of its solutions better understood, before a fully comprehensive DS reduction of
CED to QED can be carried out.
4.3 The Quantum Maxwell and Lorentz Models
As discussed above, the classical Lorentz and Maxwell models each have quan-
tum counterparts. In the quantum Maxwell model, it is the evolution of the
fermionic degrees of freedom that is prescribed; in the quantum Lorentz model,
it is the evolution of the electromagnetic degrees of freedom that is prescribed.
Quantum Maxwell Model
The quantum counterpart to the Maxwell model has as its state space the
electromagnetic Hilbert space,
SM = HEM (4.17)
and its dynamics are determined by the effective Schrodinger equation,
i
∂
∂t
|Φ〉 = HˆM |Φ〉 (4.18)
where
HˆM |Φ〉 ≡
∫
d3x
[1
2
( ~ˆE2T +
~ˆB2) +~j · ~ˆA]|Φ〉, (4.19)
and ~j(x) is some prescribed classical (that is, c-number- rather than operator-
valued) source current. This model, which I refer to as the quantum Maxwell
model, and is an example of a ‘semiclassical’ model of quantum field theory, in
which one set of degrees of freedom is treated quantum mechanically - in this
case, the bosonic degrees of freedom - while the other is treated classically -
in this case, the fermionic degrees of freedom. (The reader may consult, for
instance, [79], p. 32-33, for a brief introduction to semi-classical models of
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quantum field theory.)
Much of the discussion in section 4.4 will concern the matter of how to reduce
the classical Maxwell model to the quantum Maxwell model. For the moment,
though, I will briefly discuss the reduction of the quantum Maxwell model to
the full QED model, before returning to this matter in section 4.5.
In order that the evolution of the bosonic degrees of freedom in QED may
be approximated by some unitary evolution - i.e. in terms of some Schrodinger
equation, as it is in (4.19) - it is necessary that the underlying QED state in
HD ⊗ HEM remain a product state over the timescale for which the quantum
Maxwell model is expected to apply. In addition, it is also necessary that
the fermionic degrees of freedom not vary too rapidly in time - that is, that
the fermionic state not involve energies that are too high. To see the reason
for this requirement, consider the time derivative of the QED product state
|Ψ(t)〉 ⊗ |Φ(t)〉, as determined by the full QED Schrodinger equation:
∂
∂t
(|Ψ(t)〉 ⊗ |Φ(t)〉) = HˆQED (|Ψ(t)〉 ⊗ |Φ(t)〉) . (4.20)
Now since ∂∂t (|Ψ(t)〉 ⊗ |Φ(t)〉) = ∂∂t (|Ψ(t)〉)⊗ |Φ(t)〉+ |Ψ(t)〉 ⊗ ∂∂t (|Φ(t)〉), if we
stipulate that the fermionic degrees of vary slowly - i.e., ∂∂t |Ψ(t)〉 ≈ 0 - then
∂
∂t (|Ψ(t)〉 ⊗ |Φ(t)〉) ≈ |Ψ(t)〉 ⊗ ∂∂t (|Φ(t)〉). If moreover, |Ψ(t)〉 and |Φ(t)〉 are
such that
HˆQED (|Ψ(t)〉 ⊗ |Φ(t)〉) ≈ |Ψ(t)〉 ⊗ HˆeffM (|Φ(t)〉) , (4.21)
for some Hermitian operator HˆeffM on HEM , then it follows that
|Ψ(t)〉 ⊗ ∂
∂t
|Φ(t)〉 ≈ |Ψ(t)〉 ⊗ HˆeffM |Φ(t)〉 (4.22)
and from this, that
∂
∂t
|Φ(t)〉 ≈ HˆeffM |Φ(t)〉 (4.23)
211
thereby yielding an approximately unitary, pure state evolution for the bosonic
degrees of freedom. To derive the semiclassical quantum Maxwell model dis-
cussed above, we need HˆeffM ≈ HˆM .
A full reduction of the semiclassical Maxwell model to the full QED model
goes beyond the scope of my analysis here. Nevertheless, I will endeavour to
provide some level of heuristic insight into how it comes about. Consider for
the moment just the renormalised portion HˆrQED = Hˆ
r
D + Hˆ
r
C + Hˆ
r
EM + Hˆ
r
I of
HˆQED, ignoring the counterterm portion HˆCT .
If |Ψ(t)〉 is slowly varying, then the energies associated with the purely
fermionic portion HˆrD+Hˆ
r
C of the renormalised QED Hamiltonian will be low, so
that by comparison with other terms in the Hamiltonian, (HˆrD+Hˆ
r
C)|Ψ(t)〉 ≈ 0.
If in addition, |Ψ(t)〉 is an approximate eigenstate of the interaction Hamilto-
nian HˆrI , so that ψˆ
r†(x)~α ·ψˆr(x) · ~ˆA(x)|Ψ(t)〉⊗|Φ(t)〉 ≈ ~j(x) · ~ˆA(x)|Ψ(t)〉⊗|Φ(t)〉,
then
HˆrI |Ψ(t)〉 ⊗ |Φ(t)〉 =
[∫
d3x erψˆ
r†~α · ~ˆArψˆr
]
|Ψ(t)〉 ⊗ |Φ(t)〉 (4.24)
≈
[∫
d3x ~j · ~ˆAr
]
|Ψ(t)〉 ⊗ |Φ(t)〉. (4.25)
From this it follows that
HˆrQED|Ψ(t)〉 ⊗ |Φ(t)〉 ≈
(
HˆrEM + Hˆ
r
I
)
|Ψ(t)〉 ⊗ |Φ(t)〉 (4.26)
≈ |Ψ(t)〉 ⊗
[∫
d3x
1
2
( ~ˆEr2T + ~ˆB
r2) +~j · ~ˆAr
]
|Φ(t)〉.
(4.27)
in accordance with (4.21), with HˆeffM ≈ HˆM , except that here I have employed
only the renormalised portion HˆrQED of the QED Hamiltonian rather than the
full Hamiltonian HˆrQED+ Hˆ
r
CT , and in HˆM appearing in (4.19) the superscripts
r are omitted. Noting that we have employed in this discussion only the renor-
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malised portion HˆrQED of the QEDHamiltonian rather than the full Hamiltonian
HˆrQED = Hˆ
r
QED + Hˆ
r
CT , we are still left with the issue of how to address the
presence of the counterterms and to account for their effect. I defer this issue
to future research, acknowledging that modifications to the present discussion
may be required in light of the effects of the counterterms.
A full reduction of the classical Maxwell model to QED may take as an
intermediary step the reduction of the quantum Maxwell model to QED. In
doing so, it must explain why and in what domains the quantum Maxwell model
successfully approximates QED. I have offered some heuristic and preliminary
remarks on this matter, though they are no doubt incomplete. In particular, I
have suggested that the domain of QED in which the quantum Maxwell model
applies should be restricted to a domain of states that are approximately product
states, and moreover that the fermionic factor of these product states should be
slowly varying (so, contain only low energies by comparison with those contained
in the bosonic factor). I offer some further suggestions on this matter in section
4.5.
Quantum Lorentz Model
The quantum counterpart to the classical Lorentz model has as its state
space the fermionic Hilbert space,
SL = HD (4.28)
and its dynamics are determined by the effective Schrodinger equation
i
∂|Ψ〉
∂t
= HˆL|Ψ〉, (4.29)
where
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HˆL|Ψ(t)〉 ≡
∫
d3x
[
ψˆ†(−i~α · ∇+ βm)ψˆ + e ψˆ†~α · ~Aψˆ
+
e2
8π
∫
d3y
ρˆ(x)ρˆ(y)
|x− y|
]
|Ψ(t)〉
(4.30)
with ~A(x) a prescribed classical electromagnetic field. Like the quantumMaxwell
model, this model, which I call the quantum Lorentz model, is semiclassical;
however, in this model it is the electromagnetic field that is treated as classical
and the fermionic field that is treated as quantum in nature.
All of the considerations that applied to the reduction of the quantum
Maxwell model to QED also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the reduction of the
quantum Lorentz model to QED. In particular, while we must require as in
the Maxwell model that the underlying QED state be approximately a prod-
uct state, it should now be the bosonic degrees of freedom, described by the
state |Φ〉, that are slow and so contain only low energies. Moreover, it is now
the bosonic state |Φ〉 that should be an approximate eigenstate of the inter-
action Hamiltonian, so that ψˆr†(x)~α · ~ˆA(x)ψˆr(x)|Ψ(t)〉 ⊗ |Φ(t)〉 ≈ ψˆr†(x)~α ·
~A(x)ψˆr(x)|Ψ(t)〉 ⊗ |Φ(t)〉, where the reader should note that the vector poten-
tial on the right-hand side is now a c-number rather than an operator.
As in the case of the Maxwell model, a full reduction of the classical Lorentz
model may take the reduction of the quantum Lorentz model to QED as an
intermediary step. However, in doing so it must explain why and in what
domains the quantum Lorentz model successfully approximates QED. We have
seen that the QED states that approximately instantiate the quantum Lorentz
model should be approximate product states in which the bosonic degrees of
freedom are low-energy. As I discuss further in section 4.5, the set of QED
states that evolve approximately as product states (again, over some limited
timescale) should include the set of product coherent states (and states close
to these); so, product coherent states for which the bosonic state is low-energy
and an approximate eigenstate of the interaction Hamiltonian (as it will be if
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it is sufficiently narrowly peaked in field configuration space) seem likely to be
among the elements of the Lorentz model’s domain.
4.4 Ehrenfest Theorems for Quantum Maxwell
and Lorentz Models
4.4.1 Ehrenfest Theorem for the QuantumMaxwell Model
As in Chapter 2’s discussion of the classical domain of NRQM, an Ehrenfest
Theorem for the electromagnetic field in the quantum Maxwell model is crucial
to explaining classical behavior of this field. To derive the Ehrenfest Theorem
in this case, it will prove convenient to work in the Heisenberg picture. In the
Heisenberg picture, one finds, if one employs HˆM as the system’s Hamiltonian
and uses the equal-time commutation relations [AˆTi (x, t), Eˆj(x
′, t)] = −iδTij(x−
x′), that the Heisenberg equations of motion for the operators ~A and ~E take
the form:
~˙AT (x, t) =
∂ ~ˆAT (x, t)
∂t
= i[HˆM , ~ˆA
T (x, t)] = ~ˆET (x, t) (4.31)
from which it immediately follows that
~˙B =
∂ ~ˆB
∂t
= ∇× ∂
~ˆAT
∂t
= ∇× ~ˆET (4.32)
giving the operator form of Maxwell’s magnetic induction equation. Likewise,
~˙ET =
∂ ~ˆET
∂t
= i[HˆM , ~ˆE
T ] = −∇× ~ˆB + 4π~j, (4.33)
where ~j is the prescribed source current appearing in HˆM . Taking expectation
values with respect to an arbitrary state in HEM , we find
∂〈 ~ˆB〉
∂t
= ∇× 〈 ~ˆE〉 (4.34)
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and
∂〈 ~ˆE〉
∂t
= −∇× 〈 ~ˆB〉+ 4π~j. (4.35)
Thus, no matter what the state of the EM field, the expectation values of the
electric and magnetic fields obey classical equations of motion, with ~j standing
in as a prescribed classical source current. That is, no restriction need be placed
on the quantum state in HEM in order for expectation values of the electric and
magnetic fields to behave classically. This fact can be traced back to the fact
that the electromagnetic field couples linearly to the Fermi field, and to the fact
that the operator Maxwell equations are linear in the field and field momentum
operators. However, while general states in the Maxwell model produce classical
evolutions for expectation values of the electromagnetic field, generally it is still
only states | ~A, ~E〉 that are narrowly peaked in field configuration position and
momentum - of which the EM coherent states are a subset - that can reasonably
be called ‘classical.’ For while other states may yield classical evolutions for
expectation values of the EM field operators, these states are widely distributed
about these expectation values and, as we will discuss, prone to entanglement
with fermionic degrees of freedom. This entanglement then can be expected
to cause the branch-relative expectation values of the field operators to evolve
nonclassically, even though the total expectation values always evolve classically.
As we will see in the next section, the universal classical evolution of expectation
values cannot be extended to the Dirac field.
As discussed in Introduction to this chapter, DS reductions of classical mod-
els to quantum ones typically exhibit a common sequence of steps: 1) in the
Bare/Everett model, decoherence ensures quasiclassicality, while in the Bohm
model it is ensured by the definiteness of the field beable configuration; 2) some
analogue of Ehrenfest’s Theorem then ensures classicality, but potentially only
for a restricted domain of states; 3) while decoherence will usually serve to
enforce quasi-classicality at all times, wave packet spreading can disrupt classi-
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cality; the factors that affect wave packet spreading depend most strongly on the
internal dynamics of the degrees of freedom under consideration, though may
also depend on the nature of the interaction with external degrees of freedom.
In the case of the reduction of the classical Maxwell model to the Bare/Everett
version of the quantum Maxwell model, we should expect degrees of freedom
external to the EM field - in particular, the fermions - to help to enforce qua-
siclassicality of field states in systems where we observe the field to behave
classically. I discuss this further in section 4.5. Ehrenfest’s Theorem, however,
does not in this particular case require any restriction to a particular domain of
states in order to ensure that expectation values evolve classically. Rather, the
relevance of coherent states, or of narrow wave packets more generally, to the
classical behavior of electromagnetic fields is derived not from the need for clas-
sicality, but solely from the need for quasiclassicality. As regards wave packet
spreading, in the case of the quantum Maxwell model, the free dynamics of the
EM field do not cause coherent packets to spread. However, it is possible the
external classical source current may furnish an external cause of spreading.
4.4.2 Ehrenfest Theorem for the Lorentz Model
In this section, I derive an Ehrenfest Theorem for the quantum Lorentz model,
which will be essential to reducing the classical Lorentz model. I will specialise
here to the classical model of two electrons, though the analysis can be gen-
eralised straightforwardly to higher numbers. Focusing then on the domain of
2-particle, 0-antiparticle states in the quantum Lorentz model,
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∫
d3x1 d
3x2 ψ
a1a2
2,0 (x1, x2) ψˆ
†a1
r (x1)ψˆ
†a2
r (x2) |0rD〉 (4.36)
one can show through straighforward manipulation of the canonical anticom-
mutation relations that the effective Schrodinger for the Lorentz model, (4.29),
entails that
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i
∂
∂t
ψ
a1a2
2,0 (x1, x2) =
{[
~α · (−i~∇1 + er ~A(x1)) + βmr
]a1c1δa2c2
+ δa1c1
[
~α · (−i~∇2 + er ~A(x2)) + βmr
]a2c2 + e2r
4π
1
|x1 − x2|
}
ψ
c1c2
2,0 (x1, x2)
(4.37)
for the two-particle wave function ψa1a22,0 (x1, x2, t) ≡ 〈0D|ψˆa1r (x1)ψˆa2r (x2)|Ψ(t)〉,
where an infinite constant corresponding to the quantum Coulomb self-energy
has been left out.
As a first step to reducing the classical Lorentz model to the quantum
Lorentz model, I will prove the following generalisation of Ehrenfest’s Theo-
rem for two relativistic Dirac fermions interacting via a Coulomb potential in
a background electromagnetic field (the generalisation to higher numbers of
fermions is straighforward):
Ehrenfest Theorem (2 fermions in background EM field):
d
dt
〈~ˆp1〉 =
∫
d3x1 d
3x2 ρ(x1, x2)~E
1(x1, x2) +
∫
d3x1 d
3x2 ~j(x1, x2)× ~B1(~x1).
(4.38)
where
~j1(x1, x2) ≡ −er
∑
a1a2
ψ†a1a22,0 (x1, x2)~α
a1b1δa2b2 ψb1b22,0 , (x1, x2) (4.39)
ρ(x1, x2) ≡ −er
∑
a1a2
ψ†a1a22,0 (x1, x2, t)ψ
a1a2
2,0 (x1, x2), (4.40)
~E1(x1, x2) ≡ ~E1T (x1, x2) + ~E1L(x1, x2) (4.41)
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~E1L(x1, x2) ≡ ∇1
(
e2r
4π
1
|x1 − x2|
)
, (4.42)
~E1T (x1) ≡ −
∂
∂t
~A(x1) = − d
dt
~A(x1) (4.43)
~B1(x1) ≡ ∇1 × ~A(x1), (4.44)
〈~ˆx1〉 =
∑
a1a2
∫
d3x1d
3x2 ψ
†a1a2
2,0 (x1, x2) (x1)ψ
a1a2
2,0 (x1, x2). (4.45)
〈~ˆp1〉 =
∑
a1a2
∫
d3x1d
3x2 ψ
†a1a2
2,0 (x1, x2) (−i∇1)ψa1a22,0 (x1, x2). (4.46)
Note that the Ehrenfest relation, though notationally reminiscent of the classical
Lorentz Force Law, does not on its own imply classical evolutions for electron
wave packet trajectories. The proof of this particular Ehrenfest Theorem that
I provide employs the 2-electron Dirac Hamiltonian in prescribed background
field that appears on the right-hand side of (4.37),
Hˆ2e =
{[
~α·(−i~∇1 + er ~A(x1)) + βmr
]a1c1
δa2c2 + δa1c1
[
~α·(−i~∇2+er ~A(x2)) + βmr
]a2c2
+
e2r
4π
1
|x1 − x2|
}
(4.47)
and designates the Coulomb term Vc ≡ e
2
r
4π
1
|x1−x2| . The Heisenberg equation of
motion for the 2-electron model with this Hamiltonian entails
Proof:
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ddt
〈~ˆp1 + er ~A(x1)〉 = i〈
[
Hˆ2e, ~ˆp1 + er ~A(x1)
]〉
= i〈[Hˆ2e, ~ˆp1]〉+ ier〈[Hˆ2e, ~A(x1)]〉
= i〈[er~α · ~A(x1), ~ˆp1]〉+ i〈[VC , ~ˆp1]〉+ i〈[er~α · ~ˆp1, ~A(x1)]〉
= i〈ierαj∇1Aj(x1)〉+ i〈i∇1VC〉+ i〈−ier (~α · ∇1) ~A(x1)〉
= −er
∫
d3x1d
3x2 ψ
†a1a2
2,0 (x1, x2) α
a1b1
j δ
a2b2 ψb1b22,0 (x1, x2) ∇1Aj(x1)
+ er
∫
d3x1d
3x2 ψ
†a1a2
2,0 (x1, x2)ψ
a1a2
2,0 (x1, x2) ∇1VC
+ er
∫
d3x1d
3x2 ψ
†a1a2
2,0 (x1, x2) α
a1b1
j δ
a2b2 ψb1b22,0 (x1, x2) (∇1)j ~A(x1)
(4.48)
where repeated indices have been summed over implicitly, and in going from
the third to the fourth line I have used the identity [pˆi, F (~ˆx)] = −i ∂F∂xi . Now,
employing the identity [~j × (∇× ~A)]i = jj∂iAj − jj∂jAi, we have
d
dt
〈~ˆp1〉 − er
∫
d3x1 d
3x2 ψ
†a1a2
2,0 (x1, x2)ψ
a1a2
2,0 (x1, x2)
~E1T (x1)
=
∫
d3x1 d
3x2 ρ(x1, x2) ~E
1
L(x1, x2) +
∫
d3x1d
3x2 ~j(x1, x2)× ~B1(~x1).
(4.49)
or,
d
dt
〈~ˆp1〉 −
∫
d
3
x1 d
3
x2 ρ(x1, x2) ~E
1
T (x1, x2) =
∫
d
3
x1 d
3
x2 ρ(x1, x2) ~E
1
L(x1, x2) +
∫
d
3
x1 d
3
x2 ~j(x1, x2)× ~B
1(~x1).
(4.50)
Finally, this yields
d
dt
〈~ˆp1〉 =
∫
d3x1 d
3x2 ρ(x1, x2) ~E
1(x1, x2)+
∫
d3x1 ~j(x1, x2)× ~B1(~x1), (4.51)
which completes the proof.
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Now, given Ehrenfest’s theorem, if the wave packet ψa1a22,0 (x1, x2) is an ap-
proximate product state, so ψa1a22,0 (x1, x2) ≈ ψa11,0(x1)ψa21,0(x2), narrowly peaked
in both position and momentum for both particles 1 and 2, so that both ρ(x1, x2)
and~j1(x1, x2) are substantially different from zero only in a small volume around
(〈xˆ1〉, 〈xˆ2〉), 2 we can write
d
dt
〈~ˆp1〉 ≈
(∫
d3x1d
3x2 ρ(x1, x2)
)
~E1(〈xˆ1〉, 〈xˆ2〉) +
(∫
d3x1d
3x2 ~j
1(x1, x2)
)
× ~B1(〈xˆ1〉)
= (−er) ~E1(〈xˆ1〉, 〈xˆ2〉) + (−er)d〈xˆ1〉
dt
× ~B1(〈xˆ1〉),
(4.52)
since
∫
d3x1d
3x2 ρ(x1, x2) = −er and, as we will see,
∫
d3x1d
3x2 ~j
1(x1, x2) =
−er d〈xˆ1〉dt . 3 As mentioned above, the relation
d
dt
〈~ˆp1〉 ≈ (−er) ~E1 (〈xˆ1〉, 〈xˆ2〉) + (−er)d〈xˆ1〉
dt
× ~B1 (〈xˆ1〉) , (4.53)
does not suffice to guarantee that position expectation values follow classical
trajectories. What we need in addition is that
〈~ˆp1〉 ≈ γmr d〈~ˆx1〉
dt
, (4.54)
with γ the relativistic Lorentz factor, for narrow wave packets. To show that
this is the case, I make use of the identity
〈~ˆp1〉 = 1
2
〈Hˆ10 ~α+ ~αHˆ10 〉, (4.55)
where Hˆ10 ≡ α · ~ˆp1 + βmr is the Dirac Hamiltonian for particle 1 in the absence
of electromagnetic potentials. If ψa1a22,0 (x1, x2) ≈ ψa11,0(x1)ψa21,0(x2) is not only
2Note that by 〈xˆ1〉 here, I mean the quantity
∫
d3x1d
3x2 ψ
†c1c2
2,0 (x1, x2)
(
x1
)
ψ
c1c2
2,0 (x1, x2),
and likewise for 〈xˆ2〉. The matter of how to define the position operator xˆ1 outside of the
expectation value in relativistic quantum theories is one of the notoriously difficult problems
in the foundations of relativistic quantum theory. One well-known approach to defining such
an operator is the so-called Newton-Wigner method; see, for instance, [46].
3Note that ρ(x1, x2), being a function on configuration space, does not correspond to
ordinary spatial charge density except in the 1-particle case.
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narrowly peaked in x1 and x2 but ψ
a1
1,0(x1) is approximately an eigenstate of
~ˆp1 in such a way that its spinor components make it also approximately an
eigenstate of Hˆ10 , then
〈~ˆp1〉 = 1
2
〈Hˆ10 ~α+ ~αHˆ10 〉 ≈ 〈Hˆ10 〉〈~α〉. (4.56)
If ψa11,0(x1) is centered about momentum ~p0, then 〈Hˆ0〉 ≈
√
~p20 +m
2 = γm,
where γ is the Lorentz factor corresponding to the classical 3-momentum ~p0 .
Also, one can check that d〈~ˆx1〉dt = 〈~α1〉 =
∫
d3x1d
3x2 ~j
1(x1, x2). So, for packets
peaked narrowly in both position and momentum, we have
〈~ˆp1〉 ≈ γmr d〈~ˆx1〉
dt
, (4.57)
and thus
d
dt
[
mrγ
d
dt
〈~ˆx1〉
] ≈ (−er) ~E1(〈xˆ1〉, 〈xˆ2〉) + (−er)d〈xˆ1〉
dt
× ~B1(〈xˆ1〉), (4.58)
as required for the electron packet to follow an approximately classical trajec-
tory. The generalisation to the N -fermion case proceeds by direct analogy to
the 2-particle case.
4.5 The Domains of the Classical and Quantum
Maxwell and Lorentz Models
The preceding analysis of the Lorentz model strongly suggests that the states
that instantiate approximate classical behavior of the combined fermionic and
electromagnetic degrees of freedom are tensor products of an electromagnetic
coherent state | ~A, ~E〉 and a fermionic state of definite particle number that is
itself a product of 1-particle states localised in both position and momentum
that are also approximate eigenstates of the free renormalised 1-particle Dirac
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Hamiltonian. For notational simplicity, I abbreviate such fermionic N -particle
states |q, p〉. Thus, the states that comprise the classical domain of the Lorentz
model - as well as of the Maxwell model, although as already discussed, classi-
cality of expectation value evolutions is ensured for any state evolution in this
model - are the product wave packet states,
|q, p〉 ⊗ | ~A, ~E〉, (4.59)
and states in the total Hilbert space that are ‘close’ to such states.
Beyond the fact that they yield approximately classical dynamical evolutions
for expectation values, the introduction of product wave packet states is also
motivated by considerations of decoherence. Both the quantum Maxwell and
Lorentz models presuppose that the total state of the combined fermionic and
electromagnetic system remains as a product state, without suffering entangle-
ment, throughout its dynamical evolution. In the dynamics prescribed by the
full QED model, however, a generic product state will evolve into an entangled
state. It is only for special product states in HD ⊗ HEM , if any at all, that
the absence of entanglement between fermionic and bosonic Hilbert spaces will
persist to a reliable approximation under the influence of the QED dynamics,
so that
e−iHˆQEDt (|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Φ0〉) ≈ |Ψ(t)〉 ⊗ |Φ(t)〉. (4.60)
The states satisfying this condition constitute the entanglement-free subspace
of HQED.
It is natural to guess, by analogy with analyses of decoherence in a wide
variety of systems, that the decoherence-free subspace of QED includes the
product coherent states |q, p〉 ⊗ |A,E〉 - that is, that
e−iHˆQEDt
(
|q0, p0〉 ⊗ | ~A0, ~E0〉
)
≈ |q(t), p(t)〉 ⊗ | ~A(t), ~E(t)〉. (4.61)
223
A more rigorous quantitative analysis - possibly employing Zurek’s well-known
‘predictability sieve’ method - should be given in order to confirm this assump-
tion [77], [117]. However, the assumption is already supported to some extent
by Anglin and Zurek’s analysis demonstrating that pointer states of the elec-
tromagnetic field under a certain model of its interaction with an environment
of massive particles should be coherent states | ~A(t), ~E(t)〉, and by Zurek’s ear-
lier analysis that coherent states of matter degrees of freedom under interaction
with an environment - either electromagnetic or fermionic - should, under fairly
generic assumptions, be coherent states [2], [117].
However, given the assumption that the pointer states of QED are product
coherent states, it should be recongnised that the spreading of wave packets
in the N-electron subspace of the fermionic Hilbert space is likely to limit the
time-scale on which the approximation of a persisting product state holds, since
such spreading is likely to generate entanglement when the N-electron wave
packets become sufficiently broad in position space. (Again, that while the
free fermionic dynamics generically causes spreading of the states |q, p〉, the free
electromagnetic dynamics does not cause the coherent states | ~A0, ~E0〉 to spread;
the states | ~A0, ~E0〉 spread only as a consequence of the interaction between the
electromagnetic and fermionic degrees of freedom.)
For the purposes of moving forward with the analysis, I assume that the
product coherent states and nearby states in HQED resist entanglement, and
restrict my analysis to timescales for which the full QED dynamics approxi-
mately carries coherent product states into other coherent product states.
4.5.1 Dealing with Counterterms
The dynamics of the fermionic quantum state |Ψ(t)〉 in the quantum Lorentz
model is determined by the effective Hamiltonian HˆL; the dynamics of the quan-
tum state in the Maxwell model likewise is determined by HˆM . The analysis
of section 4.3 showed that these effective Hamiltonians could be extracted in
certain state domains as approximations to the renormalised QED Hamilto-
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nian HˆrQED. Yet the dynamics of QED are determined by the full Hamilto-
nian HˆrQED + HˆCT , which includes the divergent counterterms of HˆCT . For a
complete reduction of the classical Lorentz and Maxwell models to QED, it is
necessary to explain why, even though the quantum Lorentz and Maxwell mod-
els only seem to be underwritten solely by the renormalised Hamiltonian, these
models nevertheless serve as reliable approximations to a dynamics that incor-
porates both the renormalised and counterterm components of the full QED
Hamiltonian. I leave this as a subject for future research.
4.6 DS Reductions of the Classical Maxwell and
Lorentz Models
In this section, I frame the preceding discussion within the context of the DS
approach to reduction.
4.6.1 DS Reduction of Classical Maxwell Model
The bridge map connecting the state spaces of the quantum Maxwell and clas-
sical Maxwell models, BMM , is simply the expectation values of the renormalised
field and field momentum operators:
Bridge Map:
BMM : HEM −→ ΓEM
BMM : |Φ〉 7−→
(
〈Φ| ~ˆAr,T (x)|Φ〉, 〈Φ| ~ˆEr,T (x)|Φ〉
)
.
(4.62)
Because expectation values of the electric and magnetic field operators sat-
isfy Maxwell’s equations for any state |Φ〉 ∈ HEM , the domain of the classical
Maxwell model in the quantum one consists of all states in HEM :
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Domain:
dMC = {|Φ〉 ∈ HEM} (4.63)
However, as we have seen, for the classical Lorentz model to apply as well, a
restriction specifically to coherent states | ~A, 〉E〉 is necessary. Also, it should be
noted that since the expectation values used to define the bridge map are not
branch-relative, the classical evolution of the expectation value may not reflect
the behavior of the field in individual branches of the total state.
The laws of the image theory, which ensue satisfaction of the DSR condition,
are
Image Model:
∂〈 ~ˆBr〉
∂t
= ∇× 〈 ~ˆEr,T 〉 (4.64)
∂〈 ~ˆEr,T 〉
∂t
= −∇× 〈 ~ˆBr〉+ 4π〈~ˆj〉, (4.65)
as proven above. The laws of the analogue theory are then straightforwardly
obtained through the bridge rule substitution
Bridge Rules:
(
~A′(x), ~E′(x)
)
≡
(
〈Φ| ~ˆAr,T (x)|Φ〉, 〈Φ| ~ˆEr,T (x)|Φ〉
)
(4.66)
~j′(x) ≡ er〈Ψ(t)|ψˆr,†(x) ~α ψˆr(x)|Ψ(t)〉. (4.67)
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Explicitly, the laws of the analogue theory are
Analogue Model:
∂ ~B′
∂t
= ∇× ~E′ (4.68)
∂ ~E′
∂t
= −∇× ~B′ + 4π~j. (4.69)
The ‘strong analogy’ condition,
‘Strong Analogy’:
| ~A(x, t)− ~A′(x, t)| < δA ∀ x
| ~E(x, t)− ~E′(x, t)| < δE ∀ x
(4.70)
is then satisfied for all times since ~A′(x, t) = ~A(x, t) and ~E′(x, t) = ~E(x, t). In
this particular case, the reduction timescale τ is infinite.
4.6.2 DS Reduction of the Classical Lorentz Model
Let us examine now how the results discussed above fit into the framework of
DS reduction.
The bridge map connecting the state spaces of the quantum Lorentz and
classical Lorentz models, BLL , is simply to take the expectation values of particle
position and momentum. Note that the domain of this bridge map is restricted
to the 2-particle states in HD. There may be a way to extend the map to all of
HD so that it coincides with the definition I give here on the 2-particle subspace;
however, the map I provide serves my purposes here:
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Bridge Map:
BLL : HD −→ Γ2p
B
L
L : |Ψ2p〉 7−→
(
〈xˆ1〉, 〈xˆ2〉; 〈pˆ1〉, 〈pˆ2〉
)
=
(∫
d
3
x1d
3
x2 ψ
†c1c2
2,0 (x1, x2)
(
x1
)
ψ
c1c2
2,0 (x1, x2),
∫
d
3
x1d
3
x2 x2ψ
†c1c2
2,0 (x1, x2)
(
x2
)
ψ
c1c2
2,0 (x1, x2);
∫
d
3
x1d
3
x2ψ
†c1c2
2,0 (x1, x2) (−i∇1)ψ
c1c2
2,0 (x1, x2),
∫
d
3
x1d
3
x2ψ
†c1c2
2,0 (x1, x2) (−i∇2)ψ
c1c2
2,0 (x1, x2)
)
.
(4.71)
The domain of the classical 2-electron Lorentz model is the set of 2-electron
states that are products of 1-electron states that are narrow wave packets in
both position and momentum and approximate eigenstates of the free first-
quantised Dirac Hamiltonian:
Domain:
dL = {|Ψ2e〉 ∈ H2e| |Ψ2e〉 = |q1, p1〉 ⊗ |q2, p2〉}. (4.72)
The laws of the image theory are
Image Model:
d
dt
[
mγ
d
dt
〈~ˆx1〉
] ≈ (−e)〈 ~ˆEr〉(〈~ˆx〉1, 〈~ˆx2〉) + (−e)d〈~ˆx1〉
dt
× 〈 ~ˆBr〉(〈~ˆx1〉), (4.73)
as proven above, and likewise for 〈~ˆx2〉. The laws of the analogue theory are then
straightforwardly obtained through the bridge rule substitutions
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Bridge Rules:
(x′1, x
′
2; p
′
1, p
′
2) ≡ (〈xˆ1〉, 〈xˆ2〉; 〈pˆ1〉, 〈pˆ2〉) (4.74)
~E
′
T (x, t) = 〈 ~A(t), ~E(t)| ~ˆE
r,T (x)| ~A(t), ~E(t)〉 (4.75)
~E
′
L(x1, t) = ∇x1
(
er
4π
1
|x1 − x2|
)
(4.76)
~E
′
L(x2, t) = ∇x2
(
er
4π
1
|x1 − x2|
)
(4.77)
~B′(x, t) = ∇× 〈 ~A, ~E| ~ˆAr,T (x)| ~A, ~E〉 (4.78)
Applying these bridge rules to the dynamical equations of image model above,
we obtain the dynamics of the analogue model,
Analogue Model:
d
dt
[
mrγ
dx′1
dt
〉] ≈ (−er)~E′(x′1, x′2) + (−er)dx′1dt × ~B′(x′1), (4.79)
and similarly for x′2. Applying the abbreviation, (x
′(t), p′(t)) ≡ (x′1, x′2; p′1, p′2),
the ‘strong analogy’ condition, which is ensured by validity of these analogue
dynamics, reads
‘Strong Analogy’:
229
|x(t)− x′(t)| < δx
|p(t)− p′(t)| < δp.
(4.80)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ , where the reduction timescale τ is bounded by the timescale on
which wave packets in H2e spread substantially.
4.7 DS Reduction of CED to Bohmian QED
The preceeding discussion has argued that the domains of the classical Maxwell
and Lorentz models within HQED include the coherent product states |q, p〉 ⊗
| ~A, ~E〉. I suggested that these states likely reside in the decoherence free sub-
space of HQED, and thus likely provide the product states required by both
the quantum Maxwell and quantum Lorentz models. Moreover, the fact that
these states are narrow wave packets provides the added assurance that they
will evolve approximately along classical trajectories, at least on certain limited
timescales. In discussing the reduction of the classical Lorentz and Maxwell
models to the Bohmian minimalist model of QED, I assume, as in the preceding
discussion, that the state, or effective state, of the total system in HQED is a
product coherent state evolving approximately according to classical equations
of motion.
4.7.1 DS Reduction of Classical Maxwell Model to the
Bohmian Minimalist Model
The bridge map connecting the state spaces of the Bohmian minimalist and
classical Maxwell models, BMM ,
Bridge Map:
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BMM : HEM ×QEM −→ ΓEM
BMM :
(|Φ〉,~aT (x, t)) 7−→ (~aT (x, t),−∂~aT (x, t)
∂t
)
.
(4.81)
The domain of HEM ×QEM that instantiates the classical Maxwell model is
Domain:
dMC =
{(
| ~A, ~E〉,~aT (x, t)
)
∈ HEM ×QEM
∣∣∣∣~aT (x, t) ∈ suppǫ(〈 ~AT | ~A, ~E〉)}
(4.82)
since, by equivariance, if the support of the wave packet | ~A, ~E〉 traverses a
Maxwellian evolution, then so must the Bohmian configuration ~aT (x, t). Defin-
ing ~b(x, t) ≡ ∇×~aT (x, t) ~eT (x, t) ≡ −∂~aT (x,t)∂t , the laws of the image theory can
be stated
Image Model:
∂~b
∂t
≈ ∇× ~eT (4.83)
∂~eT
∂t
≈ −∇×~b+ 4π〈~ˆj〉, (4.84)
where, note, the source current 〈~ˆj〉 continues in the Bohmian case to be a
function of the quantum state and not of a Bohmian configuration, in part
because there are no beables corresponding to the fermionic sources, but more
importantly because the beable ~aT (x, t) evolves approximately classically only
by virtue of the fact that the quantum state | ~A, ~E〉 does, and the classical
evolution of | ~A, ~E〉 in turn is one associated with the source current 〈~ˆj〉. The
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bridge rules for this model are
Bridge Rules:
(
~A′(x), ~E′(x)
)
≡
(
~aT (x, t),−∂~a
T (x, t)
∂t
)
(4.85)
~j′(x) ≡ 〈Ψ(t)|eψˆ†r(x)~αψˆr(x)|Ψ(t)〉. (4.86)
Applying these bridge rule substitutions to the image model, we find that the
laws of the analogue model are
Analogue Model:
∂ ~B′
∂t
≈ ∇× ~E′ (4.87)
∂ ~E′
∂t
≈ −∇× ~B′ + 4π~j′. (4.88)
The ‘strong analogy’ condition,
‘Strong Analogy’:
| ~A(x, t)− ~A′(x, t)| < δA ∀ x
| ~E(x, t)− ~E′(x, t)| < δE ∀ x
(4.89)
is then satisfied only for times τ such that the wave packet | ~A, ~E〉 evolves classi-
cally, which in turn occurs only when the electromagnetic and fermionic degrees
232
of freedom remain unentangled - that is, when total effective state of HD×HEM
persists approximately as a product state.
4.7.2 DS Reduction of Classical Lorentz Model to the
Bohmian Minimalist Model
Since there are no beables corresponding to the fermionic degrees of freedom in
the QED minimalist model, the motion of electrons as described in the classical
Lorentz model is, in a sense, merely ‘implied’ by the behavior of the beable
radiation field. The domain of Bohmian QED in which the classical Lorentz
model applies approximately is the domain in which the beable radiation field
is approximately one which would be produced by an electron evolving along a
classical trajectory.
The domain of HQED in which the classical Lorentz model applies is the
domain of product coherent states |q, p〉 ⊗ | ~A, ~E〉. Assuming that the state, or
effective state, |Ξ〉 of the full system lies in this domain, then the trajectory
q(t), p(t) followed by the fermionic wave packet |q, p〉, will be approximately
classical. The state | ~A, ~E〉 will be centered on a classical EM field configuration
corresponding to the radiation field generated by this trajectory. So,
|q0, p0〉 ⊗ | ~A0, ~E0〉 =⇒ |qc(t), pc(t)〉 ⊗ | ~A[qc(t)], ~E0[qc(t)]〉 (4.90)
where ~A[qc(t)] is a solution to Maxwell’s equations (in vector potential form)
corresponding to the source distribution ~j(x, t) = er
∑N
i ~˙qc,iδ
3(x − qc,i(t)),
and where i indexes the different charged particles in an N -particle system;
~E0[qc(t)] ≡ −∂ ~A[qc(t)]∂t is the transverse electric field associated with ~A[qc(t)].
Given the assumptions made so far, equivariance requires the beable conifu-
gration ~aT to lie in the support of the wave packet | ~A[qc(t)], ~E0[qc(t)]〉, which
entails
~aT ≈ ~A[qc(t)]. (4.91)
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So the electromagnetic field beable configuration in a sense functions as a record
of the fermionic particle trajectory associated with the wave packet |qc(t), pc(t)〉,
even though there are no fermionic beables associated with the evolution of this
packet. On the minimalist model of Bohmian QED, successful applications of
the classical Lorentz model are instantiated by a Bohmian system in which the
fermionic degrees of freedom are characterised by a wave packet quantum state
of definite particle number, and in which, through the dynamics of the model,
the electromagnetic field beable ~aT [qc(t)] comes to be configured as a radiation
field of the trajectory qc(t).
Because it is ultimately the wave packet evolution in the fermionic Hilbert
space that determines the trajectory qc(t) recorded in the electromagnetic beable
configuration ~aT [qc(t)], the DS reduction of the classical Lorentz model to the
minimalist Bohmian model will proceed much as the reduction of the classical
Lorentz model to the quantum Lorentz model described in section 4.6.2. Recall
that the reduction there also depended essentially on the fermionic wave packets
evolving classically, though for different reasons.
4.8 Summary
In the preceding analysis, I have offered templates for the reduction of two
models of classical electrodynamics both to Bare/Everettian versions of these
models, and to minimalist Bohmian QED. A number of assumptions of have
been taken for granted which require more detailed justification: in particular,
a more detailed analysis should demonstrate that the dynamics determined by
the full QED Hamiltonian HˆQED = Hˆ
r
QED + HˆCT coincides with the dynam-
ics determined by the quantum Maxwell and Lorentz models in appropriate
domains.
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Chapter 5
The Nonrelativistic Domain
of Quantum
Electrodynamics
In this chapter, I provide two templates for the reduction of the nonrelativistic
quantum mechanics of a spin-1/2 particle to relativistic quantum electrody-
namics. As a preliminary, I first consider the nonrelativistic domain of both
free scalar and free Dirac quantum field theory; not surprisingly, both theories
return the nonrelativistic quantum mechanics of free particles - that is, nonrel-
ativistic quantum mechanics without any potential terms in the Hamiltonian.
I then provide a template for the DS reduction of the nonrelativistic quantum
mechanics model of two spin-1/2 charges in a Coulomb potential to the quan-
tum Lorentz model of QED discussed in the previous chapter; I also provide a
template for the nonrelativistic quantum mechanics model of a single charge in
a background electromagnetic field. Following this, I consider the relation be-
tween Bell’s Bohmian model of a spin-1/2 particle and the minimalist Bohmian
model of QED, and the extent to which a reduction between the two can be
effected.
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Not much work on the nonrelativistic domain of QFT has been done. What
work there is takes an approach completely different from the one taken here,
focusing on the nonrelativistic approximation to S-matrix elements (for example,
see Peskin and Schroeder [79], Colin [25], and Beg and Furlong [8]). Thus, all
of my work here, which takes a completely different approach based on the
Schrodinger picture of QFT, is original as far as I am aware, unless explicitly
stated otherwise.
5.1 The Nonrelativistic Domain of Free Quan-
tum Field Theory
In this section, I will demonstrate the reduction of two models of nonrelativistic
quantum mechanics, the free Schrodinger equation for spinless particles, and the
free Pauli equation for particles of spin-1/2, from free Klein-Gordon quantum
field theory and free Dirac quantum field theory, respectively.
Free Scalar Field Theory
Recall from Chapter 3 that a general state |Ψ〉 in scalar quantum field theory
can be expressed in the form
|Ψ〉 = ψ0|0〉+
∞∑
n=1
∫
d3k1...d
3kn ψ˜n(k1, ..., kn) |k1, ..., kn〉 (5.1)
where ψ0 ≡ 〈0|Ψ〉 and ψ˜n(k1, ..., kn) ≡ 〈k1, ..., kn|Ψ〉. The Schrodinger equation
for free Klein-Gordon QFT,
i
∂
∂t
|Ψ〉 = HˆKG|Ψ〉, (5.2)
entails
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i
∂
∂t
ψ0 = 0
i
∂
∂t
ψ˜n(k1, ..., kn, t) =
(√
|k1|2 +m2 + ...+
√
|kn|2 +m2
)
ψ˜n(k1, ..., kn, t).
(5.3)
If we now restrict the state |Ψ〉 to be a superposition only of states of momentum
of magnitude much less than the massm - that is, if we restrict ψ˜m(k1, ..., km) =
0 for ki << m ∀i - then we may make the approximation
√|ki|2 +m2 ≈ m +
1
2mk
2
i . It is this approximation that ultimately accounts for the emergence of
nonrelativistic behavior. Under this approximation, the Schrodinger equation
for the momentum space wave functions take the form
i
∂
∂t
ψ0 = 0
i
∂
∂t
ψ˜n(k1, ..., kn, t) ≈
(
nm+
1
2m
k21 + ...+
1
2m
k2n
)
ψ˜n(k1, ..., kn, t).
(5.4)
Returning to the position representation ψn(x1, ..., xn, t) ≡ 〈0|φˆ(x1)...φˆ(xn)|Ψ〉
the Schrodinger equation takes the form
i
∂
∂t
ψn(x1, ..., xn, t) ≈ (nm− 1
2m
∇21 − ...−
1
2m
∇2n)ψn(x1, ..., xn, t). (5.5)
This equation predicts the same amplitudes (up to an overall phase) as the
ordinary Schrodinger equation,
i
∂
∂t
ψn(x1, ..., xn, t) ≈
(
− 1
2m
∇21 − ...−
1
2m
∇2n
)
ψn(x1, ..., xn, t), (5.6)
thus accounting for the fact that the latter successfuly approximates nonrela-
tivistic free systems.
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Free Dirac Field Theory
Recall from Chapter 3 that a general state |Ψ〉 in free Dirac quantum field theory
can be expressed in the form
|Ψ〉 = ψ0|0D〉
+
∞∑
n=1
∑
r1,...,rn
∫
d3k1...d
3kn ψ˜
r1,...,rn
n,0 (k1, ..., kn) bˆ
†,rn
kn
...bˆ†,r1k1 |0D〉
+
∞∑
l=1
∑
s1,...,sl
∫
d3p1...d
3pl ψ˜
s1,...,sl
0,l (p1, ..., pl) cˆ
†,sl
pl ...cˆ
†,s1
p1 |0D〉
+
∞∑
n,l=1
∑
r1,...,rn,
s1,...,sl
∫
d3k1...d
3kn d
3p1...d
3pl ψ˜
r1,...,rn,
s1,...,sl
n,l (k1, ..., kn; p1, ..., pl)cˆ
†,sl
pl
...cˆ†,s1p1 bˆ
†,rn
kn
...bˆ†,r1k1 |0D〉,
(5.7)
where ψ˜
r1,...,rn,
s1,...,sl
n,l (k1, ..., kn; p1, ..., pl) ≡ 〈0|bˆr1k1 ...bˆrnkn cˆs1p1 ...cˆslpl |Ψ > and likewise for
the (n, 0), (0, l) and (0, 0) coefficients. The Schrodinger equation for the free
fermionic field,
i
∂
∂t
|Ψ〉 = HˆD|Ψ〉, (5.8)
entails,
i
∂
∂t
ψ0 = 0
i
∂
∂t
ψ˜
r1,...,rn
n,0 (k1, ..., kn, t) =
(√
|k1|2 +m2 + ...+
√
|kn|2 +m2
)
ψ˜
r1,...,rn
n,0 (k1, ..., kn, t)
i
∂
∂t
ψ˜
s1,...,sl
0,l (s1, ..., sl, t) =
(√
|p1|2 +m2 + ...+
√
|pl|2 +m2
)
ψ˜
s1,...,sl
0,l (p1, ..., pl, t)
i
∂
∂t
ψ˜
r1,...,rn,
s1,...,sl
n,l
(k1, ..., kn; p1, ..., pl, t) =
(√
|k1|2 +m2 + ...+
√
|kn|2 +m2
+
√
|p1|2 +m2 + ...+
√
|pl|2 +m2
)
ψ˜
r1,...,rn,
s1,...,sl
n,l
(k1, ..., kn; p1, ..., pl, t)
(5.9)
Specialising to the domain of n-electron states, and assuming |Ψ〉 is a superposi-
tion only of states with momentum much less than m, the Schrodinger equaiton
for the n-electron momentum space wave function takes the form
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i
∂
∂t
ψ˜r1,...,rnn,0 (k1, ..., kn, t) ≈
(
nm+
1
2m
k21 + ...+
1
2m
k2n
)
ψ˜r1,...,rnn,0 (k1, ..., kn, t).
(5.10)
Fourier transforming back to the position representation, we have
ψa1,...,ann,0 (x1, ..., xn) =
∑
r1,...,rn
∫
d3k1
(2π)3
...
d3kn
(2π)3
1√
2Ek1
...
1√
2Ekn
ua1r1 (k1)...u
an
rn (kn)ψ˜
r1,...,rn
n,0 (k1, ..., kn)e
−ik1·x1 ...e−ikn·xn .
(5.11)
Noting that for momenta k such that km << 1, the basis 4-spinors u
ri(ki)
approximately take the form
u1(k) ≈

1
0
0
0

(5.12) u2(k) ≈

0
1
0
0

(5.13)
Because the lower two components of the basis spinors u1(k) and u2(k) can be
neglected in the nonrelativistic approximation, we may in this approximation
deal exclusively with 2-spinors consisting of the upper two components φαr :
φ1 =
 1
0
 (5.14) φ2 =
 0
1
 . (5.15)
Note that in the nonrelativistic approximation, the momentum dependence of
the basis spinors disappears. In this approximation, the spinor wave function
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can be approximated
ψα1,...,αnn,0 (x1, ..., xn) =
2∑
r1,...,rn=1
∫
d3k1
(2π)3
...
d3kn
(2π)3
1√
2Ek1
...
1√
2Ekn
φα1r1 ...φ
αn
rn ψ˜
r1,...,rn
n,0 (k1, ..., kn)e
−ik1·x1 ...e−ikn·xn .
(5.16)
Translating the momentum space Schrodinger equation (5.10) to the position
representation, we have in the nonrelativistic approximation
i
∂
∂t
ψα1,...,αnn,0 (x1, ..., xn) ≈
(
− 1
2m
∇21 − ...−
1
2m
∇2n
)
ψα1,...,αnn,0 (x1, ..., xn)
(5.17)
Summary
Thus far, my analysis has shown how the kinetic part of a nonrelativistic
Schrodinger equation approximates the dynamics of particular domain of free
quantum field theory - namely, low-momentum n-particle states. In the next
section, I consider the extension to models of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics
whose Hamiltonians include potential terms.
5.2 The Nonrelativistic Domain of QED
In this section I will provide templates for the reduction of two models of nonrel-
ativistic quantum mechanics to the Lorentz model of QED: First, the interaction
of two nonrelativistic electrons via a Coulomb potential, and second, the Pauli
equation for a single electron in a background electromagnetic field.
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5.2.1 DS Reduction of the Nonrelativistic CoulombModel
to QED
The model of two nonrelativistic electrons interacting via a Coulomb potential
takes as its state space the Hilbert space of two nonrelativistic spin-1/2 particles:
S = HNR2e . (5.18)
The dynamics of this model are determined by the Schrodinger equation
i
∂
∂t
|ψ〉 = HˆNRC |ψ〉, (5.19)
where |ψ〉 ∈ HNR2e and
HˆNRC =
pˆ21
2m
+
pˆ22
2m
+
e2
4π
1
|xˆ1 − xˆ2| . (5.20)
The low level model to which I reduce this model is the Lorentz model of QED, in
which the state of the electromagnetic field is the vaccuum state |0rEM 〉 of the free
renormalised electromagnetic field Hamiltonian, which is simply the coherent
state of the electromagnetic field centered around the field configuration ~A(x) =
0 and the field momentum configuration ~E(x) = 0. In this case, the Lorentz
model for two electrons simplifies to
i
∂
∂t
ψ
a1a2
2,0 (x1, x2) =
{[
~α · (−i~∇1) + βmr
]a1c1δa2c2
+ δa1c1
[
~α · (−i~∇2) + βmr
]a2c2 + e2r
4π
1
|x1 − x2|
}
ψ
c1c2
2,0 (x1, x2)
(5.21)
In section 5.1, I showed that in the nonrelativistic domain, in which we restrict
the wave function ψc1c22,0 (x1, x2) to contain only momenta k1 and k2 such that
k1
m << 1 and
k2
m << 1, the following approximation holds
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{[
~α · (−i~∇1) + βmr
]a1c1
δa2c2
}
ψc1c2,λ2,0 (x1, x2)
≈ − 1
2mr
∇21 ψa1a2,λ2,0 (x1, x2).
(5.22)
Because the a = 3, 4 components of the basis spinors ua1(k) and u
a
2(k) are
effectively zero for low momenta, we can neglect them and focus on the upper
two components α = 1, 2.
{[
~α · (−i~∇1) + βmr
]α1c1
δα2c2
}
ψc1c2,λ2,0 (x1, x2)
≈ − 1
2mr
∇21 ψα1α2,λ2,0 (x1, x2).
(5.23)
Likewise approximating
{
δα1c1
[
~α · (−i~∇2) + βmr
]α2c2}
ψc1c2,λ2,0 (x1, x2)
≈ − 1
2mr
∇22 ψα1α2,λ2,0 (x1, x2).
(5.24)
we obtain the relation
i
∂
∂t
ψ
α1α2
2,0 (x1, x2) ≈
{
−
1
2mr
∇21 −
1
2mr
∇22 +
e2r
4π
1
|x1 − x2|
}
ψ
α1α2
2,0 (x1, x2), (5.25)
which we recognise as the Schrodinger equation for two nonrelativistic spin-
1/2 particles. If we further restrict to the domain of states in which the spin
and position degrees of freedom of the two electrons are unentangled, so that
ψα1α22,0 (x1, x2) = ψ(x1, x2)s
α1,α2 , where sα1,α2 is a 2 × 2 matrix independent of
position, then we retrieve the more conventional-looking equation,
i
∂
∂t
ψ(x1, x2, t) ≈
{
−
1
2mr
∇21 −
1
2mr
∇22 +
e2r
4π
1
|x1 − x2|
}
ψ(x1, x2, t), (5.26)
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which is simply the Schrodinger equation for two electrons, without regard to
spin.
I now frame these results within the context of DS reduction.
The bridge map connecting the state spaces of the Lorentz model of QED
and the nonrelativistic Coulomb model, BCL , is simply to project the fermionic
wave function onto the first two spinor components α = 1, 2, using the projection
operator Pαa :
Bridge Map:
BCL : H2e −→ HNR2e
BCL : ψ
a1a2
2,0 (x1, x2) 7−→ Pα1a1 Pα2a2 ψa1a22,0 (x1, x2).
(5.27)
The domain of the 2-particle NR Coulomb model in the Lorentz model of QED
consists of 2-particle states with momenta below the nonrelativistic cutoff:
Domain:
dNRC =
{
|Ψ〉 ∈ HD | |Ψ〉 =
∫
d3x1d
3x2 ψ
a1a2,λ
2,0 (x1, x2)ψˆ
a1,λ(x1)ψˆ
a2,λ(x2)|0rD〉, with λ << mr
}
,
(5.28)
with ψˆai,λ(xi) is a fermionic field operator containing Fourier components only
up to momentum λ. The laws of the image theory, which also constitute the
requirement for DS reduction, are
Image Model:
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i
∂
∂t
[
Pα1a1 P
α2
a2 ψ
a1a2
2,0 (x1, x2, t)
] ≈ {− 1
2mr
∇21−
1
2mr
∇22+
e2r
4π
1
|x1 − x2|
} [
Pα1a1 P
α2
a2 ψ
a1a2
2,0 (x1, x2, t)
]
(5.29)
as proven above. The laws of the analogue theory are then straightforwardly
obtained through the bridge rule substitution
Bridge Rules:
ψ
′α1α2(x1, x2, t) ≡ Pα1a1 Pα2a2 ψa1a22,0 (x1, x2, t) (5.30)
Explicitly, the laws of the analogue theory are
Analogue Model:
i
∂
∂t
ψ
′α1α2(x1, x2, t) ≈
{
− 1
2mr
∇21 −
1
2mr
∇22 +
e2r
4π
1
|x1 − x2|
}
ψ
′α1α2(x1, x2, t).
(5.31)
The ‘strong analogy’ condition,
‘Strong Analogy’:
∣∣∣ψα1α2(x1, x2, t)− ψ′α1α2(x1, x2, t)∣∣∣HNR2e < δ (5.32)
is then satisfied for all times for which the state continues to contain only non-
relativistic momenta.
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5.2.2 DS Reduction of Nonrelativistic Pauli Model to QED
The state space of the Paul Theory is the Hilbert space of a single nonrelativistic
electron:
Sh = HNR1e . (5.33)
The dynamics of this model are determined by the Schrodinger equation
i
∂
∂t
|ψ〉 = HˆNRP |ψ〉, (5.34)
where |ψ〉 ∈ HNR1e and
HˆNRP =
1
2m
[
~σ ·
(
~ˆp+ e ~A(x)
)]2
. (5.35)
Note that because there is only one particle in this model, the Coulomb term
of the QED Lorentz model does not appear. The model to which I reduce has
as its state space the 1-electron subspace of the Lorentz model,
Sl = H1e; (5.36)
and for its dynamics, the QED Lorentz model dynamics restricted to the 1-
electron subspace
i
∂
∂t
ψ
a
1,0(x) =
[
~α · (−i~∇+ er ~A(x)) + βmr
]ac
ψ
c
1,0(x). (5.37)
Write ψc1,0(x) in terms of two 2-spinors φ(x) and χ(x):
ψc1,0(x) =
 φ(x)
χ(x)
 . (5.38)
Employing the Dirac representation of the matrices αi and β,
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αi =
 0 σi
σi 0
 .
β =
 1 0
0 −1
 ,
we can write the equation (5.37), in terms of the 2-spinors as the two coupled
equations,
i
∂
∂t
φ(x) = ~σ ·
(
−i∇+ er ~A(x)
)
χ(x) +mrφ(x) (5.39)
i
∂
∂t
χ(x) = ~σ ·
(
−i∇+ er ~A(x)
)
φ(x) −mrχ(x) (5.40)
In momentum space, these equations read,
Eφ˜(k) = ~σ ·
(
−~k + er ~A(−k)
)
χ˜(k) +mrφ˜(k) (5.41)
Eχ˜(k) = ~σ ·
(
−~k + er ~A(−k)
)
φ˜(k)−mrχ˜(k). (5.42)
In the nonrelativistic approximation, where φ(x) and χ(x) contain only mo-
menta k << mr, E ≈ mr, the second of these equations gives
χ˜(k) ≈ 1
2mr
~σ ·
(
−~k + er ~A(−k)
)
φ˜(k). (5.43)
Equations (5.38) to (5.46) follow, with variations, a well-known derivation of
the Pauli equation from the Dirac equation that can be found in many texts
and lectures on relativistic quantum mechanics [29]. Substituting this relation
into the first of the 2-spinor equations, we find
Eφ˜(k) ≈ 1
2mr
~σ ·
(
−~k + er ~A(−k)
)2
φ˜(k) +mrφ˜(k). (5.44)
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Transforming back to position space, we have
i
∂
∂t
φ(x, t) ≈
[
mr +
1
2mr
~σ ·
(
−i∇+ er ~A(x)
)2]
φ(x, t). (5.45)
We can ignore the term mr corresponding to the rest energy since this just
contributes the overall phase of the spinor φ(x, t). This yields the Pauli equation:
i
∂
∂t
φα(x, t) ≈ 1
2mr
{[
~σ ·
(
−i∇+ er ~A(x)
)]2}αβ
φβ(x, t). (5.46)
where the 2-spinor indices have been made explicit.
I now frame these results within the context of DS reduction.
The bridge map connecting the state spaces of the Lorentz model of QED
and of the 1-particle nonrelativistic Pauli model, BPL , is simply to project the
fermionic 1-particle wave function onto the first two spinor components α = 1, 2,
using the projection operator Pαa :
Bridge Map:
BCL : H1e −→ HNR1e
BCL : ψ
a1
1,0(x1) 7−→ Pα1a1 ψa11,0(x1).
(5.47)
The domain of the 1-particle NR Pauli model in the QED Lorentz model state
space consists of 1-particle states with momenta below the nonrelativistic cutoff:
Domain:
dNRP =
{
|Ψ〉 ∈ HD
∣∣ |Ψ〉 = ∫ d3x1 ψa1,λ1,0 (x1)ψˆa1,λ(x1)|0rD〉, with λ << mr} ,
(5.48)
247
where ψˆa1,λ(x1) is a fermionic field operator containing Fourier components only
up to momentum λ. The laws of the image theory are
Image Model:
i
∂
∂t
Pα1a1 ψ
a1
1,0(x1, t) ≈
1
2mr
{[
~σ ·
(
−i∇+ er ~A(x)
)]2}α1β1
P β1a1 ψ
a1
1,0(x1, t) (5.49)
as proven above. The laws of the analogue theory are then straightforwardly
obtained through the bridge rule substitution
Bridge Rules:
ψ
′α1(x1, t) ≡ Pα1a1 ψa11,0(x1, t) (5.50)
Explicitly, the laws of the analogue theory are
Analogue Model:
i
∂
∂t
ψ
′α1(x1, t) ≈ 1
2mr
{[
~σ ·
(
−i∇+ er ~A(x)
)]2}α1β1
ψ
′β1(x1, t) (5.51)
The ‘strong analogy’ condition,
‘Strong Analogy’:
∣∣∣ψα1(x1, t)− ψ′α1(x1, t)∣∣∣HNR1e < δ (5.52)
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is then satisfied for all times for which the state continues to contain only non-
relativistic momenta.
5.3 The Connection Between Bohmian NRQM
and Bohmian QED
In this section, I discuss the reduction of Bohmian nonrelativistic quantum
mechanics of a spin-1/2 particle to the minimalist Bohmian model of QED.
Note that in contrast to previous reductions concerning a Bohmian theory, in
which the high level theory was classical, in the present case both theories are
Bohmian. I briefly present Bell’s model of a non-relativistic spin-1/2 system, and
consider in what sense if any it is possible to effect a reduction of this model to
the minimalist model of QED, especially given that in Bell’s model, the beables
correspond to the positions of fermionic particles and in the minimalist QED
model, there are no beables corresponding to the fermionic field, only to the
electromagnetic field. The answer that I arrive at is that while in the strictest
sense, the electromagnetic beables of the minimalist model do not instantiate
the evolution of the fermionic particle beables, in the nonrelativistic domain
where both models are applicable, the electromagnetic field beables do perform
the same function as Bell’s particle beables - namely, to select a branch of the
total quantum state with probability given by the relevant Born Rule coefficient
|ci|2.
5.3.1 Bell’s Model of Spin-1/2 Particles
The state space of Bell’s model of a nonrelativistic spin-1/2 particle is
S = HNR1p ×Q1p (5.53)
where Q1p is the configuration space of a single particle in 3-space. The dynam-
ics of |ψ〉 ∈ HNR1p are specified by the Pauli Schrodinger equation
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i
∂
∂t
ψα(x, t) =
1
2m
{[
~σ ·
(
−i∇+ e ~A(x)
)]2}αβ
ψβ(x, t) (5.54)
Expanding the wave function in polar form, ψα(x, t) = Rα(x, t)eiS
α(x,t), the
guidance equation for the configuration q ∈ Q1p is
q˙ =
∑
α
1
m
(
∇Sα(x)− e ~A(x)
)
. (5.55)
These dynamics are equivariant with respect to the probability distribution,
ρ(x, t) ≡
∑
α
ψ∗α(x, t)ψα(x, t). (5.56)
In this model there are no beables corresponding to the spin degrees of freedom
[9]. For other Bohmian models of nonrelativistic spin-1/2 particles, see Holland’s
[51]. The generalisation to N-particles, and the inclusion of a Coulomb potential,
is straightforward.
5.3.2 Connecting Bell’s Model and the Minimalist QED
model
In the Pauli equation, the electromagnetic field has no independent dynamics
of its own, but is rather independently prescribed so there is no obvious role
for electromagnetic field beables within this model. Yet there is a sense in
which the transverse electromagnetic field configuration ~aT (x, t) can serve the
same functional role as Bell’s particle beables q(t), even if it is a completely
different sort of mathematical object, and associated with bosonic rather than
fermionic degrees of freedom. Consider the process of entanglement between
a spin-1/2 particle and some external degrees of freedom, such as occurs in a
measurement. As in Chapter 2, let the initial state |χ0〉 of AB be a product
state, so that |χ0〉 = |ψ0〉 ⊗ |φ0〉. Also, let {|ai〉} be a (possibly overcomplete)
basis A’s Hilbert space. Then, if |ψ0〉 =
∑
i ci|ai〉, the unitary evolution of the
quantum state takes the following form
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(
∑
i
ci|ai〉)|φ0〉 =⇒
∑
i
ci|θi〉|φi〉 (5.57)
where |θi〉 are abitrary states. Assuming that the environment consists both
of electromagnetic and fermionic degrees of freedom, then as long as the states
|φi〉 are disjoint both with respect to the electromagnetic configuration space
and with respect to the configuration space of the fermionic beables associated
with environmental degrees of freedom, either type of beable will succeed in
selecting a branch of the wave function with probability |ci|2. In this sense, the
electromagnetic field beables may fill the functional role of Bell’s particle beables
in nonrelativistic contexts even though the electromagnetic field in models of
nonrelativistic quantum mechanics is not associated with any set of independent
degrees of freedom.
An alternative Bohmian model of QED that does attach beables to the
fermionic degrees of freedom, such as Colin’s Dirac Sea model, may succeed in
filling not only the functional role of the beables in the Bell model, but in repli-
cating (approximately) the detailed motions of these beables in nonrelativistic
contexts. However, assuming that both Bell’s model and the minimalist QED
model can be regarded as empirically adequate in their domains, and that the
domain of QED encompasses the domain of nonrelativistic quantum mechan-
ics, these facts together suggest that the particle beables of Bell’s model are
expendable in the process of extending to the more encompassing domain of
QED, and that they do not play an indispensable role in the empirical success
of the nonrelativistic Bohmian model. What it suggests instead is that the part
of the model that does the essential predictive work, and which is most strongly
corroborated by the model’s empirical success, is the structure associated with
the quantum state.
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5.3.3 Metaphysical Considerations Regarding the Adequacy
of Minimalist Models
I have outlined, in a schematic way, how the electromagnetic field beables may
serve to fill the functional role of the fermionic particle beables in nonrelativistic
pilot wave models - namely, by selecting one of the decoherence-defined branches
of the total quantum state - and thereby to ensure the empirical adequacy of
the minimalist model in the particular domain that is well-described by the
nonrelativistic models. However, the legitimacy of the minimalist QED model
can be challenged on the basis of at least two distinct metaphysical arguments.
First, as Tim Maudlin would argue, it is not sufficient that the electromagnetic
field beables solely to fulfill the functional role of the particle beables of the
non-relativistic model; even if these beables do succeed in selecting a branch
of the quantum state, electromagnetic field beables, unlike fermionic particle
beables, are simply not the ‘sort of stuff’ out of which it is possible to reconstruct
the world of our experience. Second, and unlike Maudlin (who has written
extensively in defense of pilot wave approaches to quantum theory - though only
ones employing the ‘right sort’ of beable), Everettians like Brown and Wallace
would reject the minimalist model on the grounds that electromagnetic field
beables, like all other beables in all other non-collapse pilot wave models, are
epiphenomenal and therefore superfluous; it simply does not matter how they
behave because the quantum state, they claim, is sufficient to recover the world
of our experience (as well as the experience of inahbitants of other branches of
the quantum state).
Before delving into these metaphysical worries about minimalist models, let
us first consider in further detail Struyve and Westman’s account of how this
model is supposed to reproduce the ordinary quantum predictions. I quote them
directly:
While there are no variables representing matter, the wave functional
which guides the field ~AT (x), still contains the fermionic degrees of
freedom. As such, the field configuration ~AT (x) will in certain cases
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behave as if there was matter present. For example, it might look
like radiation that has been scattered off some matter distribution,
or like thermal radiation emitted by such a distribution. In this way,
it was argued that the model is empirically adequate, because there
will be an image of macroscopic matter distributions in the radiation
field. Nevertheless such a model seem rather far removed from our
everyday experience of the world and probably takes minimalism too
far. [100]
As we can see from this last line, Struyve himself has doubts about the plau-
sibility of the minimalist model as a serious candidate for describing physical
reality - though to read between the lines, it seems that his reasons are rooted
less in doubts about the model’s empirical adequacy than they are in deeper
metaphysical worries that are more intrinsic to the model itself, akin perhaps
to those that Maudlin raises. Nevertheless, the essential idea of Struyve and
Westman’s model is that the electromagnetic field beables behave in a sense as
if there were fermionic matter, thus giving the appearance of such matter even
though no beables need be associated with the fermionic degrees of freedom in
these models. After all, our experience of a projectile moving through the air is
not a direct interaction with the fermionic matter making up the projectile, but
is invariably mediated by the radiation that is scattered off of it and that enters
our retina, or by the electromagnetic forces of repulsion between ourselves and
the projectile, say when we catch it. As far as our experience of the projectile is
concerned, the fermions constituting the projectile play no direct role and are,
at least from a certain point of view, dispensable. There is no need for them
because the electromagnetic degrees of freedom that more directly determine
our experience of the projectile behave as if the fermions were there.
In his paper, ‘Why Bohm’s Theory Solve’s the Measurement Problem,’
Maudlin writes of the nonrelativistic pilot wave theory that ‘the particle posi-
tions are the heart of the theory, they specify the world as we know it. Further,
without the the effective wave function cannot be defined... .’ That is, Maudlin
requires that the beables be such that we may find an image of the world in them.
One benefit of particle beables such as the ones encountered in nonrelativistic
253
pilot wave theories is that it is relatively straightforward to see how one would
find an image of the world in them. The cats that we see are cat-shaped bunches
of particles, tables table-shaped bunches of particles, and the reason that we are
able to see them is that the configurations of the particles in our brains become
correlated through the dynamics to the configurations of these objects (much
as would be the case in a classical mechanical account). As Maudlin writes,
‘If we want to know what happened to the measuring device (e.g. which way
the pointer went), we look at it, thereby correlating positions of particles in our
brains with the pointer position. If getting the state of our brain correlated
with previously unknown external conditions is not getting information about
the world, then nothing is’ [70].
However, as is evident from Struyve’s comments on the minimalist model
above, the manner in which one might hope to find an image of the world in a
minimalist model of Bohmian QED - if indeed the sort of analysis that Struyve
sketches does go through - is far less direct and less transparent. In a separate
article, ‘Descying the World in the Wave Function,’ Maudlin applies a distinction
between what Sellars calls the ‘Manifest Image’ and the ‘Scientific Image’ of
the world to the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Maudlin describes the
distinction as follows:
The Manifest Image is the world in which we first find outselves, a
world of people and actions, characters and habits, tables and chairs.
The Scientific Image, in contrast, is a world of postulated theoretical
entities, atoms and quarks and electromagnetic fields [71].
The distinction, says Maudlin, is illustrated by Eddington’s famous passage
about ‘The Two Tables’:
One of the has been familiar to me from my earliest years. It is a
commonplace object of that environment which I call the world. How
shall I describe it? It has extension; it comparatively permanent; it
is coloured; above all it is substantial...
Table No. 2 is my scientific table. It is a more recent acquain-
tance and I do not feel so familiar with it. It does not belong to
the world previously mentioned - that world which spontaneously
appears around me when I open my eyes ... My scientific table
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is mostly emptiness. Sparsely scattered in that emptiness are nu-
merous electric charges rushing about with great speed; but their
combined bulk amounts to less than a billionth of the bulk of the
table itself ...
I need not tell you that modern physics has by delicate test and
remorseless logic assured me that my second scientific table is the
only one which is really there - wherever ‘there’ may be. [33], ix-xii
Of course, Eddington’s first table belongs to the Manifest Image and the second
to the Scientific Image.
Maudlin is interested in how the Scientific Image offered by each of the
various interpretations of quantum mechanics, and particularly pilot wave in-
terpretations, serves to undergird the Manifest Image that presents itself most
immediately to us. For this to occur, he notes, there must be an isomorophism
between some portion of the Scientific Image and the Manifest Image. As a
supporter of the Bohm theory, he argues that unlike the Everett and GRW
theories, which posit the existence only of the wave function evolving on some
very high-dimensional space, the Bohm theory makes the connection between
the Manifest Image - a world of localised objects existing in three dimensional
space - and the Scientific Image - on Bohm’s theory, a set of localised point
particles guided by a wave function - especially transparent. As he writes,
The justification for Bohm’s choice of beables is simple and pow-
erful. It is relatively easy to discover an isomorphism between the
Manifest Image and a Scientific Image which contains particles with
determinate positions. It is not a hard task to construct a passable
doppelganger for the world revealed by experience using particles
in motion. Cats in the Manifest Image correspond to cat-shaped
collections of particles in the Scientific [71].
In a separate article, his contribution to the Many Worlds conference volume
of Saunders, Barrett, Kent and Wallace, he argues that so-called monist in-
terpretations of quantum mechanics like the Everett and GRW theories, which
assume that the wave function is a complete description of the state of a sys-
tem - i.e. that no additional variables are needed - make the link between the
Manifest and Scientific Images far more opaque than does the Bohm theory.
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The Scientific Image that they posit is one of a complex valued function evolv-
ing on a very high-dimensional space, not in the three-dimensional space that
characterises the Manifest image, so that the three dimensions of our experience
must emerge from the theory in a relatively complicated and indirect way. In
he Bohm theory, which simply posits from the outset the existence of particles
evolving in 3-D space [72], the connection is much clearer.
Turning to the case of pilot wave versions of quantum field theory, he writes
If the acceptance of field theory demands a new choice of beables,
at least we now understand what those beables are for. They must
be used to fashion, within the Scientific Image, a structure which
corresponds to the Manifest Image [71].
Yet while Maudlin regards the simplicity of the link between the Manifest Image
and the Scientific Image as a major advantage of the nonrelativistic Bohm theory
over monist interpretations, he acknowledges that the Manifest Image is not
sacrosanct:
There is no requirement that all, or even most, of the Manifest Image
be vindicated by the Scientific Image: we might conclude on the basis
of our physical theory that some of the most central aspects of our
pre-theoretical picture of the world are false. So the demand for
isomorphism seems to entail rather little [71].
But presumably, the fallibility of the Manifest Image should include the pos-
sibility that, contrary to immediate appearances, the world around us is not
constructed out of fermionic matter, but instead may be built out of something
like the electromagnetic field - assuming that is, that the behavior of this field,
together with the links that the minimalist model implicitly takes to hold be-
tween field beable configurations and the world of appearances, suffice to save
the appearances. Presumably, one such link would entail that there is a charged
particle whenever the field beable takes the configuration of a field emanating
from a moving charge (e.g. something akin to the field associated with a classi-
cal Lienard-Wiechert potential). Clearly, for the minimalist model to succeed,
such correspondences need to fleshed out in more detail. Once this is done, the
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question as to whether the theory is empirically adequate becomes a theoretical
rather than a metaphysical one. And this theoretical question seems at the
moment to be an open one.
While the link between the Scientific Image and the Manifest Image that
would be required on a minimalist model with only EM field beables would be
much less direct than the link presupposed by nonrelativistic particle models,
Maudlin’s analysis seems to suggest that we should not dismiss a theory simply
because it undercuts our Manifest Image of the world. To be sure, a picture in
which everything around us is ultimately constructed out of different configura-
tions of an electromagnetic field does just this; but, as Maudlin himself should
admit, this alone does not consitute sufficient reason for dismissing the theory.
Nevertheless, it is also important to recognise that minimalist models may, if
we like, incorporate fermionic beables as well. These beables, although they will
not possess any independent dynamics of their own - their values and evolution
will depend entirely on the value of the electromagnetic field beables and on the
quantum state - can be expected to behave very much in accord with the way
matter behaves on in the Manifest Image, at least insofar as distributions of
fermionic matter can be expected to be localised in the appropriate sorts of sit-
uations. In such a case, the appropriate isomorphism between the Scientific and
Manifest Images may be simpler and more direct than in the model with only
electromagnetic beables, since this model will, as in the case on non-relativistic
Bohm theory, simply associate cat-like distributions of fermionic matter in the
Scientific Image with the cats of the Manifest Image. The only potentially salient
difference, in this case, with the nonrelativistic particle model is that in this case
the fermionic degrees of freedom do not possess their own dynamics but instead
‘piggyback’ on the dynamics of the electromagnetic field beables. Whether the
lack of any independent dynamics on the part the fermionic beables somehow
ought to disqualify them as a legitimate substrate of the Manifest Image I leave
as a subject for another discussion.
257
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, I have provided templates for the DS reduction of two models
of the nonrelativistic quantum mechanics of a charged spin-1/2 particle - the
nonrelativistic 2-particle Coulomb model and the 1-particle Pauli model - and
discussed the connection between Bell’s nonrelativistic Bohmian model of a
spin-1/2 particle and Struyve and Westman’s minimalist QED model.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion: DS Reduction
and Nagelian Reduction
In Chapter 1, I highlighted a number of parallels between GNS reduction and DS
reduction, and suggested that these parallels were strong enough to justify the
claim that DS reduction simply is GNS reduction applied within the context of
a semantic, dynamical systems view of physical theories. Presently, I argue that
in the narrowed context of physical, dynamical systems reduction, in which the
various concepts of GNS reduction can be given more precise meanings than they
are given in formulations that attempt to encompass reduction across all of the
sciences, many of the usual criticisms of GNS reduction can be straighforwardly
addressed. I consider these criticisms one-by-one, and in order. For the reader’s
convenience, I reproduce the summary of these criticisms here, as quoted from
[30]:
• Problem 1: The syntactic view of theories. Nagel formulated his theory
in the framework of the so-called syntactic view of theories, which regards
the- ories as axiomatic systems formulated in first-order logic whose non-
logical vocabulary is bifurcated into observational and theoretical terms.
This view is deemed untenable for many reasons, one of them being that
first-order logic is too weak to adequately formalise theories and that the
distinction between observational and theoretical terms is unsustainable.
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This, so one often hears, renders Nagelian reduction untenable.
• Problem 2: The content of bridge laws. There is a question about what
kind of statements bridge laws are. Nagel considers three options (1961,
354-355): they can be claims of meaning equivalence, conventional stipula-
tions, or assertions about matters of fact. The third option can be broken
down further, since a statement connecting two quantities could assert the
identity of two properties, the presence of a (merely) de facto correlation
between them, or the existence of a nomic connection. Although the issue
of the content bridge laws is not per se an objection, it is a question that
has often been discussed in ways that gave rise to various objections, in
particular in connection with multiple realisability, to which we turn now.
• Problem 3: Bridge laws and multiple realisability. The issue of multiple
real- isability (MR) is omnipresent in discussions of reduction. A TP -
property is multiply realisable if it corresponds to more than one different
TF -properties. The standard example of a multiply realisable property is
that of pain: Pain can be realised by different physical states, for instance
in a humans and in a dogs brain. The issue also seems to arise in SM
because, as Sklar points out, temperature is multiply realisable. MR is
commonly considered to undermine reduction. ... [One] argument from
MR is that, in order to reduce TP -phenomena to TF -phenomena, TP
-properties must be shown to be nothing over and above TF -properties.
That is, it must be shown that TP -properties do not exist as something
extra or in addition to TF -properties: There is only one group of entities,
TF -properties. Showing this requires the identification of TP - proper-
ties with TF -properties. But a multiply realisable TP -property is not
identifiable with a TF -property. This undercuts reduction.
• Problem 4: The Epistemology of Bridge Laws. How are bridge laws estab-
lished? Nagel points out that this is a difficult issue since we cannot test
bridge laws independently. The kinetic theory of gases can be put to test
only after we have adopted Equation 5 as a bridge law, but then we can
only test the entire package of the kinetic theory and the bridge law, while
it is impossible to subject the bridge law to independent tests. While this
is not a problem if one sees bridge laws as analytical statements or mere
conventions, it is an issue for those who see bridge laws as making factual
claims.
• Problem 5: Strong analogy. Strong analogy is essential to GNS. This raises
three issues. The first is that the notion of strong analogy is too vague and
hard to pin down to do serious work in a reduction. It is a commonplace
that everything is similar to everything else, and hence saying that one
theory is analogous to another one is a vacuous claim. [30]
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6.1 Problem 1: The Syntactic View of Theories
DS reduction is formulated specifically within the semantic view of theories,
and concerns the reduction of models to other models. For this reason, it is not
subject to arguments against the syntactic view of theories. As the authors of
[30] note, although Nagel was a proponent of the syntactic view of theories, there
is no textual evidence to the effect that he saw it as an essential prerequisite for
Nagelian reduction.
Independently of what Nagel or Schaffner may originally have intended,
though, I have explicitly demonstrated in the preceding chapters how the core
elements of Nagelian reduction (as intepreted by the GNS account) apply within
a semantic, dynamical systems view of theories, and have thereby shown that the
syntactic view is not a prerequisite for the application of Nagel and Schaffner’s
insights. Of course, the semantic view adopted here, like the syntactic view, is
subject to its own criticisms, though to address these would be to go beyond
the scope of this thesis (see, for instance, [36] for some of these criticisms).
6.2 Problem 2: The Content of Bridge Laws
In The Structure of Science, Nagel raises the question as to the logical status of
the connecting assumptions employed in his account of reduction:
There appear to be just three possibilities as to the nature of the
linkages postulated by these additional assumptions [i.e., the bridge
rules]: (1) The first is that the links are logical connections between
established meanings of expressions. The assumptions then assert
‘A’ to be logically related (presumably by synonymy or by some form
of one-way analytical entailment) to a theoretical expression ‘B’ in
the primary science. On this alternative, the meaning of ‘A’ as fixed
by the rules or habits of usage of the secondary science must be expli-
cable in terms of the established meanings of theoretical primitives
in the primary discipline. (2) The second possibility is that the link-
ages are conventions, created by deliberate fiat. The assumptions
are then coordinating definitions, which institute a correspondence
between ‘A’ and a certain theoretical primitive, or some construct
formed out of the theoretical primitives, of the primary science. On
this alternative, unlike the preceding one, the meaning of ‘A’ is not
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being explicated or analyzed in terms of the meanings of theoretical
primitives. On the contrary, if ‘A’ is an observation term of the sec-
ondary science, the assumptions in this case assign an experimental
significance to a certain theoretical expression of the primary sci-
ence, consistent with other such assignments that may have been
previously made. (3) The third possibility is that the linkages are
factual or material. The assumptions then are physical hypotheses,
asserting that the occurrence of the state of affairs signified by a
certain theoretical expression ‘B’ in the primary science is a suffi-
cient (or necessary and sufficient) condition for the state of affairs
designated by ‘A.’ It will be evident that in this case independent
evidence must in principle be obtainable for the occurrence of each
of the two states of affairs, so that the expressions designating the
two states must have identifiably different meanings. On this alter-
native, therefore, the meaning of ‘A’ is not related analytically to
the meaning of ‘B.’ Accordingly, the additional assumptions cannot
be certified as true by logical analysis alone, and the hypothesis they
formulate must be supported by empirical evidence.
Nagel is occupied largely with the question of whether bridge rules are analytic
(possibilities (1) and (2)) or synthetic (possibility (3)) in nature, and if they are
analytic, what the precise nature of their analyticity is - that is, whether their
analyticity is more aptly characterized by proposal (1) or proposal (2).
In the context of DS reduction, concepts such as bridge maps, bridge rules,
image and analogue models, and ‘strong analogy’ have precise mathematical def-
initions. The question as to their status as analytic or synthetic claims seems
beside the point, to the extent that it has any meaning in a semantic, dynam-
ical systems context. Unlike most of the core elements of Nagelian reduction,
Nagel’s comments regarding the logical status of bridge laws do seem more ap-
propriate to the syntactic view of theories than they do to the semantic view.
In the semantic view, a model as a whole represents some domain of reality; it
is difficult to see how one might isolate individual propositions within the model
and identify them as analytically or synthetically true claims. Of course, the
claim that it is difficult to see how to apply the analytic/synthetic distinction
within a semnatic, dynamical systems framework doesn’t mean it can’t be done.
For this reason, I present what I believe is the most natural attempt to carry
over Nagel’s inquiry as to the logical status of laws into the context of DS reduc-
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tion, although, insofar as Nagel’s three possibilities can be given any reasonable
construal in a dynamical systems framework, I reach a different conclusion from
Nagel on this matter. Specifically, Nagel concludes that the bridging assump-
tions cannot be logical connections and that they must be either conventions
or empirical claims. That is, he denies (1) as a possibility and claims that a
mixture of (2) and (3) serve to characteise the nature of the bridging assump-
tions in a reduction. On the other hand, I claim that within the context of DS
reduction, it is (3) that can be ruled out, and that there are senses in which
both (1) and (2) serve to characterise the nature of the bridging assumptions.
6.2.1 Do Bridge Maps Reflect Synthetic Claims?
I begin by addressing Nagel’s third possibility, that the bridging assumptions
have the status of physical hypotheses - that is, that they are synthetic propo-
sitions. Given a high-level model (Sh, Dh) and a low-level model (Sl, Dl), the
question as to which bridge maps, if any, satisfy the conditions for DS reduction,
and in which domains of Sl and over what timescales and to what margins of
approximation, is a question purely of mathematics. It is not a question re-
quiring empirical investigation for its resolution. Given a high- and a low- level
model that describe the same system, I do not need to perform any experiments
to determine whether any bridge maps, and if so which ones, exist that sat-
isfy the conditions of DS reduction; in principle, this can be decide purely by
theoretical means, with a pen and paper. The specification of the two models,
along with the stipulation that they describe the same physical system, very
severely constrain what the bridge map can be, since they specify the dynam-
ical maps and the symmetries with which the bridge map (which, recall, must
be time-independent) must be compatible. Once we have specified the high-
and low- level models and stipulated that they describe the same system, It
is simply not the case that prior to further empirical investigation the bridge
map could conceivably be anything and that it is up to us to find out through
experiment what it is. The constraints of DS reduction very severely limit the
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set of possibilities, even if they do not single out a unique one.
To elaborate, bridge maps Bhl are functions from Sl to Sh, and given the
dynamical maps Dl and Dh of the high- and low- level models, as well as
a particular approximation margin δ and a reduction timescale τ , it is pos-
sible to decide entirely by mathematical means whether the DSR condition,∣∣∣∣Bhl (Dl(xl0))−Dh(Bhl (xl0))∣∣∣∣
h
< δ for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ , as well as the condition 2) en-
suring compatibility with the dynamical symmetries of the models, is satisfied
for a particular choice of B, without ever performing a single experiment. The
only assumptions of an empirical nature that enter into the analysis are that
the high- and low- level models both approximately describe the same phenom-
ena. But this empirical assumption is one concerning the relationship between
the models and the physical world, not concerning the relationship between the
models, as bridge maps and bridge rules do. Once the models are specified
and stipulated to describe the same system, the question of what bridge maps
may exist that connect the two within the constraints of the DSR condition is,
again, solely a mathematical one. For this reason, we should discard Nagel’s
third possibility, namely that the linkages posited by the bridging assumptions
are physical hypotheses, at least within the context of physical reductions that
fit within the framework of DS reduction.
To this line of argument, one might object that bridge maps nevertheless
reflect synthetic claims with empirical content because the assertion that the
state xl of Ml subvenes or instantiates the state x
′h = B(xl) of Mh is one
with empirical content that goes beyond that of Ml and Mh alone. But to say
that such a claim of instantiation has independent empirical content is to say
that it asserts a contingent link between properties, or more appropriately in
the context of DS reduction, a contingent link between the states, posited by
the two theories - a link that, logically speaking, need not have been so. This,
in turn, entails that given the empirical assumptions that the high- and low-
level models both describe some system, nature, so to speak, still has complete
discretion in deciding what the linkages between the states of the models should
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be, so that these linkages reflect empirical facts that are logically independent
of the empirical claims that the high- and low- level models describe the same
system. But of course this is not the case, because the allowable linkages are
tighly constrained by the DSR conditions, and therefore not independent of the
empirical claims that the high- and low- level model describe a given system
(since the allowable linkages depend strongly on what the models are).
The only recourse, it seems, for those who wish to retain the notion that
bridge maps possess empirical content over and above the empirical claims that
the high- and low- level models describe a particular system, is the potential non-
uniqueness of the bridge map that satisfies the DSR conditions. Perhaps, in this
case, there is still a range of possibilities compatible with the DSR constraints
for nature to choose from, so that while many linkages are possible that satisfy
the constraints, as a matter of empirical fact only one reflects the correct linkage
between the states of the high- and low- level models.
There are a number of responses one can give to this line of thinking. The
first is to ask, in cases where a bridge map is already known to satisfy the DSR
conditions to within a certain margin of error and within a particular timescale
and on a particular domain of states, for a concrete example of an alternative
bridge map that satisfies these conditions to within the same margins before
one begins to seriously worry about non-uniqueness of the bridge map. The
question of a bridge map’s uniqueness given these constraints is one that cannot
be addressed in general but must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, unless one
constructs a general recipe for constructing alternative bridge maps that satisfy
the DSR conditions to with the given specifications. Pending such a general
recipe, or proposals of alternative bridge maps in specific cases, one can simply
choose to be relaxed about the possible non-uniqueness of bridge maps, and to
worry about it when it has more concretely been shown to be an issue and not
merely a hypothetical possibility. Ideally, though, a proof of uniqueness of the
bridge map in all cases would be the best and most conclusive way to confront
to the line of thinking expounded in the previous paragraph.
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If a general recipe for constructing alternative bridge maps does exist, then
this may suggest further conditions that need to be added to those already
imposed by the framework of DS reduction.
On the other hand, one also might respond to the worry about the non-
uniqueness of the bridge map by questioning whether it is in fact a problem
to begin with. Any bridge map identifies some mathematical structure that
can be defined within the low-level model; if more than one structure exists
that satisfies the necessary conditions to within the specified margins, then
it is simply inappropriate to question which is the ‘real’ structure and which
are those that nature chose not to make use of. For, given that the low-level
model applies, all of these structures are defined within the low-level model
and therefore exist within the model and are in some sense equally ‘real;’ they
simply represent different functions of the low-level state. Of course, in such a
case there still remains the question of which among these various structures
corresponds to the physical system in question. In such a case (again, if any such
cases exist) there may be genuine underdetermination as to which of the various
structures in the low-level theory represents the physical system in question. In
such a case, it will indeed turn out to be a matter of fact, independent of the
claims that the high- and low- level theories apply, as to which of the many
alternative low-level structures (all satisfying the DSR conditions to within the
same specifications) represents the system in quesiton.
Having listed these possible responses to the non-uniqueness worry, I choose
here to adopt a relaxed attitude to this possibility until a concrete example of
non-uniqueness or a general recipe for constructing alternative bridge maps has
been put forward.
Finally, as a caveat, it should be noted here that if B is a bridge map satisying
the DSR conditions, and Tl is a symmetry of the low-level dynamics, then B ◦Tl
is also a bridge map satisfying these conditions. Likewise, if Th is a high-level
symmetry, then Th ◦ B will also be bridge map satisfying the DSR conditions.
Thus, uniqueness here should be understood as uniqueness up to symmetries of
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the high and low-level models.
6.2.2 The Analytic Nature of Bridge Maps and Bridge
Rules
If they are not characterised by Nagel’s third possibility, might the bridge maps
and bridge rules of DS reduction be characterised by one of his first two possi-
bilities? Insofar as bridge maps are required to satisfy the DSR condition with
respect to the dynamical maps of the two models, as indeed any bridge map in
a DS reduction would, they reflect the non-empirical fact of a certain correspon-
dence, defined by the DSR condition, between the mathematical structures of
the high and low level models. It would be incorrect to describe the claim of the
existence of such a map as a definition or a convention, as per Nagel’s second
possibility, because the claim that between two models there exists such a map
is a mathematical fact, not a reflection of some arbitrary choices on our part.
However, there is a sense in which not bridge maps but bridge rules, as
defined in Chapter 1, are simply coordinating definitions or conventions as per
Nagel’s second possibility, in that bridge rules simply assign a label familiar
to the mathematical language of the high level model to a term of the same
mathematical form constructed from the mathematical ingredients of the low
level model. That is, they coordinate some element of the high level model with
some construction within the low level model that is constrained to be same
kind of mathematical object (e.g., a vector in a particular Hilbert space, or point
on a 6n-dimensional symplectic manifold, etc.). Beyond the constraint that it
represent a variable of the same mathematical form, the choice of what label to
assign the image under the bridge map is, of course, a matter of arbitrary choice;
so bridge rules (again, as differentiated from bridge maps) are conventional in
the trivial sense that we may assign whatever letter or name we like to the
relevant quantity without altering its significance.
What about Nagel’s first possibility, on which ‘the meaning of “A” as fixed
by the rules or habits of usage of the secondary science [in a DS context, the high
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level model] must be explicable in terms of the established meanings of theoret-
ical primitives in the primary discipline [in a DS context, the low level model]’
[75]? There is an approximate sense in which bridge maps and bridge rules, as
understood in the context of DS reduction, fit this description. In DS reduction,
the laws of the low-level model (i.e., the dynamical map of the low level model,
along possibly with other constraints on the state evolution), combined with
an appropriate domain restriction within the low-level state space, logically en-
tail that the quantity defined by the bridge map satisfies the laws of the image
model, which reflect in an approximate sense the behavior characteristic of the
high-level model. Insofar as the meaning of a term in the high level model is
established by the mathematical behavior that it exhibits within that model,
and insofar as the meaning of a term constructed within the low-level model
is established by its behavior in the low-level model, the meaning of the term
construed according to the bridge map in the low-level theory entails, within
a restricted domain of the low-level theory, that it exhibits approximately the
same behaviour, and in this sense holds approximately the same meaning, as the
corresponding term in the high-level theory. The bridge rule and strong analogy
relations that together connect a term in the high-level model to a corresponding
image term in the low-level model in this sense reflect a logical entailment from
the meaning of a term in the low-level theory to the (approximate) meaning of
the corresponding term in the high-level theory.
6.3 Problem 3: Bridge Laws and Multiple Re-
alisability
One major criticism of Nagelian reduction states that because multiple realis-
ability entails that certain high-level properties cannot be identified with low-
level properties, and because the bridge laws of Nagelian reduction - or so the
line of argument goes - must be statements of identity between high and low
level properties, the Nagelian account fails. While Nagel himself did not re-
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quire bridge laws to be identities in his original account of reduction, a number
of authors have argued that these laws must be identities because reductions
require inclusion of the domain of one theory into that of another, and such
inclusion requires the identification of properties in the high-level theory with
those in the low-level theory (see, for instance, [24], Ch. 4). As Sklar has ar-
gued in [95], bridge laws must be identities in order to distinguish reductions
from mere correlations between different sets of laws; he cites the example of
the Wiedemann-Franz law, which expresses a correlation between thermal and
electrical conductivity in a metal, and, in particular, permits the derivation of
certain laws of electrical conductivity from certain laws of thermal conductiv-
ity. Yet we would not wish to say that the laws of electrical conductivity have
thereby been reduced to those of thermal conductivity, even though one may
be deduced from them. The reason is that the nature of the correlations estab-
lished by the Wiedemann-Franz law are not identities but ‘mere’ correlations;
the domain of the theory of electrical theory has not been subsumed into that
of the theory of thermal conductivity as it ought to be in a reduction.
If reduction rests on bridge laws that are identities, and multiple realisation
of some high-level properties by some low-level ones is incompatible precludes
identification of each high-level property with some unique low-level property,
then - or so the antireductionist argument from multiple realisability goes -
multiple realisability precludes reduction. A number of lines of response to this
antireductionist argument have been developed in the literature. While there is
not space here to discuss them all in detail, I will briefly describe a few. The first
denies, contra Causey and Sklar, that bridge rules need to be identities in order
to effect genuine reductions, but argues instead that they need only be one-
way conditionals (see [84] and [11]). The second upholds the requirement that
bridge laws be identities, but instead argues that a given high-level property
realised by various low-level properties should in fact be divided into several
distinct high-level properties, each of which can be identified with a particular
low-level property; for example, the property of pain, rather than being multiply
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realised in humans, dogs and Martians, in fact should be conceived of as three
distinct properties: pain-in-humans, pain-in-dogs, pain-in-Martians. The third
line of argument is to regard the disjunction of all low-level properties that
realise a particular high-level property as a property in itself, and to identify
this disjunction with the high-level property (again, this approach upholds the
requirement that bridge laws be identities).
In the context of DS reduction, where we deal with the reduction of models
rather than of laws or theories, it is indeed the case that we expect the domain
of a high-level model to be subsumed into that of a low-level model, for a given
set of applications of that high-level model. For a different set of applications
of the same high-level model, it is entirely possible that an altogether different
low-level model from the first will be required to effect a reduction. For example,
a particlar classical model of the simple harmonic oscillator might reduce to one
quantum model in applications where the physical system in question is a bob
on a spring; on the other hand, the very same classical model may be reduced
to an altogether different quantum model in the case where the physical system
being described is a charge moving along an axis bored through a uniformly
charged sphere (which will also produce a linear restoring force on the charge).
Certainly, the quantum mechanical models underlying these two applications
of the classical simple harmonic oscillator model will be very different - for
example, as regards the origin of the restoring force, since in the case of the
spring the restoring force is compounded from the individual forces between the
atoms inside the spring, and in the case of the electric charge it is simply the
result of a classical background electrostatic field. We should not expect that
the domain of the high-level model, without further specification as to the class
of applications, will be subsumed into the domain of any single low-level model,
for it may be the case that different low-level models are needed to reduce
the high-level model in the context of different applications of the high-level
model. In this sense, a uniform, systematic reduction of the high-level model
will not be possible, and the reduction must proceed on a more piecemeal basis
270
(though it will often be possible to retain significantly more generality than
to proceed with the reductions on a system-by-system basis; rather, classes of
systems can be treated all at once; for example, all low-level systems that can be
modeled with the same form, but different parameter values, for their quantum
Hamiltonian might constitute one class of models to which a particular class of
classical high-level models reduces). Given that a particular high-level model
may have a number of distinct low-level models to which it reduces depending
on the particular application in question, it would be inappropriate to require
that the relation between the components of the high-level model and those of
the various low-level models to which it reduces (in the DS sense) be one of
identity.
Yet even specialising to a particular class of applications of a high-level
model, and requiring its domain relative to this range of applications to be
subsumed within that of some low-level model, there are reasons to doubt that
the bridge maps of DS reduction should be required to be identifies, even though
the terms linked by the bridge map will both refer to the same physical state of
affairs. The term ‘identity’ in the mathematical context of DS reduction suggests
that the bridge maps should be required to be one-to-one; certainly, this is not
the case with any of the bridge maps we have seen in any of the examples
considered, as there are often numerous states in the low-level theory that will
emulate the behavior of a given high-level state given some timescale and margin
of error. The best we can do - within the level of precision characterising the
high-level model’s success - is to say that the high-level state used to describe a
particular system is instantiated or realised by some particular one or other of
the many numerous low-level states that emulate its behavior under the bridge
map. But the correspondence certainly is not one-to-one, and for this reason
also it would be a mistake to require that bridge maps be identities.
In short, we have seen that DS reduction serves to describe a wide range of
inter-theory (or rather inter-model) relations in physics, but that its ability to do
so rests on an understanding of bridge maps that permits them to be many-one
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rather than one-one. If we were to require that bridge maps of DS reduction be
one-one, the account would likely no longer successfully characterise the inter-
theory relations discussed here. We can either choose to abandon the condition
of identity on bridge maps, and incorporate many intertheory relations into
our account of reduction; or we could continue to insist that ‘reduction’ requires
identity and simply call the relationship that does hold among these models, and
characterised by the conditions set out in the first chapter, something other than
reduction. I have opted for the first option here, given that DS reduction does
exhibit many of the other characteristics typically associated with the reduction
relation.
But if the links entailed by bridge maps are not required to be identities,
how do we avoid Sklar’s concern that they simply reflect correlations? Instead of
interpreting these links as identities, we should understand them links as claims
of co-reference: that is, within a given physical context, for instance, both the
classical phase space point (X,P ) and a state |ψ〉 such that 〈ψ|Xˆ|ψ〉, 〈ψ|Pˆ |ψ〉
refer to the same condition of the physical system in question; however, because
the low-level model describes this system in greater detail and with greater
accuracy, it is possible that multiple states |ψ〉 are compatible with the condition
(or rather set of possible conditions) represented by (X,P ).
Since the anti-reductionist’s multiple realisability argument loses traction
once the links between high- and low-level descriptions are no longer required to
be identities, the fact of multuple realisability simply occurs as a characteristic
of DS reduction, rather than a reason to doubt its applicability. I will now
survey the different possible senses in which multiple realisability can occur in
DS reduciton.
In the context of DS reduction, multiple realisability can be attributed to a
variety of potential characteristics of the reduction relation between two models.
First, it can be attributed to the possibility of there being more than one low-
level model to which a given high-level model reduces. For example, the classical
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model of the simple harmonic oscillator is multiply instantiated, even within
classical theory, as a bob on a spring or as a charge moving through the hollowed-
out axis of a uniformly charged sphere. Certainly, then, the quantum mechanical
models underlying these two instantiations of the simple harmonic oscillator
model will be very different - for example, as regards the origin of the restoring
force, since in the case of the spring the restoring force is compounded from
the individual forces between the atoms inside the spring, and in the case of
the electric charge it is simply the result of a classical background electrostatic
field.
Multiple realisability also can be associated with the existence of more than
one bridge map between a single high level and a single low level model, and with
the distinct domains of approximate Mh-behavior in the low-level state space
that are associated with these distinct bridge maps. For example, a classical
model of two planets orbiting each other can be instantiated in two different
ways by a classical model of two pairs of oribting planets in which the pairs
are widely separated in space so as not to affect each other; one bridge map
will associate the pair of planets in the first model with one pair in the second
model, while a different bridge map will associate the pair of planets in the first
model with the other pair in the second model.
Finally, multiple realisability could be associated with the fact that the
bridge map is typically many-one, even when restricted to the domain of states
that exhibit approximate Mh behavior under the bridge map. For example, in
the reduction of the single-particle model of classical mechanics to the single-
particle model of quantum mechanics discussed in the first chapter, there may
be a range of narrow wave packets, with varying widths and slightly varying
shapes, all of which instantiate the same classical phase space point, and the
same classical dynamics, when expectation values are taken.
Still, while acknowledging that DS reduction incorporates these various forms
of mutliple realisation, one could object that precisely for this reason it should
not be considered as a form of reduction at all, for reduction ought to require
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that the corresponding elements of the high and low-level models be identified.
To some extent, this objection is simply one of what a legitimate application of
the term ‘reduction’ is, and of whether one must include identifications as a nec-
essary component of its proper usage. What I hope I’ve demonstrated at least
somewhat convincingly in the preceding chapters is that the DS account suc-
ceeds in characterising a number of inter-theory relations in physics, irrespective
of whether these particular inter-theory relations conform to some previously
conceived notion of reduction. Moreover, as I have argued in Chapter 1, the
DS account characterises these inter-theory relations in a manner that conforms
with at least some uses of the term reduction that are flexible enough to ac-
commodate multiple realisation - in particular, the usage of the term associated
with the GNS account.
6.4 Problem 4: The Epistemology of Bridge Laws
How are bridge laws estabished on the GNS account? As argued above, they
are not established empirically, but mathematically. Given a model of a high-
level theory and a model of a low-level theory, both of which describe the same
physical system, it is a purely mathematical fact whether there exist bridge
laws and corresponding domains within the low-level state space such that the
DSR condition is satisfied. If one considers a particular function from the low-
level state space to the high-level state space, and the fixed dynamical maps of
the high- and low- level models, as well as a particular approximation margin
and a reduction timescale, it is possible to decide entirely by mathematical
means whether the DSR condition is satisfied, without ever performing a single
experiment.
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6.5 Problem 5: Strong Analogy
The relation of ‘strong analogy’ between an image and analogue theory is sup-
posed to signify some approximate agreement between the two, at least on the
GNS model 1. Yet what this approximate agreement consists in is left open on
the GNS account. Given the more specialised context of DS reduction, we can
make the sense of ‘approximate agreement’ and therefore of ‘strong analogy,’
exact. Specifically, as we have seen, on the DS approach the condition of strong
analogy between a high- and a low- level model requires that
∣∣x′h(t)− xh(t)∣∣ < δ ∀ 0 ≤ t ≤ τ, (6.1)
where τ again is the reduction timescale and δ some margin of error.
Immediately we can see that this notion is much more precise than the simple
requirement of approximate agreement between theories. The only potential
ambiguities, it seems, with this notion of ‘strong analogy’ concern the choice of
norm on the high level state space, and the arbitrariness in the choices of margin
of error. Although from a mathematical point of view it is usually possible to
define any number of norms on the high level state space, in practice there is
usually one that presents itself as the natural norm to use on the space; indeed,
the DSR condition in all cases that we have considered is satisfied with respect
to the most obvious norm on the high-level space. One may ask what uniquely
qualifies these norms as the ‘natural’ ones to use, or whether there is likely to be
a uniquely obvious norm to use in every case of dynamical systems reduction.
I will not attempt to address these concerns here, except to note that in the
particular examples that I have considered, it was possible to demonstrate DS
reduction according to the most obvious choice of norm on the high level space in
1It is possible that this construal of the concept of ‘strong analogy’ is more narrow than
Nagel or Schaffner intended; here I follow the usage of this term employed in [30], which takes it
simply to signify approximate agreement between the analogue and high-level theories; on the
DS approach, approximate agreement between analogue and high-level models is, as discussed
in Chapter 1, determined according to the norm on the high-level state space. Insofar as any
ambiguities in the meaning of ‘strong analogy’ are resolved by the DS approach, I only argue
that this is the case with respect to the construal of this term adopted [30].
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question, and that there was never any cause to consider other possible norms.
As regards the potential concern about the arbitrariness in the margin of
error characterising the approximation, this is no more serious a concern than
it is in the most straightforward cases of approximation: for which values of
x does the first-order Taylor expansion, 1 + x, of f(x) = ex count as a good
approximation to this function? Clearly, there is no unique answer, for the
answer depends on how close an agreement one desires between the value of
the first-order expansion and the value of the function for the approximation
to be ‘good’; narrower agreement will require more stringent restrictions on
x. Likewise, in the context of the DSR condition, narrower restrictions on the
margin of error in the approximation typically will reduce the timescale over
which the approximation can be expected to hold, while allowing for larger
margins of error usually will increase this timescale.
6.6 Summary
In the preceding chapters, I have exibited what I believe to be the correct
methodology for the reduction of physical theories by building upon an insight
that has received too little attention in the literature on reduction - namely, the
DSR condition. I also claim that beyond its methdological virtues, DS reduc-
tion provides the correct account of the relationship between different models
of physical theories that describe the same phenomena. Unlike much of the
philosophical literature on the subject of reduction, my analysis has not en-
deavoured to include the whole of science or the whole of reduction, but rather
has specialised to particular set of reductions within physics. However, I hope
that the reader is convinced that what we pay for with this loss of generality
in our analysis is a significant gain in the precision with which we may discuss
various notions relating to the reduction of physical theories. By specialising
in this manner, a number of important insights about reduction from the gen-
eral philosophy of science literature can be given more exact formulations. In
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particular, I showed that many of the insights of Nagelian reduction, construed
according to the GNS account - can be carried over into the semantic framework
of dynamical systems reduction and much of the ambgiuity surrounding them
eliminated in the process.
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